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East, during the post-War period of 1946-1958, was to safeguard the 
area against Soviet intrusions. This thesis attempts to examine 
the causes for the failure of the United States to achieve this 
objective. It concludes that this failure is the result of an alienation 
of the major national forces in the Middle East. The United States 
alienated the Arab world by openly and unreservedly supportin~ Zionist 
aims in Palestine. She alienated newly independent states by establish­
tng close cooperation with Britain and France, their former colonial 
masters. She alienated revolutionary nationalists by supporting 
reactionary and traditional rulers against them and by opposing their 
ideals of neutrality and revolutionary change. In doing so, the 
United States opened the way for the Soviet Union to challenge her 
position and threaten her interests in the area. By emphasizing the 
military aspects of contai~~ent, 8he demonstrated a lack of under­
standing of the nature of the Soviet threat. The revolutionary 
nationalists sought to obtain military, economic, and technical aid 
without conditions or political strings. By insisting on imposing 
her conditions of alliance against communism and securing concessions 
and guarantees, including the safety and security of Israel, the United 
States made it impossible for the nationalist forces to cooperate with 
her. They, therefore, were forced to deal with the Soviet Union, 
whose aid was offered with no condi.tions or strings attached. The 
American response to isolate and weaken those states which accepted 
Soviet aid, through such means as the Eisenhower Doctrine, brought on 
a most serious deterioration in relations never before encountered by 
the United States and the most spectacular successes ever realized 
by the Soviet Union in the Middle East. 
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FOREWORD 
The tenn "Middle East" is an elastic one. It is meant here to 
cover an area that includes Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, 
Israel, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, and the 
smaller states of the Arabian Peninsula. 
In this study, Arabic names have been rendered in fonns most 
commonly used by scholars in this field, except where difficulty was 
encountered in deciding what the common fonn was; there the Library 
of Congress transliteration rules were applied. 
The bibliography at the end of this study does not include all 
sources consulted. Only those publications actually cited are listed. 
Translations from Arabic sources are my own. The responsibility is 
mine for any imperfections or mistranslations the reader might detect. 
I am grateful to Dr. Frederick J. Cox for his critical reading 
of my manuscript. Needless to say, responsibility for its remaining 
shortcomings is mine alone. I am also indebted to the History 
Department and the Middle East Studies Center of Portland State 
University for making it possible for me to pursue this piece of 
research work. The fonner awarded me a Graduate Assistantship for the 
school year 1971-1972, and the latter paid for photocopies of journal 
articles obtained through the Portland State University Library 
!lInter-library Loan!l service. My thanks go to Ms. Lee Cummins for 
typing this thesis and to Ms. Karen Waters for her assistance and 
help. 
INTRODUCTION 
In his Farewell Address to Congress on September 17, 1796, 
outgoing President ,George Washington gave the following advice: 
The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign 
nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have 
with them as little political connections as possible •••• 
Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have 
none or very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged 
in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essen­
tially foreign to our concerns •••• Our detached and 
distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a 
different course •••• Why forego the advantage of so 
peculiar a situation? Why, by interweaving our destiny 
with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and 
prosperity in the toils of European ambitions, rivalships, 
interests, humor, or caprice?l 
Washington's policy of detachment (i.e. non-entanglement, non-involve­
ment, or isolationism) set the tone of American foreign policy for 
years to come. 
The traditional policy of non-involvement served the United 
States well in her developmental era. The founding fathers adopted 
it because it was politically advantageous. Being young and weak, 
the United States saw the wisdom of minding her own business and 
:!voiding entanglement in the problems and quarrels of other nations. 
The policy was formulated for the sole purpose of serving the national 
interests of the United States. Adherence to it, therefore, was 
applicable only insofar as it served those interests. In other words, 
1Uenry S. Commager, ed., Documents of American History (New 
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), p. 174. 
2 
intervention was permitted when the safety and security of the United 
States demanded it. 
The United States did actu~lly inte~ene When intervention was 
considered to be the most effective means of protecting the national 
interests. The interventions to achieve territorial expansion, to 
curb hostile neighbors,l and to subdue the priates of Barbary, were 
manifestations of such an interpretation of the traditional policy. 
The Barbary pirates presented a serious threat to American merchant 
vessels. Beginning in the early 1780's, the United States tried, 
through the payment of ransom for captured sailors and ships and 
through treaties, to guarantee the safety of her merchant fleet. But 
When, after nearly two decades, such arrangements proved ineffective, 
the United States began a series of naval attacks in 1800 against 
uncooperative Barbary states, culminating in a great show of force 
in 1804 as most of the United States Navy assembled in the Mediterra­
nean to put an end to piracy, to curb the Barbary rulers, and to open 
the way to the eastern Mediterranean region. 2 
Nevertheless, the policy of non-intervention was stated in such 
a way as to make it appear as though intervention would never be 
IThe interventions in Florida, Texas, and California are good 
examples; see Thomas A. Bailey, ~ Diplomatic History of the American 
Peop1£ (New York: F. S. Crofts &Co., 1946), pp. 161-77, 247-61, 
264-75; Samuel F. Bemis, ! Diplomatic History of the United States 
(New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967), pp. 186-95, 219-31, 
235-37. 
2James A. Field, Jr., America and the Mediterranean World, 1776­
1882 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 29-42, 
51-53; Harold snd Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, 
1776-1918 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni;ersity Press, 1967), pp. 17, 
25-49, 55-57. 
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employed, no matter what the provocation. The absolute terms of the 
policy were meant to blunt public pressure and prevent it from 
attempting to push the United States government into a confli~~ with 
a foreign power when it was deemed unnecessary or not in the best 
interest of the United States. Had its terms been conditional, the 
conditions would have allowed for all kinds of interpretations. l 
Thus, despite American public pressure to force the United States 
government to aid the Greeks in the 1820's, the Bulgarians in the 
1870's, and the Armenians in the 1890's against the Ottoman Turks, 
the United States government kept out of those conflicts. 
As the United States grew stronger, the traditional policy was 
occasionally reconsidered and modified. In his inaugural address in 
1857, President James Buchanan said, "iThe United State~7 ought to 
cherish a sacred regard for the independence of all nations, and 
never interfere in the domestic concerns of any unless this shall 
be imperatively required by the great law of self-preservation.,,2 
The requirements of "the great law of self-preservation" opened the 
way for a wider latitude in interpretation. On the basis of such a 
rendition of the traditional policy, President Ulysses Grant embraced 
lDoris A. Graber, "The Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines in the 
Light of the Doctrine of Non-intervention,1I Political Science Quarterly, 
LXX (September, 1958), 324-26. 
2James Daniel Richardson, compo, ! Coompilation of the Messages 
and Papers of the PreSidents, 1789-1897 (10 vols.; Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1902), IV, 2966. 
4 
the idea of annexing Santo Domingo to turn it into a naval base. This 
project drew strong protests from his opponents in the Congress. A 
prvposa1 to annex Santo Domingo was defeated by the Congress in 1870.1 
Following the Spanish-American War, the category of objectives 
for which intervention was deemed permissible was further broadened 
to include, among other things, the economic interests of American 
citizens in foreign countries. It also became no longer imperative 
to ascertain the necessity for intervention in each case. The danger 
did not need to be innnediate; potential danger was sufficient to 
justify intervention. The door became wide open for much more 
liberal interpretations of the traditional policy. Such liberal 
interpretations led to the inevitable misuse of the policy to inter­
fere in the affairs of other nations at times when a threat to American 
interests was seen as a future possibility. President Woodrow Wilson 
came to correct such misuse of the po1icy.2 In the words of Doris 
Graber, member of the Center for the Study of American Foreign and 
Military Policy at the University of Chicago, 
He dec1atmed against a policy of unbridled and unprincipled 
power and deplored advancing American welfare wantonly at the 
expense of other nations. He returned to a concept of a 
sever1y limited right of intervention in which the definition 
of "vital" interests which might be defended by intervention 
was even narrower than in the days of the founding fathers •••• 
Wilson resorted to intervention only when, in his opinion, the 
military security of the United States made a less drastic 
course impossible.3 
IBai1ey, Diplomatic History of the American People, pp. 414-15; 
Bemis, Diplomatic History of ~ United States, pp. 403-404. 
ZGraber, "The Truman and Eisenhoto1er Doctrines, n pp. 326-28. 
3~., p. 328. 
5 
But it was none other than President Wilson who led the United 
States into her first major intervention by actively participating 
in the first global war. Since 1815, an agreement with Britain enabled 
the United States to enjoy protection of her trade on the high seas. 
Britain's renunciation of territorial ambitions in the Americas and 
the balance of power in Europe guaranteed U.S. supremacy in the 
western hemisphere and her own security. However, toward the end of 
the nineteenth century, the power balance in Europe was disturbed 
by the rise of Germany and by the threat of realizing her ambitions 
in Europe. "No one in America had anticipated this," observed Walter 
Lippmann, "and few were prepared to understand this. The nation had 
always faced towards the west. Now it had to turn around and to 
recognize that there was a great threat from the rear where all had 
so long been secure."l 
It was not easy tv change the traditional attitude. It was as 
difficult for Americans to comprehend the role played by external 
forces in affecting the safety and security of the United States. 
"They had become so accustomed to their security," says George Kennan, 
that they had forgotten that it had any foundations at all 
outside our continent. They mistook our sheltered position 
behind the British fleet and British continental diplomacy 
for the results of a superior American wisdom and virtue in 
refraining from interfering in sordid differences of the old 
world. And they were oblivious to the first portents of the 
lWalter Lippmann, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the 
United States (London: Allen & Unwin, 1952), p. 23. 
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changes that were destined to shatter that pattern of security 
in the course of the ensuing half-century.l 
The United States entered World War I primarily to prevent 
Germany from becoming sole master in Europe. The justification for 
intervention given by President Wilson was based on legal and moral 
arguments. He did not make it sufficiently clear that it was in the 
national interest of the United States to enter the War. Americans 
were, therefore, confused. According to Walter Lippmann, 
Because • • • American interest was not candidly made explicit, 
the nation never understood clearly why it had entered the war 
• • • the country was • • • open to every suggestion and insinu­
ation that the nation had fought for no good reason at all, that 
it had been maneuvered into a non-American war by the interna­
tional bankers and the British diplomats. And so, having failed 
to make plain that the war was waged for a vital American interest, 
President Wilson had no way of proving to the nation that his 
settlement of the war really concerned the United States. 2 
Consequently, the idea of collective security was discarded, 
the League of Nations W2.S abandoned, and internationalism was sub­
ordinated to traditional isolationism until World War II. Besides, 
the need for the United States to intervene after World War I declined 
because enemies and rivals were exhausted by the war and reduced to 
temporary impotence. The reversion to isolationism did not last for 
long, however. The rise of Hitlerism in the mid 1930's and similar 
aggressive authoritarian states in Europe and Asia disturbed the 
lGeorge F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 5. 
2walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic 
(Boston: Littl~Brown and Company, 1943), pp. 37-38. 
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the temporary peace. President Franklin D. Roosevelt considered the ; 
domination of Europe and Asia by two expansionist and totalitarian 
regimes a serious enough threat to America's territorial integrity 
and national independence to justify intervention against Germany 
and Japan. The United States first extended military and financial 
aid to those nations resisting the Axis powers, but eventually became 
an active belligerent in the war against them. 
American participation in World War II campaigns in the Middle 
East helped establish direct contact between American and Middle 
Eastern officials. The reputation of the United States as a supporter 
of popular independence movements created a congenial and favorable 
atmosphere for her to further her interests and establish meaningful 
friendships with the area's peoples. 
In fact, America's relations with the Middle East go back much 
further. American commercial contacts with the area began in the 
late eighteenth century. Barbary piracy and European resistance, 
however, discouraged the growth of U.S.-Mideast trade. American rum, 
grain and fish were in great demand in the Levant. Smyrna raisins 
were shipped to the United States as early as 1785. Turkish figs and 
opium were also traded. Opium was the principal commodity and 
essential to America's China trade. American skills and naval archi­
tecture excited the rulers of Barbary and aroused the interest of 
the Ottomans. America's non-involvement in European feuds made her 
merchant fleet a useful neutral carrier. Her remoteness and her 
policy of non-entanglement made her all the more desirable as a friend. 
Her forceful intervention in Barbary came as a last resort. Once the 
8 

Barbary rulers were curbed, the way to the Levant was open. As a 
result, American commerce penetrated the region and expanded 
vigorously. 1 
The eastern Mediterranean region, however, had, toward the end 
of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, 
become subject to international rivalries and interferences. Russia's 
appearance in the region in the eighteenth century was followed by the 
Napoleonic expedition into Egypt and southern Syria. Mohammed Ali 
rose against the Ottoman Sultan and established his own state in 
Egypt. The Greeks revolted against the Ottomans. Russia's interest 
in the Turkish straits was displayed in a provocative advance toward 
Constantinop1e--a move that drew the British and the French into 
the political arena of a decaying Ottoman Empire. l~erican mission­
aries began their work in the area early in the nineteenth century. 
The growth and success of their work required the necessary protection 
of the American government when such protection was not provided by 
the British.2 
A formal treaty was concluded between Turkey and the United 
States on May 7, 1830, which was followed by an unofficial American 
naval mission to Turkey to help build new warships and modernize the 
lFie1d, America and the Mediterranean World, pp. 113-120; see 
also, Leland J. Gordon, American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930: 
An Economic Interpretation (Philadelphia: Uni'lersity of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1932). 
2Robert L. Daniel, American Philanthropy in ~~, 
1820-1960 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1970); Field, America and 
the Mediterranean world, pp. 104-140, 176-213. 
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Turkish navy. A similar mission operated in Egypt beginning in the 
late 1860's and did not leave until pressured out by the European 
po~rs and the Ottoman Sultan in the early 1880's. One of the most 
outstanding accomplishments of this latter mission were the geographi­
cal surveys it produced, especially of the Sudan.l 
Perhaps the most significant manifestations of American interest 
in the Middle East were the religious, educational, and philanthropic 
activities of American missionaries. They founded well-known and 
influential American educational institutions in the area such as 
Robert College of Istanbul in 1863, the American University of Beirut 
in 1866, and the American University at Cairo in 1919. Through their 
presses in Istanbul and Beirut, they encouraged education and moderni­
zation through reading. The presses produced school manuals, textbooks, 
and general reading materials. The missionaries encouraged the revival 
of Arabic literature and tradition, stimulated the growth and directed 
the course of national movements in the Middle East. 2 
lIbid., pp. 141-75, 389-435; Frederick J. Cox, "The American 
Naval Mission in Egypt," The Journal of Modern History, XXVI (June, 
1954), pp. 173-78; Pierre Crabites, &~ericans i.n the Egyptian ~ 
(London: G. Routledge &Sons, Ltd., 1938). 
2Daniel, American Phi1anthrophy in the Middle East, pp. 1-225; 
Albert Habib Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 95-102; Field, America 
and the Mediterranean World, pp. 92-103, 153-65, 176-206, 262-305, 
345-59; see also, David H. Finnie, Pioneers East: The Early American 
Experience in the Middle East (Cambridge, l-f3.ss.: Harvard University 
Press, 1967); Roa Humpherys Lindsay, Ninetee.nth Centu!y American 
Schools in the Levant: ~ Study of Purposes (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1965); Julius Richter, ~ History of Protestant Mis­
sions in the Near East (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1910); 
Abdul Latif Tibawi~erican Interests in Syria, 1800-1901 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1966). 
-- --- ----
10 
When President Wilson announced his Fourteen Points (point 12 
concerned the Middle East) during World War I in support of national 
self-determination, 1 the people of the Miadle East saw him as an ally. 
A resolution by the General Syrian Congress on July 2, 1919 declared, 
We rely on President Wilson's declaration that his object 
in entering the war was to put an end to acquisitive designs 
for imperialist purposes. In our desire that our country 
should not be made a field for colonisation and in the belief 
that the American President has no political designs on our 
country, we resolve to seek assistance ••• from the United 
States of America ••• for help in the fulfilment of our hopes. 2 
The King-Crane Commission, sent to Syria by President Wilson 
to ascertain the national aspiration of the Arab peoples, reported 
on August 28, 1919, "Our survey left no room for doubt ••• 1thas7 
America was the first choice l;s mandatorr/.,,3 The King-Crane 
Commission also revealed that Iraq too chose "America as mandatory, 
and with no second choice.,,4 
In regard to the Palestine question, the Commission reported 
that there was strong opposition in Syria to the idea of a Jewish 
State in Palestine. 5 The Commission's report, however, remained a 
secret until portions of it were published in 1922. It is believed 
lRalph 	H. Magnus, comp., Documents ~ ~ Middle ~ (Washington, 
D.C. : 	 American Enterprise Institute for PubliC Policy Research, 1969), 
p. 	27. 
2George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (New York: G. P. Putnam's 
Sons, 	1946), pp. 441-42, Appendix G. 
3Magnus, Documents on the Middle East, p. 35. --~~~~ 
I
··Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 457, Appendix H. 
SSee, Magnus, Documents ~ the Middle East, p. 33. 
11 
that Zionist pressures were the primary cause for the suppression of the 
King-Crane report. l 
Until the peace settlement1 of 1922, America's primary interests 
in the area were humanitarian and educational interests, not economic 
or political. Significant economic interests developed after the 
discovery of oil in the Middle East. 2 As America's share in Middle 
East oil increased, her interests in the political affairs of the area 
also increased. By 1942~ the United States share in Middle East oil 
grew to 42 percent. 3 
After World War II and before the United States reverted once 
more to isolationism, she found herself threatened by Soviet communism. 
The United States had the choice either to allow world events to take 
their natural course or to use her power to defeat communism. The 
argument for the first choice was that~ by staying out, the U.S. 
would preserve her strength and leave communism to defeat itself 
or be weakened by its victims. Should communism spread around the 
world, however, then the United States would fight it whenever it 
attacked the western hemisphere. The argument for the latter choice 
was that, once communism spread around the world, it would be too late 
to fight it. Therefore~ the United States should immediately inter­
vene to halt its advance anywhere and everywhere in the world. 
1Harrv N. Howard, The King-Crane Commission: An American Inquiry 
~ the Middle East (Beirut: Khayat, 1963), p. 311. 
2See, Magnus, Documents .2!! the Middle East, pp. 40-42. 
3John A. DeNovo, American Interests in the Middle East, 1900­
1939 (Minneapolis: University of }linncsota-Press, 1963), pp. 167-209. 
12 
It was George Kennan, then charge d'affaires in ~scow, who was 
instrumental in formulating the policy based on the latter argument. 
In a telegram from Moscow, dated February 22, 1946, he wrote, 
Soviet power ••• does not work by fixed plans. It does 
not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, 
and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason 
it can easily withdraw--and usually does--when strong resist­
ance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has 
sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he 
rarely has to do so.l 
In his book, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, Kennan says that the "main 
concern" of Soviet policy "is to make sure that it has filled every 
nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if 
it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosoph­
ica1ly and accommodates itself to them." Therefore, "the main element 
of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a 
long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian 
expansive tendencies."2 
Kennan advocated the implementation of containment of Soviet 
communism through, 
the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a 
series of constantly shifting geographical and political 
pOints, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet 
policy • • • to confront the Russians with unalterable 
counterforce at every point where they show signs of 
encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable 
wor1d.3 . 
1U•S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1946 (11 vols.; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1969), VI, 707. 
2Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, pp. 118-19. 
3x lieorge F. Kenna!!7, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign 
Affairs, XXV (July, 1947), 576-81. 
13 
In relation to the Middle East, the United States attempted to 
implement the policy of containment through warnings, threats, pacts 
and alliances, treaties, technical and financial aid programs. This 
was done first in cooperation with Britain and France before the United 
•States gradually began to replace them in the area. The Truman 
Doctrine, announced on March 12, 1947, was meant to fill the power 
vacuum created by the British decision to quit Greece and Turkey. 
"Specifically," says Ralph Deans, "the Truman Doctrine put the United 
States in the traditional British role of preventing Russian expansion 
into Turkey and Greece."l 
Thus, instead of reverting to isolationism, the United States 
accepted her new international responsibilities. U.S. policy planners 
had apparently decided that American security and national interest 
demanded that world responsibilities be shouldered. America's basic 
policy of non-involvement and non-intervention was replaced by a 
dynamic policy of full involvement and full intervention as she 
assumed full responsibility for the balance of power in the world. 
What becomes evident, therefore, is that America was content all along 
to let the European powers manage the balance of power and fill power 
vacuums in the world while "Fortress America" remained sheltered in 
isolationism, but when those powers gave way and America saw a threat 
to her security, she was ready and willing to assume their role. The 
apparent change in policy is not, therefore, a reflection of a basic 
lRalph C. Deans, "American Policy in the Middle East," Editorial 
Research Reports, II (August 19, 1970), 616. 
io......­
14 
change in the American character, but in the world situation. The 
MOnroe Doctrine was simply extended to cover the whole world. 
PART I. CONTAINMENT: THE TRUMAN YEARS 
CHAPTER I 
THE CASE OF IRAN 
Before World War II, the relationships between the United States 
and Iran on the government level were relatively insignificant. On 
the private level, however, missionaries and other American private 
citizens had expended money, time and effort in various constructive 
activities, creating a great deal of good will among Iranians toward 
the United States. The fact, too, that the U.S., unlike Russia and 
Britain, had not interfered in Iran's internal affairs and had not 
shown territorial ambitions in their country, impressed Iranians. 
The United States considered Iran in the British and Rassian sphere 
of influence, which she was determined not to trespass. 
Following the outbreak of World War II, Iran came more and more 
into contact with the United States. Britain, under the strain of 
the War, called upon U.S. assistance in getting supplies to Russia 
through the so-called "Persian Corridor. 1I The U.S. formed the Persian 
Gulf Service Command, composed of some 30,000 troops to serve in the 
Corridor in a technical capacity and to see to it that the necessary 
war materials were delivered to Russia. Under American Lend-Lease 
aid, Iran got an American army mission under General Clarence Ridley, 
a police mission under Colonel H. Norman Shwartzkopf, and an economic 
mission under Dr. Morgan Millspaugh. Other arrangements were made for 
16 
additional American experts to work under individual contracts in Iran. 
All this was done in the absence of a real American policy toward 
Ir~'. The Tripartite Treaty of 1942, between Iran, Britain, and Russia, 
provided for Allied troop withdrawal within six months after war 
hostilities ceased. Toward the end of the Teheran Conference in 1943, 
the Big Three issued the Teheran Conference Declaration (December 1, 
1943), thanking Iran for her services, promising economic assistance 
after the war, and reaffirming their interest in guarding Iranrs 
territorial integrity and maintaining her independence and sovereignty. 
By the end of the War, Iranians had been greatly impressed by the 
attitude, behavior, and work of American troops, technicians, advisers, 
and missionaries. They hoped the U.S. would provide more experts, 
increase her material assistance and, eventually, attempt to offset 
Russian and British influence in Iran. 
I. THE AZERZAIJAN CRISIS 
On ~ 8, 1945, Germany surrendered; Russia had not yet decided 
to enter the war against Japan, and Iran was declared an inactive 
theater. The Iranian government, therefore, requested that the Allied 
troops be withdrawn from her territory.l The United States declared 
her intention to comply with the Iranian request and began to withdraw 
her troops in June. 2 Russia reminded Iran that Allied forces did not 
lU.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, Diplomatic Papers: 1945 (9 vols.; Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1967-69), VIII, 369-74. 
2Ibid., 378. 
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have to leave until six months after the end of hostilities, in accord­
ance with the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. The United Kingdom expressed 
her willingr..ess to withdraw, pro'lided the Russians did.1 The issue 
was discussed in July during the Potsdam Conference, but Stalin 
maintained his position. He promised, however, that no action would 
be taken by the Soviet Union against Iran. 2 
In August, while the matter of withdrawal was sti11 being debated, 
the Azerbaijan crisis erupted. Under the name Democrat, the Tudeh 
party, supported by Soviet troops, attempted to gain control of Tabriz 
and the area around it and called for administrative autonomy of the 
province of Azerbaijan. Several new divisions of Soviet troops entered 
the area in October in support of the Tudeh party, followed in November 
by a second attempt to seize power. Iranian troops were dispatched 
to quell the rebellion, but Russian troops prevented them from doing 
so. The Tudeh declared the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan on 
December 12, 1945, and an Iranian Communist, Ja'afar Pishevari, was 
appointed Premier. This was followed by a Kurdish rebellion in Western 
Azerbaijan and the creation of the Kurdish People's Republic on 
December 15, 1945.3 
The formation of those two independent republics separated 
lIbid., 362, 374, 413-14. 
2Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (2 vols.; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 
1955-56), I, 379-80. 
lMichael Kahl Sheehan, Iran: The Impact of United States Interests 
!E& Policies, 1941-1954 (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Theo. Gaus' Sons, 1968), p. 28. 
• • 
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Azerbaijan from the control of the central government of Iran. All 
Iran could do was to send protest notes to the Soviets and appeal for 
American support. The U.S. response was to give serious thought over 
reconsidering her position. It was the Azerbaijan crisis that set the 
U.s. on the course which led to the policy of containment. On 
November 24, 1945, the U.S. sent one of the first strong notes of 
protest to the Soviet Union urging early evacuation of allied troops 
from Iran. l The call for withdrawal was rejected by the Soviet Union. 
Instead the Soviets insisted on staying in Iran until the Treaty 
deadline of March 2, 19462 (a date agreed upon by Bevin and Molotov 
at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers). A further warning 
came from Secretary Byrnes to Stalin during the Allied Foreign Ministers 
Conference in MOscow in December 1945 to the effect that, should Iran 
take the matter to the U.N., the U.S. would back Iran, and that 
Stalin should try to avert this dispute with the U.S. Stalin replied 
that the "Soviet Union was not afraid of having the Iran question 
raised at UNO.,,3 
When no agreement was reached between Stalin and Byrnes, and 
after U.S. protests were rejected, the Iranian government brought the 
problem before the U.N. Security Council in January 1946, formally 
1Foreign Relations ••• : 1945, VIII, 448-50. 
2Trum&l, MeIOOirs, II, 93; Andre Fontaine, History of the Cold War 
from the October Revolution to the Korean War, 1917-1950 (New York: 
Random House, 1968), p. 282. 
3Truman, Memoirs, II, 94; Foreign Relations 1945, VIII, 
518. 
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charging the Soviet Union with interference in Iran's internal affairs. 
Following some discussion on the issue, the Security Council decided 
to have Iran and the Soviet Union make a try at settling the ~ispute 
between themselves and report the results to the Council. l Ahmad 
Qavam, the Iranian Prime Minister, began his talks with the Soviets 
on February 19, 1946. No agreement was reached. The withdrawal date 
of March 2 was anxiously watched by the U.S., Great Britain and Iran. 
On March 1, 1946, Russia announced a partial withdrawal starting 
March 2, from three areas; her troops would remain in the other areas 
pending improvement in the Iranian situation. Another strong note was 
sent to Russia by the U.S. on March 6, 1946: 
The decision of the Soviet government to retain Soviet 

troops in Iran beyond the Period stipulated by the 

Tripartite Treaty has caused a situation to which the 

United States • • • as a party to the Declaration 

Regarding Iran dated December 1, 1943, cannot remain 

indifferent.2 

To this was added "the earnest hope that the Government of the Soviet 
Union will do its part, by withdrawing immediately all Soviet forces 
from the territory of Iran.n3 
The response to this note was the exact opposite of what the 
U.S. expected, or hoped, the Soviet Union would do. Instead of with­
drawing tmmediately, the Soviets ordered additional troops into Iran 
and, according to reports received by President Truman, 
1Fontaine, Cold War, 1917-1950, p. 283. 

2U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XIV (March 17, 1946), 435. 

3Ibid., 436. 
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Three major Russian columns were reported on the march, 

one toward the capital city of Teheran, another swinging 

toward the Turko-Iranian border. The signs were plain that 

Russia was determined to have her way and that she intended 

to ignore the U.S. and the U.N. alike. l 

There was strong suspicion in Iran that Russia and her agents had 
planned a coup d'etat. 2 The U.S. government was alarmed and, expecting 
trouble, ordered her embassy personnel to be ready to leave the capital 
to the South on a moment's notice. 3 While this tension gripped Iranians 
and their government, the U.S. urged Iran to refer the matter back to 
the U.N. On March 18, 1946, Iran did so and charged Russia with 
aggression. 
The expected coup did not take place, however. Instead Russia 
made a surpirse announcement on March 24, while the matter was still 
being debated at the U.N. The announcement revealed that an agreement 
was reached between Iran and Russia, according to which Russian troops 
were to be withdrawn within six weeks from Iran; the dispute was to be 
dropped by the U.N.; the Azerbaijan crisis would be considered an 
internal affair of Iran; and a Joint-Stock Soviet-Iranian Oil Company, 
in which Russia would hold fifty-one percent of the stock, would be 
established. In harmony with a law passed by the Iranian Majlis on 
lTruman, Memoirs, II, 95. 
2Sheehan, Iran, pp. 30-31. 
, 3Nasrotallah S. Fatemi, Oil Diploma-;:v: ~~ Keg in Iran (New 
York: Whittier Books, 1954), p. 302. 
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December 2, 1944, whose author was Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, 1 the oil 
treaty was subject to ratification by the Majlis within seven months 
following its election. Accordillg to George Lenczowski, Qavam was 
"acting under duress" when he made these "three important concessions 
to Russia. n2 Secretary of State Byrnes ins:is ted, however, that the 
Security Council adopt a resolution (and it did) to the effect that, 
if the Soviets did not show signs of carrying out their promise of 
withdrawal by May 6, the Security Council withheld the right to take 
up the question once more. By May 9 all Russian troops had departed 
and Iranian troops entered Azerbaijan in December despite Russian and 
Tudeh objections and protests. The two republics collapsed in the 
same month and Azerbaijan was reincorporated into the rest of the 
country. A purge of the Tudeh party was soon underway. In his book, 
Present at the Creation, Dean Acheson records that, 
Ambassador George Allen cabled on December 17, 1946, that 

in the Iranian view the quick collapse of the Tudeh Party 

was due to the conviction of everyone--the Russians, the 

Iranians, and the Azerbaijanis--that the United States was 

not bluffing but solidly supporting Iranian sovereignty.3 

The Russian decision to withdraw was not at all expected, because 
all indications showed that they were intent on staying and bent upon 
lGeorge Lenczowski, Oil and State in the Middle East (Ithaca, 
N.Y.: Cornell University Press,-1960), p. 90. -­
2George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (3rd ed.; 
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968), p. 195. 
3Dean Gooderham. Acheson, Present at the Creation: !!l. Years at 
the State Department (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 198. 
---
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bringing about a change in the Iranian government. What was it, 
therefore, that made them suddenly decide to withdraw? It was 
revealed later that U.S. support to Iran 'Uas much stronger than it 
appeared to have been on the surface. On April 24, 1952, President 
Truman stated that he and his State Department had come to the 
conclusion, as early as 1946, that the only thing the Russians under­
stood or respected was force or the threat to use it. The failure of 
the Moscow Conference, the Russian refusal to heed warning, and the 
sending of additional troops and military equipment into Iran caused 
the U.S. serious alarm. The "Iron Fist" approach was to be used with 
Russia, concluded President Truman, or the free world could expect 
another war. Truman declared, ItI had to send an ultimatum tothe 
head of the Soviet Union to get out of Persia. ttl The President went 
further to say that, Ult was a message from me to Stalin to get out 
of Persia. Unless he di.d get out, we would put some more people in 
there.,,2 The President was ready to "take the necessary steps, if 
he did not get out. And we had a fleet at that ttme in the Persian 
Gulf, and we had a lot of soldiers over in that neighborhood.tt3 In 
his memoirs, however, President Truman does not use the word ultimatum; 
instead he just says, ttl told Byrnes to send a blunt message to 
1U•S., PreSident, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National 
Archives and Records Service, 1945-), Harry S. Truman, 1952, p. 291. 
2Ibid., p. 294. 
3Ibid. 
, 
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Premier Stalin.ttl 
If Truman's claim is true, a tough policy toward Russia was 
adopted as early as March 1946, which had at its core the spirit of 
the Doctrine of Containment of conmnmism. Therefore, it can be argued 
that the Truman Doctrine was conceived not in March of 1947, but a 
year earlier. It had its beginning not in Greece, but in Iran. It 
was this policy, then, that caused the rumored Russian-supported coup 
to fail and brought Russia to make that unexpected withdrawal announce­
mente But the victory for Iran was not total. There still remained 
the tmdesirable oil treaty with Russia. Had the Iranians been aware 
of the tough American stand, the oil agreement would, perhaps, never 
have been reached. Nevertheless, it still needed to be ratified by 
the new Majlis before it went into effect. But before the new Majlis 
met for the first time, several things had taken place, which were to 
significantly influence its decision. 
In the fall of 1946, the United States made known her support 
to Turkey against Soviet demands for exclusive control of the 
Dardanelles by the Black Sea powers and for cession of Turkish 
territory in eastern Anatolia. In regard to the Straits, the United 
States declared on October 9, 1946, that 
The Government of Turkey should continue to be primarily 

responsible for the defense of the Straits and that should 

the Straits become the object of attack or threat of attack 

by an aggressor, the resulting situat:i.on would be a matter 

for act~on on the part of the Security Council of the United 

Nations.2 

lTruman, Memoirs, II, 95. 
2U.S~, Department of State, Bulletin, XXV (November 19, 1951), 811; 
see also U.S. News (August 30, 1946), pp. 16-17. 
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On March 12, 1947, President Truman announced the Truman Doctrine, 
declaring readiness on the part of the U.S. government to contain 
communism in all the world, to support nations threatened by communism, 
and to grant specified financial grants to Greece and Turkey.l 
Iranians welcomed the Truman Doctrine even though Iran was not 
specifically mentioned in it. The Doctrine definitely covered Iran 
and, to the Iranians, was an official recognition and a concrete 
evidence of U.S. interests in Iran. The creation of the Bureau of 
Greek, Turkish, Iranian Affairs as a unit of the U.S. Department of 
State2 was a further expression of support to the Iranians, who took 
it to mean that their country was considered as important to the U.S. 
as Greece and Turkey. After all, the Truman Doctrine was an out­
growth of American policy in Iran. The fading British influence in 
the area had to be replaced and Soviet expansionism contained, making 
u.S. policy in Iran only' a part of a larger and wider policy to contain 
communism, not only in Iran, Greece or Turkey, but in other parts of 
the world, and to strengthen non-communist countries against communism, 
including Iran. 
The Truman Doctrine was followed with the signing of an agree­
ment on June 21, 1947, according to which the U.S. agreed to sell 
Iran defensive weapons and military supplies. The Truman Doctrine 
and the military agreement gave the Iranians the strength to face the 
, 1U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XVI OMarch 23, 19~7), 
34-37. 
2Sheehan, Iran, p. 37. 
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Russians with independence and force. This inspired courage was given 
greater impetus when on September 11, 1947, the U.S. Ambassador to 
Iran issued a policy statement to the eff~t that Iran was free to 
accept or reject any Russian offer and that she could count on U.S. 
support and backing. This had a distinct impact on the Majlis as it 
was preparing to accept or reject the oil treaty with Russia. A further 
assurance which was definitely designed to erase any remaining doubt, 
if there was any left, came a few days before the Maj lis voted on 
the treaty in the form of an agreement between the U.S. Ambassador 
George Allen and the Iranian War Ministry, extending the services of 
the Army and Police missions until March 20, 1949, and limiting 
military advice to that provided by the U.S. advisers. l 
On October 22, 1947, the Majlis rejected the treaty in spite of 
objections from the Tudeh party and from Russia. Prime Minister Qavam, 
who negotiated the treaty with the Russians, resigned.2 But the 
strong American backing, the rejection of the treaty, and the ouster 
of Qavam naturally angered the Soviets and tensed relations between 
Russia and Iran. Russian hostility became so intense that Iranians 
began to be suspicious of another coup attempt. Iran received protests 
from the Soviet Union accusing her of hostile activity and of encourag­
ing American influence, both military and otherwise, in Iran.3 The 
lIbid., pp. 37-38. 
2Richard Cottam, Nationalism in ~ (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1964), pp. 197-98. 
ltenczowski, Middle East in World Affairs, p. 197. 
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United States was also warned and accused of trying "to transform Iran 
into a military base to be used against the Soviet Union. tll To give 
credence to aussian protests, th~ Tudeh purty held demonstrations to 
protest American influence. 
But Iran could not be intimidated. U.S. support was open and 
2strong. Russian pressure was successfully resisted with rare courage.
The big neighbor and traditional enemy was firmly rebuffed and her 
agents and sympathizers were effectively dealt with, thanks to U.S. 
support, for without it the much-talked-about shrewdness of Qavam 
could not have saved Iran. In March of 1949, after the signing of 
the Atlantic Pact, Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that the 
Pact was not meant to shift American attention from Greece, Turkey 
or Iran to Europe, but that "interest in the security of these 
countries has been made clear, and shall continue to pursue that 
policy. 113 This statement was followed a few days later by the arrival 
of the first shipment of arms to Iran from the U.S. 
II. ATTEMPTS AT. REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT 
With the cooling of the Azerbaijan crisis and with American 
support assured, Iranians were able to turn their attention to the 
more important objective of economic development. The internal 
lU.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XX (April 3, 1949), 432. 
2Lenczowski, Middle East in World Affairs, p. 196. 
3U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XX (March 27, 1949), 383. 
----- ---
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structure of the country needed overhauling. The Iranian government 
turned to the U.S. for help in planning and executing a seven-year 
development plan. l Two American companies drew up the plan and. ad­
vised on its implementation. The cost of the plan was estimated at 
$650 million. 2 Since Iran could not completely finance the plan, 
a loan was to be sought. The financing of the plan had to come from 
oil revenues and from a foreign loan. If a foreign loan could not be 
obtained, the A.I.O.C. had to agree to increase the oil royalties. 
The greater the amount of funds available through a foreign loan, 
therefore, the less urgent it was to increase oil royalties. 
Since the Iranian government believed that the U.S. would grant 
Iran a loan, the matter was simple, they thought. All they needed 
to do was to carry their case to Washington. No one could blame them 
for being so hopeful since the U.S. was spending billions of dollars 
to fight communism and effect a world economic recovery. Greece and 
Turkey were receiving generous amounts of aid. Besides, Iran was 
right on the doorstep of the communist camp. This type of logic 
filled the Shah with optimism and hope. When he arrived in the U.S. 
in November of 1949 to start a six-week official visit, it turned 
out that, in addition to the loan, he wanted more definite defense 
guarantees from the U.S. against aggression in the form of a treaty. 
Unfortunately, the Shah was disappointed. 3 Asfar as his objectives 
IBenjamin Shwadran, The Middle East: Oil and the Great Powers 
(New York: Praeger, 1955)-:Pp. 171-72. - - - --­
2Lenczowski, Middle East in World Affairs, p. 30. ~~~ ~~~~ 
3Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 208. 
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were concerned, his trip was a total failure. U.S. officials were 
more interested in seeing Iran stamp out corruption and institute 
reform first. The Shah was so upset that he refused the courtesy 
of the presidential plane on his return trip. Iranian officials were 
confused; they could not figure out how the U.S. could refuse such a 
request when she was being such a good friend of Iran.l The Shah's 
failure in Washington caused great disappointment in Iran and dealt 
a serious blow to his prestige. 2 
The reason behind this American attitude was the belief that 
corruption prevailed in the Iranian administration. There was the 
fear that money lent would find its way into the pockets of Iranian 
public officials. The lesson of China was still fresh in the memory 
of U.S. officials, where money was poured generously into the coffers 
of the Kaumintang government; nevertheless, it collapsed because of 
corruption and lack of interest in reform. 3 The U.S. was determined 
that any considerable loan to Iran would be granted only after 
corruption had been eradicated and reforms instituted. Besides, the 
U.S. did not want to give the impression that any promise to fight 
communism woul ~e rewarded with money. Another reason for the 
lack of enthusis8m on the part of the U.S., stated by Dean Acheson, 
was the feeling th~!:: "The seven year plan ••• {Via!.! a grandiose 
lIbid., pp. 211-13. 

2Lenczowski, Middle ~ in World Affairs, pp. 202-3. 
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plan beyond the capacity of the Iranian government."l Acheson goes 
on to say that "The plans, military and economic, were too ambitious 
for the meaus available.,,2 
So, though disappointed and extremely annoyed, the Shah returned 
to Iran determined to take steps to make his country merit the 
financial assistance she needed. He, more than anyone else, knew 
that the Americans were right about corruption in his country's 
governmental system. In his own words, 
The failure of my mission was certainly in part our fault, 
because Americans realized that we were not yet handling our 
internal affairs with the necessary firmness. Americahad 
been shocked by the collapse of National China • • • and she 
was determined to aid only those countries which showed a 
desire to clean house at home. 3 
The Shah did not merely talk about reform, but actually initiated 
serious steps toward it. The U.S. could be credited with the respon­
sibility of generating the impulse and the will to bring it about. 
One of the Shah's first acts, as early as January 1950, was to break 
up his Royal Estates to be sold as small farms to the peasants. In 
February, because of the insistence of the U.S. that he practice more 
democracy, the Shah provided for "relatively free" elections.4 In 
the same month he spoke publicly urging reform and attacking corruption, 
pressing the implementation of the seven-year plan and the revision 
IAcheson, Present at the Creation, p. 501. 

2Ibid • 

~hmmned Reza Shah Pah1avi, ~ion for :!!!y Country (New York: 

McGraw-Hill, 1961), pp. 88-89. 
4cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 261. 
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of the constitution to allow him the necessary powers to carry out the 
proposed reforms. 1 
While the peasants were glad that nuw they could own a piece 
of land, though small, the privileged classes were up in arms. The 
latter strongly opposed the Shah's efforts because he struck at their 
jealously guarded privileged position. Their resentment was as strong 
toward the U.S., for they believed that, had it not been for the U.S., 
the Shah would never have dared to take such steps. Despite this 
opposition, however, an anti-corruption commission was soon set up 
and anti-corruption laws were passed. The appointment of General Ali 
Razmara as Prime Minister in June 1950 was regarded by many Iranians 
as interference by the U.S. in Iranian internal affairs. The reason 
was the suspicion that Razamara was already briefed by the Americans 
and the British. Though this was a misimpression,2 it proved un­
fortunate for him and may have been the cause for his weakened position 
in the oil negotiations and for his assassination later. When 
Dr. Henry I. Grady arrived in Iran in June as the American Ambassador, 
the reform program was vigorously pushed forward. Iranians began to 
think that they had done enough to deserve a loan. But despite their 
hopes and wishes, American assistance toward the seven-year plan 
was not forthcoming; and although their optimism did not completely 
vanish, tension began to build up in Iran3 as time went by and the 
1Lenczowski, Middle East in World Affairs, pp. 203-5. 

2cottam, Nationalism in~, p. 209. 

3Lenczowski, Middle East in ~orld Affairs, p. 202. 
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Americans showed no signs of relaxing their position. 
At about this time, the Anti-Corruption Commission published 
its report (August 31, 1950), describing 500 government emp1o:"ees 
as corrupt and unfit for public office. l An uproar in the Majlis 
followed attacking the report as too harsh and too drastic. This was 
followed by a U.S. announcement on October 10, 1950, that a loan of 
only $25 million could be granted to Iran, plus a grant (announced 
2October 19, 1950) of $500 thousand credit under the Point IV program.
This was a far cry from the $250 million loan Iran sought, which had 
been blankly refused. The reaction on the part of Iranians was 
immediate. Their bitterness and anger toward the U.S. and their 
anti-American feelings began to rise. Soon the U.S. lost the good 
feeling she had nurtured for herself in Iran. Her consultants in 
that country were sent home and their contracts were terminated. 
In short, there developed a general resentment toward America and 
Americans in Iran. There were wild outbursts of anger and indignation 
in the Majlis as deputy after deputy stood to denounce the U.S. 
attitude as an insult to Iranian pride and dignity. One deputy 
contended that there was nothing that Iran could gain by posing as 
pro-American. The Shah himself joined the crescendo of rising 
indignation.3 
1Ibid., pp. 201-2. 
2cottam, Nationalism in Iran, p. 211. 
3LPnczowski, Middle East in World Affairs, p. 204. 
32 
None could have been happier than Russia and the Tudeh party, 
for Iran quickly moved to sign a trade agreement with the Soviet 
Union on November 4, 1950.1 SOO1'l after, pressure to revise the British 
oil concessions began to build. Failure to obtain the desperately 
needed loan focused Iranian eyes on the A.I.O.C. (Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company).2 The stage was set for the ensuing oil crisis and for the 
rise of Dr. Mossadegh and his National Front. "Such a serious setback 
to our hopes," lamented the Shah, "convinced many of our people that 
the United States had deserted them, and anti-American feeling 
developed, with a corresponding strengthening of the National Front 
Pact. ,,3 
III. THE U.S. AND THE OIL CRISIS 
Soon after American oil companies and Venezuela reached an 
agreement to share profits from Venezuelan oil on a fifty-fifty 
basis, Iran asked the A.I.O.C. to raise her share of the profits.4 
But the failure to obtain an American loan in 1950, lent this request 
a measure of urgency not existent when it was first made in early 1948. 
Negotiations were underway between Saudi Arabia and ARAMCO to reach an 
agreement based on the fifty-fifty profit sharing principle, already in 
1I bid., p. 205. 

2Ibid• 

3Pah1avi, Mission for ~ Country, p. 89. 

4cottam, Nationalism in Iran, pp. 204-5. 
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practice in Venezuela. As Prime Minister Razmara repeatedly urged 
the A.I.O.C. to make concessions before it was too late, the British 
were hardly aware of the seriousn~\ss of the situation. When they 
finally woke up in February 1951 to the realities surrounding their 
investments in Iran, it was already too late. The British sluggishness 
and the momentum gained by the Iranian national movement under Mossadegh 
produced a situation under which the nationalists no longer were 
satisfied with a fifty-fifty profit sharing arrangement, but demanded 
complete nationalization of the oil industry. The proposal of 
November 1950 to the Maj1is Oil Committee by Dr. Mossadegh to nationalize 
the oil industry was taken to the Maj1is. On March 15, 1951, the 
Majlis voted unanimously to nationalize Iranian oil and, five days 
later, the decision was confirmed by the Iranian Senate. l 
The Rise of Mossadegh 
The nationalization of the oil industry had taken place amid a 
tremendous amount of pressure from public opinion. The mood was such 
that when Razmara, on March 3, 1951, appealed to the Oil Commission to 
consider the question of nationalization on its economic merits, to 
have experts study the problem realistic ~ly and prudently, and 
declared that he was convinced Iran was not c . able of exploiting 
her petroleum resources on her own,2 his moderation caused his 
lLenczowski, Middle ~ in World Affairs, p. 205. 
2John Marlowe, Iran: ~ Short Political Guide (New York: Praeger, 
1963), p. 92; Andre Fontaine, History of the Cold ~£ From the Korean 
War to the Present (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 146; Cottam, 
Nationalism in Iran, p. 205. 
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assassination four days later on March 7, 1951.1 Before that, in the 
fall of 1950, national feeling was such that Dr. Mossadegh, the symbol 
of nationalism and national aspiration, was named Chairman of the Oil 
Commission. 2 When Razmara was assassinated, the last serious block 
in the way of nationalization was removed. Before the Majlis voted 
on the issue, Dr. Mossadegh told of a white figure that appeared to 
him the previous night and exhorted him to "Stand up, Mossadegh, go 
burst the chains of the Iranian people!"3 
Hussein Ala, the new Prime Minister, lasted only a few weeks.4 
Pressure to appoint Dr. Mossadegh as Premier increased tremendously. 
The Shah reluctantly appointed him on April 28, 1951, after his attempt 
to appoint Qavam failed. On May 2, 1951, the Shah proclaimed the oil 
nationalization law. 5 The Tudeh party suddenly became active and held 
demonstrations carrying red flags and shouting anti-imperialist slogans. 
In early May, Tudeh representatives called on Mossadegh and demanded 
legalization of their party, recognition of Red China, rejection of U.S. 
arms aid, nationalization of the American-controlled oil fields in 
Bahrein, and the expulSion of the remnants of the American military 
mission in Iran. Great Britain invoked the 1933 oil accord and proposed 
lLenczowski, Middle East in World ~ffairs, p. 205. 

2Fontaine, Cold War from Korean War to Present, p. 146. 

3Inge Morath, From Persia to Iran (London: Thames and Hudson, 
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arbitration~ but MOssadegh refused to comply. The Abadan refinery had 
to be shut down because British technicians refused to work for the new 
National Iranian Oil Company. When the International Court of Justice 
took conservation measures on Britain's request in July 1951~ Iran refused 
to observe them. Britain's protests as to the illegality of the 
Iranian action were to no avail. Iran's position was that, as a sovereign 
nation~ it was her right to nationalize her oil industry~ and argued 
that oil concessions were forced upon her when her government was under 
British control. It was time, therefore, that Iran be freed of British 
bondage and exploitation. l 
The Stalemate 
Negotiations between Britain and Iran broke down in August. 
President Truman's attempt at conciliation also failed. On September 10~ 
1951, Britain cancelled her commercial ties with Iran and Abadan-bound 
British tankers were ordered to return. On September 25~ MOssadegh 
retaliated by ordering the expulsion within a week of all British 
personnel at the Abadan refinery and its occupation by Iranian troops.2 
Britain was tempted to use force; her navy and troops were alerted.3 
But though they arrived in Iranian waters, they never landed. The 
reason Britain did not act is related by Anthony Eden in his memoirs: 
IFontaine, Cold War from Korean War to Present, p. 146; Lenczowski, 
KiddIe East ~n Wo~Aff;ir;:-pp. 207-a;-Sheehan~ 1!!g, pp. 53-56. 
2Ibid., pp. 208-10 • 
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3Bahman Nirumand, Iran: The ~ Iwperialism in Action (New York: 
MOG~hly Review Press, 1969), p. 50. 
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"The temptation to intervene to reclaim this stolen property must have 
been strong, but pressure from the United States was vigorous against 
any such action."l The United States calculated that interference by 
Britain could very well force the Soviet Union to invoke the 1921 
Soviet-Persian Treaty,2 according to which Russia was given the right 
to occupy the Northern part of the country if and when a third power 
intervened. There was also the fear on the part of the U.S. govern­
ment that failure of the nationalists "might bring the Connnunists to 
power."3 
Instead of military action, Britain intensified her economic pres­
sures on Iran. She ordered an embargo on Iranian oil and set up a 
virtual economic blockade of Iran. Iran found herself unable to break 
the embargo and the Iranian economy began to feel the pinch.4 British 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, a Conservative and a disciple of 
Churchill, who replaced ~rnest Bevin in October 1951, realized the im­
portance of convincing the U.S. to give up her neutrality regarding the 
oil crisis. He believed that the policy of coming to terms with Mossa­
degh at any price "would be a policy of despair. u5 He had no respect 
for the argtmlent that "the only choice in Iran lay between Mossadegh 
and Connnunism. ,,6 But he also realized that it was hard to sell these 
1Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 
pp. 216-17. 
2Shwadran, Middle East: Oil, pp. 82-84. 
3Pontaine, Cold War from Korean War to Present, p. 174. 
-- -- -- -- -- =-=:.=;.;;;. 
4Lenczowski, Middle East in World Affairs, pp. 210-12. 
5Eden, Full Circle, p. 219. 
6Ibid. 
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ideas to President Truman, who happened to hold an opposite view. 
According to Henry Grady, "Mossadegh with the great mass of the people 
behind him cannot easily be gotten rid of. Nor would it help to do so!"l 
President Truman, however, supported Britain in trying to get the 
International Court of Justice to rule on the compensation to be paid 
to the A.I.O.C. for its nationalized property. Dr. Mossadegh categorical­
ly refused and went to New York himself in the fall of 1952, where he 
skillfully presented his countryf s case before the U.N. Security 
Council, then considering Britainfs complaint against Iran. Before 
returning to Iran he visited and had talks with American officials2 
and personally requested a loan of $120 million from the U.S. to meet 
the emergency situation in Iran. On his way back to Iran he stopped 
in Cairo, where he was given a tremendous welcome. When he finally 
arrived in Iran, the near hysterical reception he had showed the immense 
measure of popular support he still enjoyed. To the welcoming crowds 
he said, "It is better to be independent and produce only one ton oil a 
year than to produce thirty-two million tons and be a slave to Britain.,,3 
The $120 million loan re- '.lested by Mossadegh was not granted. 
Nevertheless, the U.S. continued to seek a solution through conciliation 
and urged the World Bank to grant Iran an emergency loan of $23 million 
and promised her military aid. Meanwhile, to deal with the problems 
1Grady, "Tension in ••• Iran," p. 560. 

2Nirumand, New Imperialism, p. 56. 

3Dwight David Eisenhower, Mandate !2! Change, 1953-1956: The 

White House Years (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), p. 159. 
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Iran was facing, Dr. MOssadegh asked and obtained special powers. 
As he strove to gain control of the army, tension began to build 
between him and the Shah. By the summer of 1952, he had what amounted 
to almost complete control of the government. On October 16 he broke 
diplomatic relations with Great Britain. l But as he made the error 
of attacking the Shah, and as the economic and political difficulties 
began to mount, Mossadegh's power base began to break up. He lost the 
support of the army and of the religious elements, such as MOllah 
Kashani and his followers. 2 According to Richard Cottam, "After 
midsummer 1952 • • • many nationalists began drinfting away from the 
Nationalists."l So many of his supporters had been alienated by his 
failure to settle the oil dispute, by his authoritarianism, and by his 
capricious manners, that he was forced to abolish the Majlis in early 
August 1951 and rule by decree. Mossadegh became a virtual dictator 
and the Shah began his struggle against being completely choked out 
politically. 
In spite of her involvement in the Korean War, the United States 
government became deeply involved in the Iranian oil dispute, first 
trying to be neutral and acting as an arbitrator but later shifting 
her position to coincide with that of Britain. The Iranian oil dispute 
affected the Korean war effort and the oil needs of Europe. By the 
time President Eisenhower took over as President, the U.S. was beginning 
lCottam, Nationalism in Iran, pp. 220-21. 

2Ibid., p. 215. 

lIbid., p. 211. 
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to take a second look at nationalization. Such an act could set a 
precedent which would jeopardize American oil concessions in oil­
pro~ucing co'mtries. Besides, unilateral cancellation of contracts 
could seriously undermine the basis of international business. MOreover, 
there was fear that economic distress could endanger Iran's survival 
and independence as a nation. With Iran weakened, communism could 
easily bring it into the Soviet orbit and open the whole Middle East 
to Soviet penetration. l But when Anthony Eden visited Eisenhower in 
the spring of 1953, Eisenhower still considered Mossadegh "as the 
only hope for the West in Iran,,,2 and insisted that the U.S. should 
continue to play her role of mediator to achieve conciliation. 
The Iranians felt that the U.S. ought to help them rid their 
country of British influence; while the British felt that the battle 
was as much America's as it was theirs; for if lost, America's oil 
interests would suffer too. The stubborn attitude of Mossadegh and his 
followers gradually drove the U.S. to a united front with Great Britain. 
As the U.S. began to apply pressure on Iran, suspicion of her mounted,3 
and the Tudeh party seized the opportunity to accuse her of imperialism 
and collaboration with Great Britain. Mossadegh and his policy planners 
could not understand the behavior of the U.S. since they thought that 
her fear of communism and her dependence on Iranian oil would cause 
her to override Britai.n. They were confident that the U.S. would supply 
lLenczowski, Middle East in World Affairs, p. 212. 

2Eden , Full Circle, p. 235. 

3Cottam, Nationalism in ~, pp. 214-15. 
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Iran with large amounts of aid. But Mossadegh should have realized 
that the U.S. was no longer willing to support him in the methods he 
chose to handle the delicate situation. However, because she wanted 
to maintain her relationship with Iran and to prevent a total collapse 
of her economy, the U.S. gave Iran limited aid in the form of financial 
transfusions. According to the Shah, Mossadegh "let his negative 
emotionalism rule out any chance of agreement." l 
For the U.S. it was a great dilemma. The British point of view 
could not be disregarded. The oil interests of both countries were 
similar and British friendship was needed, especially in the face of 
communist threats in Korea. America's interests in Iran were also 
important--Iran must not be allowed to drift behind the "Iron Curtain." 
At any rate, the British argument made more sense to the United States 
than the Iranian one, especially after Britain accepted the nationaliza­
tion law. The U.S. continued her mediation well into 1953, but it 
only served to severely strain relations between her and Iran. 
Hostility against America became more intense; American military and 
technical assistance was criticized; and American citizens in Iran 
were insulted and occasionally physically attacked.2 
The Fall of Mossadegh 
Dr. Mossadegh, desperate for funds, tried to draw the attention 
of President-elect Eisenhower to Iran's problems while still at 
Columbia University. In his memoirs President Eisenhower says, 
lpahlavi, Mission for ~ Country, p. 91. 

2Sheehan, Iran, pp. 56-57. 

even before I was inaugurated ••• early in January 1953, 
while I was still living on the Columbia University Campus, 
I received a cable from Premier Mossadegh, who by that time 
was ruling the country by decree. In his cable, three pages 
long, he congratulated me on the election results, and then 
plunged into an extended dissertation on the problems of Iran, 
which he feared had already been presented to me by those who 
did not see eye to eye with him on his country's future. l 
Mossadegh wrote, 
I dislike taking up with you the problems of my country even 
before you assume office. I do so partly because of their 
urgency and partly because I have reason to believe that they 
have already been presented to you by those who may not share 
my concern for the future of Iran and its people. 2 
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Eisenhower sent a prompt reply assuring the Prime Minister that he "had 
in no way compromised a position of impartiality and that no one had 
attempted to prejudice me in the matter. I expressed the hope that our 
own future relationships would be completely free of any suspicion.,,3 
On May 28, 1953, Mossadegh wrote another letter to Eisenhower, 
described by several writers as a piece of international b1ackmail.4 
"There can be serious consequences, from an international viewpoint," 
the Premier warned, "if this situation is pennitted to continue. If 
prompt and effective aid is not given this country now, and steps that 
might be taken tomorrow to compensate ••• might well be too late. u5 
The tmplication was that the only alternative was communism. Mossadegh 
lEisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 160. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid ., pp. l60-61~ 
4cottam, Nationalis3. in Iran, p. 216; or·~ of several that could 
be ci~ed. 
5Eisenhower, ~date for Change, p. 161. 
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first thought that the loss of Iranian oil would bring concessions 
from the West. But he was proved wrong since the market was so glutted 
with Iraqi, Kuwaiti, and Saudi-Arabian oil, plus that of Venezuela, 
that oil companies operating in those countries were hoping the oil 
crisis in Iran would not be settled. During the month it took Eisenhower 
to send a reply, Mossadegh realized that President Eisenhower's coop-
eration was not going to be obtained easily. In desperation, therefore, 
he allowed the Tudeh party a free hand to play on America's fear of 
communism. He certainly was not conspiring with the communists, but 
in his effort to frighten the Americans,l some American officials, 
including President Eisenhower, thought he was. But whether the United 
States was afraid of communism or whether she finally gave up on 
Mossadegh, she decided to act. Her action, however, was not according 
to Dr. Mossadegh's expectations. On June 29, 1953, President Eisenhower 
in his reply to Mossadegh refused to "pour more Americ~n money into a 
country in turmoil in order to bail Mossadegh out of troubles rooted 
in his refusal to work an agreement with Britain.,,2 The President 
wrote, 
it would not be fair to the American taxpayers • • • to extend 
any considerable amount of economic aid to Iran so long as Iran 
could have access to funds derived from oil and oil products • • 
Similarly, many American citizens would be deeply opposed to 
purchase by the United States government of Iranian oil in the 
absence of an oil settlement. 3 
lCottam, Nationalism in ~, pp. 216-17. 
2Eisenhower, Handate for Chan.ge, p. 162. 
3Ibid. 
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After deciding to abolish the Majlis, a ple~cite was held on August 2, 
in which Mossadegh got 99.4 percent of the votes and, according to 
~ise~hower, "Iran's downhill course toward communist-supported dictator-
ship was picking up momentum."l 
MOssadegh was already defeated. Richard Cottam contends that as 
opposition ranks swelled against Mossadegh, it included landowners, 
merchants, members of the court, officers of the army, and clerical 
leaders, plus splits within his National Front. 2 But MOssadegh would 
not give in. Instead he strove to continue his regime without oil 
revenue and without American aid. He had hoped that the Soviet Union 
would grant Iran $20 million to keep his treasury afloat for two or 
three more months. In fact, a new Soviet Ambassador arrived in Teheran 
in early August. But Eisenhower's letter was published and broadcast 
over the Voice of America. 3 Iranians realized that the U.S. had given 
up on MOssadegh and his government. Soon a CIA plan to oust him from 
power was underway. According to accounts of what followed, supplied 
by the Shah in his Mission for ~ Country and by President Eisenhower 
in his Mandate for Change, 1953-1956, one gets the impression that the 
move against MOssadegh was a purely spontaneous popular revolt and 
that once the people knew what the Shah wanted, opinions began to 
crystallize. Other observers believe, however, that it was not all 
that simple; that interference by foreign agents w· 3 evident and that 
1Ibid., p. 163. 
Zcottam, Nationalism in Iran, pp. 223-25. 
3Ibid·., p. 224. 
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huge sums of money were expended on an intricate operation to bring 
about MOssadegh's downfall. There is no reason to dispute the fact 
t·hat the American CIA was instrumental in bringing about the fall of 
MOssadegh, especially after Allen Dulles confirmed it. Speaking of 
Iran and Guatemala and the intention of their leaders to turn them 
into communist-dominated countries, Allen Dulles records, 
When this purpose became clear, support from outside was 
given to loyal anti-Communist elements in the respective coun­
tries, in the one case, to the Shah's supporters; in the other 
to a group of Guatemalan patriots. In each case the danger 
was successfully met. l 
Miles Copeland, who calls himself an American "cripto-diplomat" and 
operated in the Middle East for a long time, tells how in August 1953, 
and in Operation Ajax, his colleague Kirmit Roosevelt "almost single­
handedly called pro-Shah forces on to the streets of Teheran and 
supervised their riots so as to oust Mossadegh and restore the Shah, 
who had fled to Rome. 2 Andrew Tully contends, "It is senseless • • 
to say that the Iranians overthrew Mossadegh all by themselves. It 
was an American operation from beginning to end."3 
The operation by the CIA involved, among others, its own chief, 
Allen Dulles, Ambassador Henerson, General Schwartzkopf (a former 
director of the American police mission to Iran), "whose membership 
lAllenDulles, The Craft of Intelligence (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1963), p. 224. 
2Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power 
Politics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), p. 51. 
3Andrew Tully, CIA: The Inside Story (New York: Morrow, 1962), 
p. 96. 
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in the famed Central Intelligence Agency was known to everyone.,,,l and 
Princess Ashraf as they met in Switzerland for a joint "vacation." On 
August 13, the Shah dismissed MOs$adegh and appointed General Zahedi 
Premier. When the note reached MOssadegh on the 15th, he had the 
officer sent to deliver it arrested and thrown in jail. The revolt 
was announced-crushed. The Shah, fearing for his life, took his queen 
and fled the country to Rome through Baghdad. But, according to Andrew 
Tully, 
Shwartzkopf • • • held his ground on the Iranian stage. He 
took over as unofficial paymaster for the MOssadegh-Must-Go 
clique. Certain Iranians started to get rich, and the word 
later was that in a period of a few days Shwartzkopf supervised 
the careful spending of more than ten million of CIA's dollars. 
MOssadegh suddenly lost a great many supporters. 2 
Fred Cook observes that the "CIA showed a tendency, if not to brag, 
at least to chuckle in public about this wily and triumphant coup; 
but the aftennath has furnished no cause for unalloyed re'joicing. ,,3 
On August 19, a pro-Shah demonstration followed by army units 
led by Zahedi overthrew Mossadegh, who was captured in the same day clad 
in his famous pajamas and throvm in jail.4 General Zahedi took over 
IFontaine, Cold War from Korean War !2 Present, p. 151. 
2Tully, CIA, p. 95. 
3Fred J. Cook, "The CIA," The Nation, Special Issue (June 24, 1961), 
532; for further details on the August 19 coup, see also, Richard and 
Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of the CIA," Saturday Evening 
Post (Novembe~ 6, 1954), 34ff. 
4Accounts differ. According to one account, he turned himself 
in to the authorities the following day. 
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as Premier and the Shah returned. The coup was carefully staged to 
appear as though it was an Iranian uprising in favor of the Shah 
'brought about spontaneously. The~'e is no doubt that there were many 
who opposed Mossadegh, but there is no doubt either that they got most 
of the encouragement from the CIA, and this fact was not hidden from 
educated Iranfans. The impact of this action was far-reaching as it 
helped bring a complete change in the political climate in Iran. The 
first act of the new government was to outlaw the Tudeh party and hunt 
down its members. National Front members went underground as they were 
barred from active political life and from the parliament. As a result, 
the U.S. was blamed by the Nationalists for their misfortune. To them, 
both the Shah and Zahedi were American puppets, who brought Iran under 
foreign domination. According to Don Peretz, 
Although the Shah has • • • attempted to make himself the 
symbol of unity, a strong feeling has not been revived since 
the downfall of Mossadegh. Since then, Iran has again been 
torn by the divisive elements that have so often prevented 
it from becoming a unified nation in the past. l 
IV. THE AFTERMATH 
The coup against Mossadegh was an American gamble, but a winning 
one. The Shah was clearly favored by the U.S. As a result his position 
and influence were tremendously strengthened. He gained absolute 
control over the government, was able to crush all opposition, and to 
consistently follow a pro-American policy. The U.S. moved quickly to 
lDon Peretz, The Middle East Today (New York: Rinehart and 
Winston, 1963), pp. 429-30. 
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find a solution to the oil problem. In the meantime, Iran desperately 
needed funds. So the U.S. supplied her with a $45 million loan until 
oil operations could be resumed. l 
The author of the Venezuelan petroleum law, Herbert Hoover, Jr., 
was dispatched to Teheran. Both General Zahedi and the Shah were eager 
to reach a solution so the country could stand on its feet again. 
Due to the situation in Iran, oil nationalization could not be undone-­
a fact that Hoover could not ignore. While still in Teheran, Hoover 
struck upon the idea of an oil consortium. In London, his idea met 
with opposition at first, but after several exchanges in both London 
and Teheran, it was tentatively agreed upon. In December 1953, major 
oil companies met in London to discuss its feasibility. A.I.O.C. 
demanded a controlling share, but the U.S. objected. What the U.S. 
wanted and got was that each of Britain and the U.S. would hold 40% 
of the shares in the consortium, and the remaining 20% of the shares 
would be divided between France and Holland. The U.S. share was 
divided equally among five different U.S. companies: Standard Oil of 
California, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Socony-Mobile, The Texas 
Company, and Gulf Oil. In March 1954, particip~~ing companies began 
talks with the Iranian government and the A.I.O.C. in Teheran. By 
the end of October, the agreement was ratified by the Majlis and approved 
by the Shah. In November normal oil operations were resumed. 
Since 1953 the U.S. has supplied Iran with massive amounts of 
aid, making her nne of the major recipients of American aid. Approximately 
lLenczowski, Middle East in World Affairs, p. 216. 
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half of the aid was toward building Iran's army. Immediately following 
the overthrow of Mbssadegh in August, the U.S. government, according 
\ 
to Andrew Tully, whose figures come from the 1957 report of the 
Committee on Governmental Operations of the HOuse of Representatives, 
"began to feed mutual security funds into Iran at an average rate of 
five million dollars a month, and kept this up for three years to make 
up deficits in Iran's budget. lfl Incidentally, the House Committee 
revealed that American aid in Iran was so loosely administered and so 
poorly handled that it was "impossible--with any accuracy--to tell 
what became of the funds.,,2 The situation has, no doubt, improved 
since then. Through financial aid, the U.S. has become the principal 
supporter of the Iranian army and the principal source of development 
funds, not including revenue from- oil. Without American assistance, 
the Iranian economy would have coll~psed. As a result the U.S.~ 
through this aid and through her participation in the I.O.C., acquired 
a firm hold on the Iranian' economy. Naturally this influence was 
resented by many Iranians, and U.S. aid was considered an obligation 
after being instrumental in bringing about the fall of Mossadegh. 
Many also thought that assistance was the necessary price for Iran's 
continued support of the Western alliance system. 
As the chief source of equipment, advice, and funds for Iran's 
army, the U.S. concluded that the army was the mainstay of the Shah's 
regime. The Shah was to fulfill the hope of the U.S. in fostering 
lTully, C~, p. 97. 
2Quoted in Ibid. 
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stability as against chaos and a communist take-over. With the army 
continuing to be loyal to the Shah, its impr.ovement and strength 
would serve to keep the Shah in p<..wer and n.aintain internal order, not 
to protect or defend Iran against Russia. In the course of an investi­
gation of the military aid program to Iran, Senator Hubert Humphrey 
reported that-the Chief of Iran's army, then, said that the Iranian 
"Army was in good shape, thanks to U.S. aid--it was now capable of 
coping with the civilian population."l U.S. interest accounts for 
the $530,100,0002 the U.S. spent on Iran's army between 1945 and 1961, 
and for its American training and organization. The economy and the 
Crown, therefore, became dependent on the U.S. for support and assistance. 
Thus by her continued support to the Shah, the United States made all 
Iranians who were anti-Shah also anti-U.S. In exchange, the Shah's 
~, 
regime followed a consistently pro-Western policy, joined the Baghdad 
t 
1: 
i. Pact; and when this was dissolved following the 1958 Revolution in 
f j Iraq, Iran joined the Central Treaty Organization.I 
~ On the economic level, the Shah has apparently succeeded beyond
I. :-",
t any expectations. By 1900,'''economic development went forward by leapsf 
t' 
and bounds,,,3 according to 'I.C. Young, U.S. loans amounted to $200 
million in economic aid and to $850 million in military aid between 
! lHubert Humphrey, quoted in David Horowitz, The Free World Colossus (New York: Hill and Wang, 1965), p. 190. 
2Sheehan, Iran, p. 51. 
3T.Cuyler Young, "Iran in Continuing Crisis," Foreign Affairs, 
XL (January, 1962), 280. 
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1950 and 1960.1 The successes gained under the Shah cause one to doubt 
whether the Nationalists could have produced better results in the 
ngu;rdianship and guidance of the nation."2 
1Ibid. 
2Ibid., p. 287. 
CHAPTER 11 
THE CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRABt. 
Zionism originated in Russia. It was first preached by Leon 
Pinsker, a Russian Jew, in 1882. The most effective political leader 
of Zionism, however, was Theodore Herz1, an Austrian Jew, who wrote 
The Jewish State. This book and Herz1's other efforts resulted in the 
creation of the World Zionist Organization. Herzl', initial bid to 
obtain Ottoman approval of the Zionist plan to establish a Jewish Home 
in Palestine did not meet with much success. In 1903, England 
offered an African protectorate for that purpose. This offer wal 
refused by the Russian Zionist majority despite the fact that HarEl 
was in favor of it. It was in Palestine that they wanted their Jew1.h 
Home established. 
1. ZIONISM AND THE POWERS 
Russian pogroms in the late nineteenth century caused many Jew. 
to immigrate to Western Europe and the United State.~ As a result, 
Zionism spread to those areas, which eventually became the main center. 
of Zionist activity.1 Dr. Chaim Weizmann and Nahum Sokolow solicited 
the aid of British statesmen as ~ar1y as 1906, and their mis.1on 
eventually resulted in the issuance of the Balfour Declaration of 
1Nahum Sokolow, History of Zionism, 1600·1918 (2 vol•• in 1; 
New York: KTAV Publishing House, 1969), pp. 217·27. 
1917 by Arthur Balfour, Britain's Foreign Secretary.1 The United' 
States extended her support for this Declaration a short time 1ater.2 
Franee and Italy followed with vague gestures of support. 3 The 
Allies were not only interested in Zionism, but also gave support to 
its movement in order to secure the help of Jewish members in the 
Kerensky government of 1917 in encouraging the Russians to stay in 
the War, to outbid the Germans in soliciting the support of world 
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Jewry, and to strengthen Britain's position in the Middle East through 
a Jewish-dominated Palestine. 
To the Arabs, Britain made the promise of complete independence 
under a unified Arab nation (including Palestine) as a reward for 
joining the war on the side of Britain and her allies. But on May 16, 
1916, Britain and France signed the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement, 
dividing many Arab territories into zones of influence, British-and-
French-administered areas, and provided for the internationalization 
of Palestine. When the Russian revolutionary government made known 
the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement in December 1917, Britain 
reaffirmed her promises to the Arabs and declared that the treaty 
was not formal. The Arabs were appeased, and Britain continued to 
enjoy Arab confidence and support. When Arab fears began to rise 
lSee, Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (London: Valentine, 
Mitchell, 1961). 
2Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error (New York: Harper, 1949), p. 211. 
3Ibid., pp. 212-13; Stein, Balfour Declaration, pp. 465-71, 520-32, 
587-97. 
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again, Britain and France issued a joint statement assuring the 
Arabs "complete and final liberation."l These promises and President 
Wilson's "Fourteen Points" gave the necessary assurance the Arabs 
needed in support of the principle of national self-determination. 
In 1922, Palestine became a separate political entity when 
Britain received it as a mandated territory. The terms of the mandate, 
which incorporated the Balfour Declaration, were signed with the 
League of Nations. Under the mandate, the Jews were allowed to set 
up the Jewish Agency, and Hebrew became an official language in 
Palestine like Arabic and English. The Arabs considered this arrange­
ment unjust, undemocratic, and contrary to all the promises made to 
them. The first British Commissioner's efforts to organize an 
advisory council met with Arab resistance and ultimately failed. 
The Zionist aim was to retain the mandate until large-scale immigration 
placed the Jews in the majority and then to press for a Jewish state. 
Unrestricted immigration, therefore, was vital to the Jews, but ob­
jectionable to the Arabs. That is why it became the basic source of 
friction. 2 
By 1936, the Zionists had thoroughly cultivated the Western 
press, public, statesmen, and had organized Zionist cells throughout 
the world to gain support for their cause. After 1933, Nazi persecution 
brought an up-swing in Jewish immigration to Palestine. When the 
1Quoted in AntoniUS, The Arab Awakening, pp. 435-36, Appendix E. 
2Fred John Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (Syracuse, N.Y.: 
Syracuse UniverSity Press, 1968), pp. 17-24. 
I 
r 

54 
Paleatinian Arabs revolted in 1936-37, Britain arrested their leaders 
or forced them to flee. Several Royal commissions reported that the 
basic causes for unrest were Arab desire for independence and their 
fear of Jewish objectives in Palestine. Britain came to the reali­
zation that she had trapped herself with conflicting promises to both 
Jews and Arabs and the way out was becoming more difficult every day. 
Perhaps the most important British effort to settle the Palestinian 
problem was the Peel Commission of 1937, which drew up plans for 
partitioning Palestine. The Jews agreed to those plans provided they 
got a large area. The Arabs strongly objected and stepped up their 
acts of violence against the British mandate government. When it was 
concluded that partition was not workable, Britain called the two 
Palestinian communities and the Arab States for a conference, which 
was held in London during March 1939. This conference, like all 
previous British efforts to settle the problem, failed. 
The British government, realizing once more her need for Arab 
support, issued a white paper that favored the Arabs. Italy and Germany 
were at work arousing Arab feelings against Britain. The 1939 White 
Paper, by restricting Jewish immigration to 75 thousand over a 5-year 
period and prohibiting land sales to Jews in certain areas, quieted 
the Arabs and secured their cooperation. Quite naturally, the Jews 
opposed the 1939 White Paper and accused Britain of a breach of 
contract. When war broke out, however, both Jews and Arabs joined 
the British forces. The Jewish Agency, realizing that eventually the 
Zionists would have to fight either the Arabs or the British (or both) 
to set up their state, encouraged Jewish youth to join the British 
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armed forces. Some 43,000 Palestinian Jews were enlisted. Britain 
set up a separate Jewish Brigade, which eventually became the backbone 
of Baganah, the principal Jewish fighting force in Palestine. In 
contrast, only about 8,000 Palestinian Arabs joined the British forces. 
Illegal Jewish immigration to Palestine was stepped up along with arms 
smuggling ana stealing of ammunition that belonged to the British 
forces. 
When Churchill came to power, the Zionist position was boosted 
because he was a known supporter of their objectives. In May 1942, 
the Zionist Biltmore Program called for a Jewish state officially for 
the first time. Until then, the Zionists had been calling for a 
.Jewish Home. In November 1944, Weizmann was privately informed by 
Churchill of a British Cabinet decision to ultimately grant the Jews 
a state in Palestine. The Arabs, on the other hand, were continuing 
to receive assurances that Britain was standing by the 1939 White 
Paper--their support was needed while the war was still onl 
In the United States, the government was sympathetic toward 
the Jewish cause. Its sympathy, however, was mainly due to humanitarian 
considerations. Since early twentieth century, America had conducted 
sustained negotiations with the Ottoman Empire with regard to the Jews. 
Zionist influence was not felt in the United States, however, until 
World War I. Although President Wilson was cautious in dealing with 
American Zionists and despite warnings by members of his own govern­
ment against 'Hldng public statements in favor of the Balfour 
Declaration, the Zionists finally succeeded in convincing him to 
write Rabbi Stephen Wise on August 31, 1918, 
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I have watched with deep and sincere interest the reconstructive 
work which the Weizmann Commission has done in Palestine at the 
instance of the British Government, and I welcome an opportunity 
to express the satisfaction I have felt in the progress of the 
Zionist Movement in the Unit::-.d States and in the Allied countries 
since the declaration of Mr. Balfour on behalf of the British 
Government, of Great Britain's approval of the establishment in 
Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and his 
promise that the British Government would use its best endeavors 
to facilitate the achievement of that objective, with the under-
standing that nothing would be done to prejudice the civil and 
religious rights of non-Jewish people in Palestine or the rights 
and political status enjoyed by Jews in other countries. l 
On September 21, 1922, the U.S. Congress passed a joint resolution 
endorsing the provisions of the Balfour Declaration. On December 3, 
1924, the United States recognized the British mandate over Palestine 
when the Anglo-American Mandate Treaty was signed. 2 On the whole, 
however, the U.S. government remained quite indifferent to the Zionist 
character of the Palestine mandate during the 1920's and the early 
1930's, since American Zionism was not yet a serious force to be 
reckoned with. But in 1937, the State Department issued a statement 
that came shortly before the Peel Commdssion submitted its report. 
The statement said, 
As is well known, the American people have for many years taken 
a close interest in the development of the Jewish National Home 
in Palestine. Beginning with President Wilson each succeeding 
president has on one or more occasions expressed his own interest 
in the idea of a National Home and his pleasure in the progress 
made in its estab1ishment. 3 
1Quoted in Frank E. Manuel, The Realities of American-Palestine 
Relations (W~shington, D.C.: Public Affairs Pre;;, 1949), p. 176. 
2Corde1l Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 vols.; New York: 
Macmillan, 1948), II, 1528. 
3Ibid., p. 1529. 
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On July 6, 1937, the United States inquired of Britain whether 
she would be consulted on matters pertaining to Palestine and the Peel 
C~ssion partition proposa1s. 1 The 1939 British White Paper was 
received with a good deal of dismay in Washington. Soon after, the 
American Palestine Committee was organized. In early 1944, reso1u­
tions were introduced in the Senate and in the House of Representatives 
in favor of Jewish objectives in Palestine. However, Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull says, 
At the State Department we felt that the passage of these 
resolutions, although not binding on the executive, might 
precipitate conflict in Palestine and other parts of the Arab 
world endangering American troops and requiring the diversion 
of forces from European and other combat areas. It might 
prejudice o~ shatter pending negotiations with Ibn Saud, for 
the construction of a pipeline across Saudi Arabia, Which our 
military leaders felt was of utmost importance to our security.2 
But by then the American Jewish community had become the most 
influential among the Jews of the world. The American Zionist Emergency 
Council established a network of branches covering all of the United 
States. Through an extremely efficient and effective propaganda 
machine, the American Jews effectively won the support of ordinary 
American citizens as well as American officials. As a result, pro-
Zionist resolutions were passed in the majority of state legislatures, 
and both American political parties came under increasing Zionist 
pressure as the 1944 Presidential elections drew near. 
1Manue1, Realities.:! American-Palestine Relations, pp. 305-6. 
2Hu1l, Memoirs, II, 1534-35. 
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II. TRUMAN SUCCEEDS ROOSEVELT 
Both political parties and their candidates, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and Thomas E. Dewey, strongly backed the Zionist program 
in the Presidential election campaign of 1944. The Jewish vote could 
not be ignor~d, and each party tried to outbid the other for it. l 
Shortly after the elections, however, President Roosevelt met with 
King Ibn Saud,2 and told Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, while 
still in Egyptian waters, that as a result of his conversation with 
Ibn Saud, "he must have a conference with congressional leaders and 
re-examine our entire policy on Palestine.,,3 In a letter, one week 
before his death, he promised Ibn Saud that "no decision will be taken 
with respect to /Palestine7 • • • without full consultation with both 
Arabs and Jews." He closed his letter by further assuring the King 
that he "would take no action • • • which might prove hostile to the 
Arab people.,,4 Little did he or Ibn Saud know that death was to deny 
him the chance to prove how earnest he was. Roosevelt's death must 
have been very disappointing to Ibn Saud since he had great faith in 
his personal diplomacy, his principle of national self-determination, 
lNew York Times, October 12, 1944; Bradford Westerfield, Foreign 
Policy and Party Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), 
p. 166; U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, Diplomatic Papers: 1944 (7 vols.; Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1967), V, 605n, 606n, 616-17. 
2Foreign Relations ••• : 1945 (9 vols.; Washington, D.C.: 
Gc ~rnment Printing Office, 1967-69), VIII, 2-3, 7-9, 680-82, 701-2, 
7Cj~6. 
3Edward Reilly Stettinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians 
(Garden City J N.Y.: Doubleday, 1949), p. 289. -­
4Ibid., p. 290; Foreign Relations. 1945, VIII, 698. 
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his open-door policy, and deeply appreciated his opinion of Britain 
as an imperialistic power, who needed to learn to respect other people's 
sovereignty.l 
Upon assuming his responsibilities as President of the United 
States, Harry S. Truman received from the Secretary of State Edward 
Stettinius,2 rrom Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew,3 from his 
War Department,4 from State Department Representatives in the Middle 
East,5 chief of whom was Loy Henderson, and from Arab 1eaders,6 
counsel to be cautious in regard to the question of Palestine, 
warnings of Soviet intentions in the area, and reminders of President 
Roosevelt's promise to the Arabs. Aware of the strategiC and economic 
tmportance of the area, both the State and War Departments advised 
that American interests could be safeguarded only by maintaining 
Arab goodwill and friendship. The War Department further warned that 
a Jewish state could be established in Palestine only by force of 
arms. President Truman, therefore, formally assured the Arab leaders 
that he would abide by the promises made to them by his predecessor.7 
1Ibid., 7-8. 

2Ibid., 704-5; Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (2 vols.; Garden City, 

N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955-56), I, 68-69. 
3Foreign Relations 1945, VIII, 705. 
4Ibid., 742. 
5Ibid., 679-710. 
6Ibid. 
7Ibid., 707, 708-9; Truman, Memoirs, II, 135. 
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CODIDenting on this in his Memoirs, Truman says, "To assure the Arabs 
that they would be consulted was by no means inconsistent with my 
general sympathetic attitude toward Jewish aspirations."l 
Truman claims that he had familiarized himself with the question 
of Palestine and the position of both the Arabs and Britain. 2 And 
though he appeared, at first, to have heeded the advice of his State 
Department, he admits that he "was skeptical ••• about some of the 
views and attitudes assumed by the 'striped-pants boys' in the State 
Department. It seemed to me that they did not care what happened to 
the thousands of displaced persons who were involved."3 When he met 
Rabbi Wise, therefore, it was his "feeling that it would be possible 
for us to watch out for the long-range interests of our country while 
at the same time helping these unfortunate victims of persecution to 
find a home. And before Rabbi Wise left, I believe I made this clear 
to him.,,4 
In July 1945, Truman met with Churchill at Potsdam and discussed 
the situation in the Middle East with him. 5 By the end of the War in 
Europe, the brutality of the slaughter of the Jews was revealed and 
Zionist objectives gained greater sympathy and support. World Jewry 
lIbid. 

2Ibid., I, 69. 

3Ibid. 

4Ibid. 

5Ibid ., II, 136; Foreign Relations • • •. The Conference of 

Berlin, 1945 (2 vols.; Washington, D.C.: Gover~~ent Printing Office, 
1960), I, 979; II, 314-18. 
applied intensive pressure for open immigration and the establishment 
of a Jewish state in Palestine. Zionist propaganda had so effectively 
influenced American public opinio;:.l that th~ Palestine question became 
a burning issue in American domestic politics. l Truman was so 
influenced by Jewish political pressure and his sympathy (so he says) 
for the Nazi victims that he disregarded the advice of his own advisers 
and experts and the official American promises to the Arabs. He wrote 
to Churchill on July 24, 1945, requesting that restrictions on immi-
gration to Palestine be lifted,2 and in a press conference, he 
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answered, "we want to let as many Jews into Palestine as it is possible.,,3 
Truman's pro-Zionist policy became more pronounced in time. 
However, the cooperation he expected from Churchill was not forthcoming. 
Before Churchill could reply, Clement Attlee became Prime Minister 
and Ernest Bevin Foreign Secretary--the Labor Party took over the 
reins of power following its victory in the July elections. Zionist 
hopes rose because the Labor Party had consistently supported the 
Zionist cause.4 Upon assuming full responsibility for its policies, 
however, the Labor Party found that it could not deal with the Palestine 
problem without considering Britain's other obligations. Unlike 
1U.S., Congress, 79th Congress, 1st Session, June II-October 11, 
1945. Congressional Record, vol. 91, part 12, 3756, 3767, Appendix; 
Ibid., October IS-December 21, 1945, vol. 91, part 13, 4482, Appendix; 
see-a1so volumes of 1943-47. 
2Foreign Relations 
II, 135-36, 148. 
• 1945, VIII, 716-17; Truman, Memoirs, 
3Ibid ., 136; Foreign Relations ••• : 1945, VIII, 722. 
4Ibid ., 796; Ibid., Berlin, II, 1403. 
• • • 
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Truman, both Att1ee and Bevin heeded the advice of their officials 
in the Colonial and Foreign Offices, who were recommending a pro-Arab 
policy to prevent Russian entry into the area and to maintain British 
influence there. Palestine was to be the new British military base 
since the one in Egypt was to be abandoned due to Egyptian nationalist 
demands.1 Besides, a special committee, set up by the Labor govern­
ment to study the Palestine problem, concluded that without active 
American military and financial support Britain could not hope to carry 
out a pro-Zionist program. 2 
Therefore, Att1ee's reply on July 31 to Truman's letter in regard 
to immigration was not encouraging. 3 The British Colonial Office, 
in its turn, reaffirmed that no more than 1,500 permits per month 
would be granted for immigration into Pa1estine.4 This stand was firm 
and American and Zionist pressures were resisted. Truman, however, 
persisted and the Zionists accused the British Labor government of a 
breach of promise.5 The British government affirmed that, in the face 
of its obligations in the Arab world, the Jews could not be crowded 
into the small country of Palestine. And should this take place, 
1C1ement Richard Attlee, As It Happened (London: W. Heinemann, 
1945), pp. 244-45; Richard Crossman, "The Role Britain Hopes to 
Play ••• ," Conunentary (New York), V (June, 1948),495; Elizabeth 
Monroe, "Mr. Bevin's 'Arab Policy' ," in St. Antony's Papers, no. 11, 
Middle Eastern Affairs, no. 2; edited by Albert Hourani (London: 
Chatto &Windus, 1961), pp. 9-48. 
2Ibid., p. 29. 
3Truman, Memoirs, II, 136; Foreign Relations 1945, VIII, 
719. 
4Ibid., 719-20; Weizmann, Trial and Error, pp. 439-40. 
5Foreign Relations 1945, VIII, 819-20, 759. 
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the Arabs were likely to resist by force of arms with Soviet support. 
This would require American military and financial assistance since 
Grtat Britain could not carry the burden alone. l Truman, however, 
could not commit the U.S. to provide such support because he was 
under pressure from the American Congress and public to demobilize 
the armed forces and to avoid military commitments. 2 British officials 
were annoyed when Truman continued insisting that Britain adopt 
American policies without Americans assuming any responsibility for 
implementing them. 3 The following is Attlee's comment on this same 
situation several years later: "The Americans thought we should 
introduce a hundred thousand Jews into Palestine right away without 
the slightest consideration for the effect on the Arabs. They had no 
4obligation there. We had ... 
III. ANGLO-AMERICAN EFFORTS 
In his effort to make the United States share in the burden, 
Attlee proposed on October 19, 1945, the formation of an Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry.5 Truman, wishing perhaps to exclude the possibility 
lIbid., 771-76; Francis Williams, Twilight of Empire: Memoirs 
~ Prime Minister Clement Attlee, As Set Down !I Francis Williams 
(New York: Barnes, 1962), p. 181; Monroe, "Mr. Bevin's 'Arab PoliCY'," 
pp. 27-38; Truman, Memoirs, II, 136-37. 
2Ibid., 345; Congressional Record, vol. 91, part 13, 1945, 5666, 
5677, Appendix. 
3Francis Williams, Ernest Bevin: Portrait of ~ Great Englishman 
(London: Hutchinson, 1952), p. 260. 
4Williams, Twilight of Empire, p. 181. 
5Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 171; Truman, Memoirs, II, 
141. 
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of Jewish immigration into the United States, suggested that the 
inquiries be focused on Palestine.1 On December 19, 1945, and several 
~~hs beforp. this Committee released its report, the American Congress 
passed a resolution enjoining the American government to secure "free 
entry of Jews into Palestine so that they may have a chance to proceed 
to erect a Je"'Wl.sh Home.,,2 
When the Committee of Inquiry submitted its report on April 20, 
1946, they warned that Palestine could not absorb all the Jews who 
wanted to go there. Therefore, the U.S. and other countries should 
open their doors to them. It was recommended, however, that 100,000 
Jews be permitted to go to Palestine in 1946. Some other recommendations 
were that since Palestine was holy not only to the Jews but to two 
other religions, a democratic government with equal representation 
ought to be set up, that it should become a U.N. trust area, and that 
further immigration be based on the agreement between the two communities. 3 
President Truman immediately urged that 100,000 Jews be permitted to go 
to Palestine without delay.4 
1Ibid., 142; Foreign Relations 1945, VIII, 775-801, 
829-41. 
2Ibid., 841-42. 
3U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XIV (May 12, 1946), 783-84; 
Documents ~ American Foreign Relations, July 1, 1945-December 31, 1946, 
vol. VIII (Princeton, N.J.: Published for the World Peace Foundation 
by Princeton University Press, 1948), 908-14; Great Britain, Parliament, 
Papers ~ Command, Cmd. 6808, The Anglo-American Committee, Final 
Report, 1946 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1946). 
4Documents on American Foreign Relations (Princeton, 1948), VIII, 
908-14; Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 172; Department of State 
Bulletin (May 12, 1946), p. 783. 
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Quite naturally, the British officials were terribly upset over 
the fact that Truman chose one recommendation of the report and featured 
it. At this time Britain was negotiating treaties with Transjvcdan 
and Egypt, and the Arabs were criticizing her for her weakness in dealing 
with the Zionists.1 The British government demanded that the report 
should be considered "as a whole with all its implications." And to 
this Att1ee added that large-scale immigration into Palestine could not 
be permitted until the Zionists disbanded their underground armed forces 
and ended terrorism. 2 
The Zionist reaction was increased terrorism in Pa1estine. 3 
When Britain's mandatory government began to make arrests and to take 
firm measures against the Jewish Agency, the American Zionists and their 
supporters threatened to work for congressional rejection of the badly 
needed American loan to Britain. Disciplinary action against the 
Palestine Jews had, therefore, to be suspended. 4 On May 27 and 28, 
four Arab States met and issued a statement from Egypt warning both 
Britain and the United States that, "Although the Arabs wanted their 
friendship, that friendship would depend on whether the two democracies 
would or would not transgress upon the rights of the Palestine Arabs."S 
1Monroe, "Mr. Bevin's 'Arab PoliCY'," pp. 29-30; Truman, Memoirs, 
II, 147. 
2Ibid ., 149-50; Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 172-73. 
~ruman, Memoirs, II, 150. 
4James Forresta1, The Forresta1 Diaries, edited by Walter Millis 
(New York: Viking Press,-r951), p. 180. 
~idd1e East Opinion, I (June 10, 1946), 16-17. 
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This statement was followed by similar ones in an effort to remind the 
two governments that the Palestinian Arabs should be allowed their right 
for self-determination and independence. 
The Soviet Union, at this point, took advantage of the situation 
to win favor and further her interests. Zionism was attacked in Soviet. 
newspapers as an agent of British imperialism and the Anglo-American 
Committee was criticized for by-passing the Arab States and the United 
Nations. 1 Such an attack ought to have brought the U.S. and Britain 
closer together, but it did not. In the face of Russian threats in 
. Turkey, Iran, North Africa, and Europe, Anglo-American accord was being 
threatened mainly because of the Palestine problem. Arab diplomats 
called on Acheson and Henderson; they were assured once more that the 
U.S. government would take no action on Palestine without consulting 

both Arabs and Jews. 2 But it was obvious that American policy was 

not being faithful to these promises. Attlee's description of this 

tug-of-war between those involved is very revealing. He says, 

The President went completely against the advice of his own 
State Department and his own military people. The State Depart­
ment would tell us one thing and then the President would come 
out with the exact opposite. The State Department's view was 
very close to ours, they had to think internationally.3 
In June 1946, Bevin complained that Truman was pressing for 

immigration into Palestine because he did not want the Jews in the 

United States. In Bevin's view, Truman's persistence was dictated by 

IJacob Coleman Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine (New York: 

Nor~on, 1950), pp. 246-47; Khouri, Arab-Israeli Dilemma, pp. 35-36. 

2Acheson, Present !! the Creation, p. 173. 

3williams, Twiligitt of Empire, p. 181. 
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domestic politics and because of Jewish contributions to the Democratic 
Party's purse. 1 Therefore, to avoid further deterioration in relations, 
Truman and Att1ee agreed to review the problem. The MOrrison~rady 
Commission was formed and submitted its report on July 10, 1946. 
This Commission called for a federal state to consist of a small 
Jewish province. a large Arab province, and for controlled immigration 
by a central government, whose executives were to be appointed by the 
British government. 2 Both Jews and Arabs rejected the plan and, on 
August 12, Truman rejected it too. 3 
In the congressional election campaign of 1946, again both parties 
supported the Zionist program and, on October 4, President Truman 
publicly called for immediate admittance of Jews in substantial numbers 
into Palestine without waiting for a solution. 4 At about the same 
time, the British government was trying through conferences with Arabs 
and Jews to find some kind of a solution. When these efforts failed, 
Bevin alleged that they were undermined by the President's campaign 
speeches. 5 Bevin's statement annoyed Truman. In his Memoirs he says 
that the immigration issue "had been the cornerstone of our Palestine 
policy since my first letter to Att1ee August, 1945.,,6 
1Acheson, Present !! the Creation, pp. 169, 173; Truman, Memoirs, 
II, 149. 
2Ibid., 151-52. 
3Ibid., 152. 
~ew York Times, October 5, 1946. 
5Truman , Memoirs, II, 153-54. 
6Ibid., 154. 
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The President's position naturally weakened the position of the 
moderate Zionists while it encouraged the extremists to hold fast to 
th~ir max~ demands and to refuse to make any significant concessions. 
This was evident in the resolution of the 22nd Zionist Congress, held 
in December 1946, which consented to nothing less than a Jewish state 
or a favorable partition plan. l This situation led to the stiffening 
of the Arab position too. 2 
Following the failure of the Anglo-Jewish-Arab and Anglo-American 
efforts, Britain submitted her own plan. When this too was rejected 
by both Jews and Arabs, Britain requested formally on April 2, 1947, 
that the United Nations General Assembly call a special session to deal 
with the probl~.3 Britain apparently had found out that the costs 
of the mandate outweighed the advantages. The Arabs and Jews were 
alienated. Besides, the Jews had made Palestine no longer suitable as 
a British military base.4 
IV. THE PROBLEM BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS 
When the United Nations General Assembly met in April 1947, all 
went well, except for Russian insistence that the British mandate be 
lHarry Sacher, Israel: The Establishment of ~ State (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1952), p. 71. .. 
~urewitz, Struggle, p. 265; Arab News Bulletin (London, 
November 18, 1946), p. 2. 
3United Nations, Yearbook, 1946-47 (Lake Success, N.Y.: United 
Nations, Department of Public Information, 1947), p. 227. 
4Ibid ., p. 281; Crossman, liThe Role Britain Hopes to Play," 
pp. 496-97; Monroe, "Mr. Bevin's 'Arab Policy'," pp. 32-36. 
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ended immediately and a minor disagreement between the Russian and 
American representatives. Mr. Andre Gromyko, the Soviet Representative, 
wanted the five permanent memberz of the Security Council to be the 
nucleus of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. Mr. Warren 
Austin, the American representative, objected, possibly because he did 
not want the ~oviet Union to have anything to do with the direction 
of affairs in Palestine. But the Russians were determined to have a 
say; so Mr. Gromyko spoke in favor of Zionist aspirations. 1 This was 
a great surprise since Stalin was a known anti-Zionist2 and since 
only the previous summer the Soviet Union took the exact opposite 
view. Why did the Soviets take such a stand then? Soviet foreign 
relations papers would help supply the answer, but such papers are not 
available from the Soviet Union. Had Soviet strategic planners perceived 
then that partition would not bring peace, making it possible for them 
to acquire the influence they always longed for in that area? Or 
was it a strike against Anglo-American cooperation? Did they think 
they could export Russian communists to exploit the situation? 
According to Charles Issawi, 
Their objective was a negative one: ultimately to eliminate 
all western power in the Middle East and in the meantime to 
weaken the western position in every way, militarily, politically, 
economically and culturally • • • • Hence the task of the Soviets 
was easy. All they had to do was to ally themselves with what­
ever force happened to be fighting the West: Syrian and Lebanese 
nationalism in 1945, Zionism in 1947-9, and, since 1955, Arab 
nationali.. sm led by Egypt and Syria. 3 
1United Nations, Yearbook, 1946-47, p. 302; see also, Ibid., 
1947-48, pp. 235, 244-45. 
2Svet1ana A11iuyeva, Twenty Letters to ~ Friend (New York: 
Harper &Row, 1967), p. 196. 
3Charles Issawi, "Middle East Dilemmas: An Outline of Problems," 
Journal of International Affairs, XIII, no. 2 (1959); 102. 
--- --- -- - --- --
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The UNSCOP submitted its report to the General Assembly in 
September 1947. The majority recommendation was for partition. l 
An Ad Hoc Committee was formed to determine how partition could be 
carried out. Britain warned that she would not use her troops to 
enforce the plan should the Arabs or the Jews not accept it. 2 The 
American mem~er on the Ad Hoc Committee, Herschel Johnson, proposed 
that the Negev and Jaffa be part of the Arab state. When Weizmann 
learned of this proposal, he immediately requested to see Truman and 
succeeded in doing so on the 19th of November, 1947. Truman was so 
impressed that he telephoned Johnson at the United Nations instructing 
him to drop his proposal and support the inclusion of the Negev 
in the Jewish State. 3 
The Arabs were informed by the State Department that, though the 
American government was going to vote for partition, she would not 
apply pressure on other members to do so.4 Truman says that, although 
he was urged by some Zionists to press other nations into favorable 
votes, he "has never approved of the practice of the strong imposing 
1See, United Nations, General Assembly, Special Committee on 
Palestine, Report on Palestine: Report to the Second Session of the 
General Assembly, 1947 (New York: Somerset Books, 1947); United 
Nations, Yearbook, 1947-48, pp. 231-32; Jorge Garcia-Granados, The 
Birth of Israel: The Drama as I Saw It (New York: Knopf, 1948). 
2Documents ~ American Foreign Relations, 1947, IX, 724-30; 
United Nations, Yearbook, 1947-48, p. 232. 
lweizmann, Trial and Error, pp. 458-59; Herbert Feis, The 
Birth of Israel: The Tousled Diplomatic Bed (New York: Norton, 
1969),p. 44. 
4Ibid., pp. 45-66. 
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their will on the weak."l If this is a denial by Truman that American 
pressure was not applied, it does not represent the truth. Sumner 
Welles says, 
By direct order of the White House every form of pressure, 
direct or indirect, was brought to bear by American officials 
upon those countries outside the Moslem world that were known 
to be either uncertain or opposed to partition. Representatives 
or inte~diaries were employed by the White House to m~ke sure 
that the necessary majority would at length be secured. 
The Arabs opposed partition as grossly unfair and undemocratic. 
The Jewish minority was being allotted the best part of Palestine. 
Besides, the proposed Jewish state was going to have as many Arabs 
as Jews. Therefore, the right of the Arab half needed to be recognized 
if the principle of self-determination meant anything. Under the 
proposed partition, their right for self-determination was being denied, 
while the Jews, most of them still foreigners, were entitled to it. 
They even denied the legal and moral obligation of the United Nations 
to partition Palestine against the wishes of its legitimate inhabitants. 3 
Forrestal, seeing the danger to American interests, tried unsuccessfully 
to effect a change in American policy.4 State Department officials 
had apprently given up on the issue by then, since it was bringing 
them only embarrassment and loss of face. 
lTruman, Memoirs, II, 158. 
2Sumner Welles, We Need Not Fail (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1948), p. 63. 
3Kermit Roosevelt, "The Partition of Palestine," Middle East 
Journal, II (January, 1948), 14; United Nations, Yearbook, 1947=48, 
pp. 232-33. 
4rruman, Memoirs, II, 133, 140; Forrestal, Diaries, pp. 360, 411. 
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When the Soviet Union announced that she would vote for partition, 
needless to say, the Zionists were overjoyed while the Arabs' anger and 
dismay mounted. Arab representatives tried in vain to delay the vote 
on the resolution. The President of the U. N. General Assembly ruled 
that it should be voted immediately. Efforts in support of Arab demands 
by several nations also failed. When the partition resolution was 
passed on November 29, 1947, by a majority of 33 votes against 13 (and 
10 abstentions), the Arab representatives announced that they would not 
abide by it. 1 They have kept their word. One Arab spokesman, Prince 
Feisa1 of Saudi Arabia, said to the U.N. Assembly, 
We have felt like many others, the pressure exerted on various 
representat~ves of this Organization by some of the big powers 
in order that voting should be in favor of partition • • • • My 
Government holds responsible those parties that hampered all 
means of cooperation and understanding. 2 
Dr. Fadhi1 a1-Jama1i, the Foreign Minister of Iraq, added, 
The fact that we failed to win your support is not the result 
of a lack of good will on the part of the members of this 
assembly. It is not due to a lack of understanding on the 
part of most of you. On the contrary we understand very well 
that it was great pressure and great influence that worked 
itself through the Ad Hoc Committee and through the General 
Assembly to direct the matter in a course which led to this 
conclusion. 3 
V. COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM 
War broke out even before the mandate was terminated. Both America 
and Britain knew all along that the Jews w~u1d be able to smash Arab 
1United Nations, Yearbook, 1947-48, pp. 245, 261. 
2United Nations, General Assembly, Official :':.cords, 128 
Plenary Meeting, 1947, vol. II, p. 1425, Appendix A'~ (III). 
3Ibid., p. 1427 .. 
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resistance when the time came. l The worry in the United States was over 
the suspicion of what Russia might do if the United States did not inter­
venL. Both Scate and War Department officials did not want to see the 
United States fight against the Arabs in case the Soviets decided to 
assist the Arabs. 2 The United States, therefore, started considering 
the possibility of a trusteeship instead of partition. Again Weizmann 
requested to see Truman, but the President was not willing to see any 
Zionist spokesman at that time. Eddie Jacobson, Truman's former partner 
in the haberdashery business,3 interceded. Truman recalls that when 
. Weizmann saw him on March 18, he was gratified and "reached a full 
understanding of my policy and that I knew what it was he wanted.,,4 
The next day the United States representative at the United 
Nations declared that, since partition could not be implemented peace­
fully, it should be suspended. 5 The Zionists attacked the State Depart­
ment and especially Loy Henderson. President Truman took the Palestine 
affairs from Henderson and placed them in the charge of Major General 
Hilldring, an ardent pro-Zionist. 6 And to comfort Weizmann, he asked 
his adviser, Samuel Rosenman, to assure him that this was not a change 
in the United States long-range "policy he and I talked about.,,7 Truman 
1Winston Churchill, The Second World War (6 vols.; Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1948-53), V, 688; Feis, Birth of Israel, p. 59. 
2Forrestal, Diaries, p. 410. 
3Jonathan Daniels, The Man of Independence (New York: Lippincott, 
1950), p. 318; Feis, Birth of Israel, p. 53. 
4rruman, Memoirs, II, 190. 
5Forrestal, Diaries, p. 360; Westerfield, Foreign Policy, p. 233. 
6Acheson, Present ~ the Creation, p. 173. 
7Truman, Memoirs, II, 162. 
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continues, "He knew, I am sure, what the direction of American policy 

ttl
was.
It appears that Truman, by then, had already made up his mind to 
recognize the Jewish state when it came into existence. Feis states that 
on April 12, 1948, he authorized Jacobson to inform Weizmann of this 
decision and to reassure him that he stood by his promises. 2 Weizmann, 
upon advising Ben Gurion to proclaim the state, notified Truman that this 
would take place on May l4;at midnight. 3 Truman, determined to grant 
immediate recognition, got in touch with the Jewish Agency to coordinate 
. the action. Truman claims that Secretary Marshall supported his policy.4 
It was revealed, however, that he objected to it, but when he learned 
that Truman was already on record for a Jewish state, he gave up.5 There 
was no way to change American policy against the wishes of the President. 
Secretary Byrnes, before him, had tried and failed. Byrnes is even 
reported to have washed his hands of the Palestine policy.6 
When Israel was proclaimed a state as planned, the United States' 
recognition was declared only 11 minutes later. Truman's decision was 
a purely personal one. His State Department and his United Nations 
lIbido 

2Feis , Birth of Israel, p. 59. 

3Truman, MemOirs, II, 164. 

4Ibid. 

Swesterfield, Foreign Policy, p. 233. 

6Forrestal, Diaries, p. 310; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 

p. 169. 
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mission were informed only after action was taken. l He did not trust 
them, it seems, and believed they wanted to block recognition. 2 Truman 
recnlls, "Charlie Ross, my press secretary, handed the press the 
announcement.,,3 He adds, "I was told that to some of the career men 
at the State Department this announcement came as a surprise. It should 
not have been~if these men had faithfully supported my policy.,,4 
Truman further reveals, "I wanted to make it plain that the President 
of the United States ••• is responsible for making foreign policy, 
and furthermore, that no one in any department can sabotage the President's 
. policy."5 
Israel won the war, partly due to substantial assistance from 
abroad--foreign'money, arms, and volunteers. 6 One grave consequence 
of the war was to drive about one million Palestinians from their homes 
and property.7 Unmindful of the suffering of the new refugees, despite 
his claims at sympathy and philanthropy, Truman declared on October 28, 
1948, "Israel must be large enough and strong enough to make its people 
lIbid.; Daniels, Man of Independence, p. 319; Cecil Van Meter 

Crabb, Jr., Bipartisan Foreign Policy (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 

1957), p. 124. 

2Truman , Memoirs, II, 164. 
3I bid. 
4Ibid • 
5Ibid., 165. 
~ew York Times, May 16, 23; June 6, 11, 14; July 1; October 11, 
1948. 

7William Reitzel, United States Foreign Policy, 1945-55 (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1956), pp. 216-17. 
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self-supporting and secure."1 It was mainly through American support 
that Israel was established; it was through her influence that partition 
was adopted; she was the first n~tion to grant de facto recognition; and 
her President was promising her (Israel) economic and logistic support. 
What else could be done to aggravate and embitter the Arabs? 
They placed primary blame on the United States and Britain and almost 
ignored the key role Russia played. If Russia's stand was meant to 
create such a situation, in the first place, it was indeed a masterly 
stroke of remarkable foresight and genius. What followed since then 
only confirms this belief. 
lHew York Times, October 29, 1948. 
CHAPTER III 
THE ALIENATION OF THE ARAB WORLD 
Up to 1946, the main concerns of the United States Government had 
been safeguarding and expanding American oil business in the Middle 
East and securing and maintaining normal trade relations with Middle 
Eastern states. The United States neither sought control of Middle 
Eastern States nor wished to interfere with their affairs. The fact 
that the United States left the area soon after the war ended in 1945 
was a clear indication of this post-war American attitude toward the 
Middle East. Of the twenty-seven bases the United States operated and 
maintained in the area, only the one in Tripoli was kept under American 
control. The new base at Dhahran, secured in early 1946, was to be 
maintained and used by the United States for a period of three years.l 
The American involvement in Iran beginning in 1946, and the 
declaration of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947 marked the starting 
points of an era of growing American involvement in Middle Eastern 
affairs. American involvement came as a response to the challenges 
of the Soviet Union. In the Middle East, the United States began to 
adopt the British outlook on defense. This identification with Britain 
was finally to prove as diasterous to United States interests in the 
area as her pro-Zionist policy, and marked the first significant reversal 
of American traditional policy in the Middle East. It came as a result 
lNew York Times, February 8, 1946. 
of a necessity felt by the United S-tat.es to establish a situation of 
strength in the Middle East to replace that of the British and French, 
whose influence had been greatly weakened. l 
The preservation of the status quo became the primary concern of 
the United States. It was considered to be an effective means of 
maintaining the traditional Western influence in the area, of insuring 
the safety of communication routes and the supply of oil, and of 
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discouraging Soviet attempts to gain influence in the area. The Truman 
Doctrine was successful in Greece and Turkey. But following its 
declaration, Czechoslovakia fell to the communists, Berlin was blockaded, 
mainland China came under communist rule, and a conflict in Korea 
erupted. Such events made it appear to the Western powers that the 
status quo in the Middle ~ast could be maintained only through a l1iddle 
Eastern military defense alliance with the West. The assumption on 
the part of the Western powers that the states of the Arab World would 
welcome an alliance with them in the same way Greece and Turkey had 
welcomed American aid after Britain's withdrawal proved erroneous. 2 
This assumption was based on an invalid rationale because the 
Arabs were far from being disturbed by a Russian threat. They were 
lHarry Hopkins, Egypt, the Crucible: the Unfinished Revolution 
in the Arab World (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), p. 189; John Coert 
Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy (New 
York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper, 1958), 
pp. 13-16. 
2Ibid ., pp. 23-28, 32-35; Malcolm Kerr, '''Coming to Terms with 
Nasser': Attempts and Failures," International Affairs, XLIII (January, 
1967), 68; R. K. Ramazani, "Changing United States Policy in the Middle 
East," The Virginia Quarterly Review, XL (Surrnner, 1964), 369-71. 
l 
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preoccupied ~~th their struggle against the remnants of British 
"imperialism" and with the challenge posed by political Zionism. 
HG~ing supp~rted Zionism, the United States could not possibly expect 
the Arabs to be more than lukewarm toward her policies in the area.
The growing Anglo-American cooperation in seeking to maintain control 
over strategic positions in the Middle East made it all the more 
difficult to find a common ground for cooperation with the Arabs. 2 
Moreover, the United States sought the friendship of local regimes to 
safeguard her interests and those of her allies. But those regimes 
were often at odds with each other. Thus America's friendship with one 
or the other of Middle Eastern countries got her involved in their 
local quarrels. The United States, on the other hand, could not avoid 
being involved by staying out because her strategic position and her 
influence would have been threatened. 3 
1. ATTEMPTS AT COOPERATION 
Despite these trends in American policy, the Egyptian government 
appeared ready and willing to establish normal relations with the 
United States. Anxious to have her army reequipped, Egypt sought 
U. S. military assistance soon after World War II. During April and 
September of 1947, Washington hosted first the Egyptian army Chief of 
lCampbell, Defense of the Middle Ea3t, pp. 35-38. 
2Muhammed Shafi Agwani, The United States and the Arab World, 
1945-1952 (Aligarb: Institute of Islamic Studie;:-Muslim University, 
1955), pp. 111-12. 
3Kerr , "'Coming to Terms with Nasser' ,If 68. 
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Staff General Ibrahim Atallah Pasha and then Prime Minister Nokrashi 
Pasha, who were out shopping for arms. Through such visits and diplo­
matic exchanges, Washington was made aware of Egypt's deep res~lltment 
of the British presence on her soil. Egyptian officials left an 
impression that closer cooperation between the United States and Egypt 
was possible, ~had it not been for the occupation by Britain of the 
Suez Zone base. America's Palestine policy in 1948 added another 
obstacle in the way for better U.S.-Arab relations. 
Americals pro-Zionist policy and her cooperation with Britain to 
hold on to Western strategic positions in the Middle East alarmed the 
Arabs and aroused their doubt and suspicion of her motives. There 
seemed to be very little hope, therefore, that the Point IV Program 
(announced January 20, 1949, by President Truman) could attain any 
significant success in the Arab world. The idea of the Program was 
that, in order to prevent uncommitted peoples from emb~acing communism 
and becoming satellites of the Soviet Union, it was necessary to "help 
them help themselves." Such economic and technical assistance as offered 
through the Point IV Program would, it was hoped, work for stability 
and economic strength and win f~iends for the United States. But this 
first concrete effort to encourage U.S.-Arab cooperation proved a 
failure. According to the Egyptian Economic and Political Review, the 
Point IV Program carried with it the stigma of "power politics." 
National governments who accepted it came under serious public scrutiny. 
The. chances for the United States were open to launch a more realistic 
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program, that met the needs felt by the area's people. l 
What the countries of the Middle East needed, according to H. Paul 
Ca~tleberryt was sufficient funds to finance "a few big undertakings 
that will produce immediate results in the form of new jobs and high 
income, rather than surveys followed by reports setting forth needs 
that they could have easily outlined themselves.,,2 The amount of aid 
granted under the Point IV Program was too little as compared to the 
aid given Israel. The Program was viewed, therefore, as a device not 
meant to effect a significant increase in the national product of the 
countries of the Middle East or to improve the lot of the poverty-
stricken masses. In short, the Point IV Program was rejected by Syria, 
tried and dismissed by Saudi Arabia, regarded as unimportant by Iraq, 
accepted but immobilized in Jordan and Egypt, and exploited only by 
Lebanon.3 
Although Syria was the first Arab country to flatly reject the 
Point IV Program and to denounce it, her relations with the United 
States continued somewhat undisturbed until 1949. The United States 
legation in Damascus was trying for sometime to stimulate a program 
of reform in Syria through the Quwat1y regime. The legation hoped 
that either the Quwatly regime or a replacement would soften down on 
l"From the Shores of Tripoli to the Oilfie1ds of Arabia, II Egyptian 
Economic and Political Review (International Edition, June, 1955), 
p. 22; for an analysis of the Arab view of Point IV, see George Hakim, 
"Point Four and the Middle East: a Middle East View," The Middle East 
Journal, IV (April, 1950), 183-95. 
2H• Paul Castleberry, "The Arabs' View of Postwar American Foreign 
Policy," Western Political Quarterly, XXII (M;lrch, 1959), 20. 
3Richard H. Noble, "American Policy in the Middle East,1I Journal 
of International Affairs, XIII (No.2, 1959), 117. 
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the Israeli issue and move toward a peaceful settlement. When the Quwatly 
establishment showed no signs of any intention to liberalize the system 
or institute reform, American ag_nts got in touch with Husni al-Zaim, 
then Chief of Staff of Syria I s army, and gave him instructions on how 
to effect a coup against Quwatly. Husni al-Zaim was to overthrow the 
elected repuolican government to stem corruption and inefficiency and 
begin anew. Accordingly, on March 30, 1949, al-Zaim's plans materialized 
in a bloodless coup.l American officials were disappointed, however, 
for he not only followed an independent course, but within six months 
he was toppled by a coup staged against htm by Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi. 2 
Before the year was over, Hinnawi himself was overthrown by Lieutenant 
Colonel Adib al-Shishakli. 3 Thus the United States helped start a 
chain reaction in Syria that, by degree and at every oncoming stage, 
displayed a mood that became increasingly anti-American. 4 
Oil was a major interest for the United States and her allies. 
But there were few problems connected with it as far as U.S.-Arab 
relations were concerned. In fact, the agreement with Saudi Arabia 
to share oil revenues on a 50/50 basis "made the extremely one-sided 
British agreements in the Gulf and Iran look like what they indeed 
lFor more detail on the a1-Zaim coup, 
Syrian Politics and the Military, 1945-1958 
University Press, 1964), pp. 121-31. 
see Gordon H. Torrey, 
(Columbus: Ohio State 
2Ibid., pp. 143-57. 
3Ibid., pp. 162-97. 
~les Copeland, The Game £E Nations: the Amorality of Pow~ 
Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), pp. 49-56; Harry B. 
Ellis, Challenge in the Middle East: Communist Influence and Am.erican 
Policy (New York: Ronald Press, 1960), pp. 32-34. 
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were, a ruthless exploitation of local resources without any regard 
to the needs and rights of the inhabitants." The pay and the treatment 
at the American oil companies a~tua11y cuused a sensation.1 The 
American oil companies were well on their way to gaining a larger 
share of Middle East oil. According to Marian Pearl, 
In 1946, the British still controlled half the entire interest 
in Middle Eastern oil compared to 35.3% for American companies. 
However, by 1955, after the Iranian dispute resulted in a con­
sortium giving American companies a 40% share in a formerly 
all-British concern, the American share in Middle Eastern oil 
jumped to 58.4% while Britain's dropped to 35.9%.2 
But the dominating American interest, which was back in the minds 
of American and British policy planners all along, was the concern over 
Middle East defense. Western officials realized there were obstacles, 
but they never lost hope of binding the Arab states to some sort of a 
Western-sponsored collective defense system against the Soviet Union. 
II. ARAB REACTION 
Fearful that participation in Western-sponsored alliance might 
involve them in an East-West confrontation, several Arab states, 
led by Egypt, formed the Arab League Collective Security Pact. The 
plans for this pact 'tY'ere drawn up on October 3, 1949, and finally 
approved on June 7, 1950. By doing so, those Arab states were attempting 
to create a collective defense system that was independent of the 
Western pOlv~rs. Besides their fear of involvement in a super-power 
lllIso1ation or Entanglement," Egyptian Economic and Political 
Review (International Edition, December, 1956/January, 1957), p. 14. 
~rian A. Pearl, "America in the Middle East," Contemporary 
Issues, X (May/June, 1960), 83. 
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struggle, they had the fear of economic domination, exploitation, 
and loss of independence. Moreover, the United States campaign against 
Buaaia did not concern them. One of Cairo's leading journalists at 
the time, Fikry Abazah, said, "The United States has become a camp 
dressed against the Soviets • • • what is this all about? There is 
nothing but a spectre that is being used as a scarecrow and is called 
communism. ,,1 
As the war in Korea broke out in June, 1950, opposition to it 
came loud and clear from the Arab camp. As a member of the United 
Nations Security Council then, Egypt abstained from voting for the 
United Nations resolution to aid South Korea. Demonstrations against 
American involvement in Korea erupted in Syria, Iraq, Tunisia, and 
Egypt, which denounced American policy in Korea and blamed the Western 
powers for the war in that country.2 Egypt's policy received unwavering 
aupport from the Arab public and from leaders of Arab public opinion. 
The leader of the Iraqi National Democratic Party is quoted as saying, 
"Egypt has taken a sound stand by declaring her neutrality and I am 
convinced all the Arab nations support her. I hope none of the Arab 
governments will act contrary to the wishes of their people.,,3 
But though the Arab public generally supported Egypt's policy, 
their governments were far from being united on this issue. By voicing 
their support to the American involvement in Korea, the ruling classes 
of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, undermined Egypt's 
lThe Egyptian Gazette, April 20, 1950. 

2New York Times, July 2, 1950. 

3Ibid., July 3, 1950. 
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policy of non-alignment. Despite this setback, leaders of Arab public 
opinion continued to press for and campaign in support of neutrality 
until eventually it became impossible for the politicians to Ignore its 
force. The pro-American actions were taken in July 1950. Within a 
period of six months both Syria and Iraq came out in support of neutrality. 
During the Arab League session of January 1951, under public nationalist 
pressure, Premiers Nuri aI-Said of Iraq and Nazim al-Qudsi of Syria 
had to declare a change of policy in support of non-alignment. 1 Walter 
Laqueur observes that "Of all the Middle Eastern states, only Turkey 
came out openly on the side of the United Nations and decided to send 
an armed contingent to Korea." Laqueur goes on to say that, 
Several Arab newspapers were openly jubilant at the reverses 
of the United Nations armies, seeing in them a just retribution 
for the Organization's support of Israel. By her abstentions in 
the Security Council, Egypt regained in the Arab world some of 
the prestige she had lost in the Palestine War, while a politician 
of the Syrian People's Party and future Premier, Shaikh Ma'ruf 
al-Dawalibi, declared that the only~way to prevent a third world 
war was to sign a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. 2 
III. MIDDLE EAST DEFENSE PROPOSALS 
Meanwhile, concerned over the maintenance of stability in the area 
and especially over the security of the state of Israel, the United 
States joined Britain and France in issuing the Tripartite Declaration 
of May 25, 1950. The Declaration, by opposing the use or threat to 
use force in the area, served the functi0n of keeping the Palestine 
lIbid., February 11, 1951. 
2Walter Z. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East 
(New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 256. - - -- -­
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frontier quiet and guarding the 1949 armistice agreement between Israel 
and the Arab states. It might have also been intended to prevent 
pObdible action against Jordan, which annexed the Arab West Bank against 
the wishes of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. l It also governed the supply of 
arms to the states of the Middle East until Syria and Egypt made their 
arms deals with the Soviet Union in 1955. 
The United States espousal of the principle of self-determination 
did not prevent her from trying to preserve the influence and prestige 
of her major allies. The remaining British and French military bases 
and related facilities were essential for the protection of common 
interests in the region. 2 The attitude displayed by the Arabs, however, 
confronted the United States government with a dilemma. It became 
obvious that backing the British in the Middle East would further 
alienate the Arabs. On the other hand, to press England for complete 
evacuation would deal a deadly blow to Western defense plans. The 
United States chose to back Britain. Little, if any, attention was 
given the idea of supporting neutrality and Arab nationalism. This 
proved to be an unfortunate choice that plagued U.S.-Arab relations 
ever since. 
The United States, it was thought, should try to forge an alliance 
binding the Middle East with Western allies to secure the southern flank 
of NATO and to check Soviet influence. This resort to military pacts 
IJacob Coleman Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East 
(2 vols.; New York: Van Nostrand, 1956), II, 308-9. 
2Jacob Coleman Hurewitz, cd., "Soviet-American Rivalry in the 
Middle East," Academy of Political Science Proceedings, XXIX (Y~rch, 
1969), 8. 
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was an automatic response to the Soviet challenge, which appeared to 
be mainly military. Various events in Europe and Asia gave credence 
to that line of thinking. "Hence the rather mechanical attempts," 
says John Campbell, "pursued without sufficient regard to the political 
conditions and consequences, to form with the Middle Eastern nations 
an Allied Middle East Command or a Middle East Defense Organization."l 
Egypt and the other Arab states were more concerned over the problems 
of Western "imperialism" than over Russia. At the same time, Iran was 
in the middle of a dispute over oil with Britain. "In an atmosphere 
poisoned by these bitter disputes, where was the basis," asks Campbell, 
"for partnership and pacts of mutual defense?,,2 
Cold war considerations, however, were the governing preoccupations 
of the United States and Britain. But major cold war confrontations at 
the time were all outside the Middle East. The communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, the fall of mainland China to the 
communists, the war in Korea, and the European and Japanese need for 
oil were not of immediate concern to the area's peoples.3 Thus while 
the West busied itself with defense pacts aimed at resisting Soviet 
threats, especially in areas such as the Middle East, the Arab fears 
were not of Soviet communism but of Israeli expansionism and British 
colonialism. The fact that Egypt was striving to secure British 
evacuation was sufficient reason to keep her from enlisting Britain's 
lJohn Coert Campbell, "America and the Middle East," India 
Quarterly, XV (April/June, 1959), 143. 
2Ibid. 
~nroe, "Mr. Bevin's IArab Policy' ," pp. 9-10. 
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aid in defending her territory. But global considerations weighed 
very heavily on the American agenda, making it difficult for America 
to be sensitive to the desires ali.d aspirations of the Arabs and to 
avoid misjudgment and error in her Mideast policy. Such calls for 
neutrality as the one issued by Akram al-Burani in January 1950, in his 
Arab Socialist Party1s program, went unheeded. Al-Hurani called for an 
Arab foreign policy "free from all foreign orientation or influence." 
In its manifesto of January 24, 1951, the Ba'th Party issued a warning 
to the Arab League "against making any gesture of adhesion to one or 
other of the two blocs."l In answer to Western efforts to align the 
Arab world and to come to terms with Israel, a public Arab cry arose 
asserting the Arab wish to choose Russia over falling prey to Israel. 
On March 12, 1950, Sheikh Mustafa al-Siba'i, addressing an Islamic 
Socialist Front rally in Damascus, declared, "We are resolved to turn 
towards the eastern camp if the Democracies do not give us justice. • • • 
To those who say this eastern camp is our enemy we would answer: when 
has the Western camp been our friend? We will bind ;,)urselves to 
Russia were she the very devil. ,,2 
It should not have been surprising, therefore, that the Western 
efforta at pact-making in the Middle East came against a wall of strong 
Arab resistance. When the West began shopping for a local key ally, 
it was not easy to make a decision. Iran, besides being in financial 
lQuoted in Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: ~ Study of 
Post-war Arab Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 
p. 	103. 
2Ibid., p. 102. 
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troubles, was locked in dispute over oil with Britain, the climax of 
which was the nationalization of her oil industry. It was therefore 
unthinkable to expect her to welcome a pact in which Britain was a 
leading member, and especially while Dr. Mossadegh was still in power. 
Israel would have been a worse choice, for no Arab state would join 
a pact in which Israel was a leader or a member. Arab resentment of 
Turkey made her no better choice either. The choice fell on Egypt, 
being a central power and the strongest Arab state. It was thought 
that Egyptian leadership, participation, or, at least, toleration, 
was essential for the success of Western defense plans. l The facts 
were, however, that the efforts to organize the Middle East into a 
Western-sponsored defense system were doomed to fail no matter where 
they started. The political, social, and psychological mood displayed 
sufficient evidence of resistance and opposition to such plans. 
Nevertheless, unmindful of the moods, desires, aims, fears, and 
hopes of the area's peoples, the Western powers went ahead trying to 
implement their plans for securing and defending the Middle East. In 
early 1951, Middle Eastern capitals began to be frequented by official 
Western visitors. Several conferences were held among Western military 
officers to discuss Middle East defense. During January, March, and 
April of 1951, the United States took part in a series of conferences 
held in Malta with Britain, France, and Italy. United States envoys, 
led by Mr. George C. McGee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
lCampbell, Defense of the ~ddle East, pp. 40-43; William Roe 
Polk, The United States and th- Arab World (Cambridge, !-lass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1969), p. 2i;. 
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Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, met in Istanbul, Turkey, 
during February of 1951. Following their conference, Mr. McGee 
toured the area expressing the hope that the states of the Middle 
East would try and emulate the example of Greece, Turkey, and Iran to 
achieve the same degree of progress in military preparedness those 
-
countries reached through their association with the West. But this 
call of his, coupled with exhortations to wake up to the need for general 
defense and security arrangements not only fell on deaf ears, but 
demonstrations broke out, especially in Syria, protesting such visits 
by Western officials and military officers. l In a message to the 
Secretary of the Arab League, Salih Harb, the leader of the Society 
of Muslim Youth in Egypt, wrote, 
the Arab peoples, after all they have suffered, will not accept 
to be sold in !h~ name of democracy on the British imperial 
market ••• lw~/ ask you, in the name of the Arab peoples, to 
proclaim the most absolute neutrality. We wish neither to sup-
port Communism nor to defend imperialist democracy.2 
Western efforts persisted in spite of the protests, demonstrations, 
and manifestoes. On June 18, 1951, the United States renewed the 
Dhahran base lease with Saudi Arabia for a period of five more years. 
On September 20, 1951, C,.."';!ece and Turkey were invited to join the NATO 
alliance. On October 14, 1951, Egypt received a four-power proposal 
to join an Allied Middle East Command. 3 The United States, Great 
Britain, France, and Turkey handed Egypt drafts of the plans and 
lSeale, Struggle for Syria, p. 103. 
2a1-Misri (Cairo), January 23, 1951, quoted in Ibid., p. 104. 
3U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XXV (October 22, 1951), 
647-48. 
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proposed that she join and occupy a place equal to each of them. 
Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa were to join 
as associatE members, and AMEC was supposed to have an undefiIA~d re-
lationship with NATO.l Aware of Egypt's attitude toward British 
occupation of the Suez Canal base, and believing that her unwillingness 
to discuss defense plans was due to that British presence, the proposal 
included a British statement to the effect that, if Egypt joined and 
permitted the use of her facilities,including the Suez base, British 
forces not assigned to the Allied Middle East Command would be with-
drawn and the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 would be suppressed. In 
the Sudan, however, Britain would not be able to meet Egypt's demands. 2 
On October 10, 1951, three days before the draft proposal was presented 
to Egypt, Secretary of State Dean Acheson released a statement to the 
press saying, 
It is the belief of the United States that a solution to the 
~gl£-Egyptian question can be found through these proposals • • • 
lan~/ should serve as a sound basis of an agreement which will 
not only satisfy the interests of all parties concerned but also 
contribute to the defense of the free world in which the Middle 
East plays such an important ro1e. 3 
IV. EGYPT'S REJECTION AND ITS IMPACT 
Egypt's response was immediate. Her government flatly rejected 
the proposals and abrogated the treaty of 1936 and the agreement of 
1Halford L. Hoskins, "Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the 
Middle East," American Political Science Review, XLVII (March, 1953), 
188-98. 
2Kerr, '''Coming to Tenns with Nasser'," 70; Polk, The United 
States and the Arab World, p. 270. 
3U•S., Department of State, Bulletin, XXV (October 22, 1951), 647. 
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1899 with Britain. According to Halford Hoskins, "the Egyptian Parlia­
ment had unanimously adopted measures abrogating the treaties under 
Which Great Britain held sway in the Sudan and maintained bases in 
the Suez Canal Zone."l The proposals overlooked Egypt's constant 
and persistent calls for total evacuation of British troops and the 
union of Egypt and the Sudan under one crown. In giving Israel assur­
ancea that her interests would be carefully guarded in working out 
Middle East Command plans, the Western allies ignored a general Arab 
feeling of resentment toward the West for its support of Israel. In 
fact those assurances multiplied Arab fears of Israel itself. 
By her rejection of the defense proposals and her abrogation of 
the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 and the agreement of 1899, Egypt 
and the Wafd Party government demonstrated their commitment to the 
policy of neutra1ity--a policy, which was described by Mr. George 
McGee as "a disturbing factor ••• in the Middle East."2 Egypt's 
government was under Egyptian public pressure to keep Egypt neutral 
and the Nile Valley united. 3 The climate of the time made it inevitable 
for Egypt to turn down the defense proposals. By accepting them, 
Egypt would have only supported another means of prolonging British 
occupation and continuing an unequal relationship with Britain with 
lBoskins, "Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle 
East," 194. 
Lu.s., Department of State, Bulletin, XXV (October 22, 1951), 
645. 
3po1k , The United States _a_n_d _t_h_e Ar_ab W~o~r~l_d, p. 270. 
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the backing of the United States. l In August 1951, on the anniversary 
of the signing of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, anti-British popular 
demonstrations broke out and one attacked the embassies of both Britain 
and the United States. 2 Under such circumstances, "Even the corrupt 
and cynical Farouk-Nahhas Pasha regime," says Senator Humphrey, I1declined 
to accept an -arrangement that would perpetuate the presence of the 
British in Suez. ,,3 
In reply to Egypt's actions, the United States joined Britain 
in denouncing and condemning the Egyptian stand. On October 17, 
Secretary Acheson, in a press release, said, 
The U.S. Government must reaffirm its belief that the action 
of the Egyptian Government with respect to the Anglo-Egyptian 
Treaty of 1936 and the agreements of 1899 regarding the Sudan 
is not in accord with proper respect for international obliga­
tions. For its part the U.S. Government considers the action 
of the Egyptian Government to be without va1idity.4 
To Egypt's response that the defense proposals could not be considered 
as long as British forces continued their presence in Egypt and the 
Sudan, Mr. Acheson replied that the 
proposals were formulated by the nations interested in the wel­
fare and security of the Middle East after the most intensive 
and thorough consideration of the special problems of the area. 
The invitation to join with other free nations of the free world 
lJohn Coert Campbell, The Middle East in the Muted Cold War 
(Denver: University of Denver, 1964), pp. 5-6; Campbell, Defense of 
the Middle East, pp. 43-44. 
2Sea1e~ Struggle for Syria, p. 112. 
3Uubert H. Humphrey, tlA Chronology of Fai1ure,1t Reporter, XIX 
(August 7, 1958), 12. 
4U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XXV (October 29, 1951), 
702-3. 
r 
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in a joint cooperative effort to make the world safe from 
aggression was wholly consistent with the independence and 
sovereignty of Egypt.1 
But, regrettably, those thorough considerations did not include 
previous consultations with Egypt. This cannot be considered but a 
serious blunder on the part of the four powers. Egypt should have at 
least been included in the preliminary discussions. 2 On October 25, 
1951, the Egyptian Ambassador to the United States Kami1 Abd-a1-Rahim 
issued a statement to the press in which he said that, after the 
Egyptian government's careful study of the defense proposals, the 
conclusion arrived at was that they were only a means of perpetuating 
the occupation of Egypt "not only by Britain but also by other powers, 
an occupation against Which Egypt has been rising and clamouring for 
seventy years." The Ambassador did not fail to point out that the 
proposals came as a surprise to the Egyptian government. "Egypt 
was never consulted beforehand on the joint proposals presented to 
her," he said, "was not invited to participate in their formulation 
and she did not know of the contents except on the day of their 
presentation.,,3 
Among the states informed of the proposals was Syria. Thousands 
of demonstrators took to the streets in Syria's cities and telegrams 
were sent "to the Prime Minister, to the Security Council, to Muslim 
and Arab states and to a number of foreign powers, pledging support 
1 
. Ibid., 702. 
2Hoskins, "Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle 
East," 194; Campbell, Defense of the Middle ~, p. 43. 
3Egyptian News, October/November, 1951, (f!0ted in Agwani, The 
United States and the Arab World, pp. 122-23. 
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for the Egyptian cause ••• and denouncing the 'imperialist plot of 
common defense.,"l Though Syria was not asked to comment on the 
proposals, a number of deputies demanded, during a parliamentary 
session on October 22, a statement from the Syrian Foreign Minister, 
Faydi al-Atasi. Despite Prime Minister Hasan al-Hakim's efforts to 
dissuade him; al-Atasi rose up to declare, 
Our participation in a system of common defense can only be 
justified by a clear and real national interest. But I have 
sought in vain for such &1 interest • • • • Common defense 
supposes an enemy against whom it is directed. • • • But in 
what way are we threatened by the enemy aimed at by this 
project? What evil has the enemy done us?2 
There followed a cabinet crisis in Syria. Hasan al-Hakim's government 
fell and was succeeded by one headed by Dr. Ma'ruf al-Dawalibi, a 
staunch neutralist. But the latter was soon overthrown (on November 29, 
1951) by Col. Adib al-Shishakli's second coup. Al-Shishakli's allies 
were the progressive nationalists, most important of whom was Akram 
al-Hurani. "Although he La1-Shishakl.!7 was basically friendly to the 
West," observed Senator Hubert Humphrey, "he followed, until he was 
overthrown by those even more intransigent, a policy of nonalignment 
with the West."3 
Adib al-Shishakli may be considered a forerunner of Nasser. His 
initial policy views were mainly concerned with Syria. He could not 
go so far as to accept a limitation on Syria's sovereignty within a 
Western-sponsored defense system. He attempted to align his policies 
lSeale, Struggle for Syria, p. 112. 
2Quoted in Ibid., pp. 112-13. 
3Humphrey, "A Chronology of Failure," 12. 
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with those of Cairo in dealing with the great powers, and is credited 
with being the first Arab leader to flatly reject the Point IV Program. 
Frem the tim.e he came on the scene in late 1949, his associates and 
advisers were such neutralist Arab nationalists as Akram al-Hurani. 
Bis early association with the PPS did not last very long. He seemed 
to have been convinced in his own mind that Arabism was the cause to 
which Syria's people would respond. Out of this conviction grew his 
idea for the establishment of the Arab Liberation MOvement, which he 
announced on August 25, 1952. In an appeal to all the Syrian political 
parties to join his ALM, al-Shishakli declared in late October 1952, 
"Our country is the home of the Arab idea • • • I invite you to join 
the progressive Arab Liberation Movement which is destined to grow 
until it embraces the whole Arab Fatherland."l By expanding the 
Syrian broadcasting services, he pioneered the use of radio propaganda 
in the Arab world as a weapon of mass education. Damascus Radio set 
the pace until Nasser established his "Voice of the Arabs" about 
three years later.2 
The Western defense proposals were rejected for several reasons. 
The Arabs saw in them the possibility of including Israel. They went 
against Egyptian interests in ending British influence in Egypt and the 
Sudan. It was a mistake to include Turkey in a defense system in 
which the Arabs would be possible partners. She was resented by the 
IBarada (Damascus), October 23, 1952, quoted in Seale, Struggle 
for Syria, p. 125. 
2Ibid., pp. 124-25; Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, 
pp. 205-35. 
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Arabs for her lack of support for the Arab cause in Palestine, for her 
annexing of the Syrian province of Alexandretta, and for the fact that 
it was Ottoman rule from which the Arabs, not so long ago, had fought 
to gain independence. Besides, having already committed herself to an 
alliance with the West, Turkey was in no position to lead uncommitted 
states in a common defense undertaking. Last, but not least, was the 
Arab attitude toward the Soviet Union and alliances in general. The 
Soviet Union was not feared and alliances were seen by the Arabs as new 
entanglements and as new means of domination. The rejection of the 
proposals was a further weakening of the West's position without getting 
what it sought. l 
V. THE WEST'S PERSISTENCE 
The subject of collective defense was kept alive until early 
1953 despite Arab lack of cooperation and rejection and despite Russian 
protests. On October 24, 1951, the State Department issued a state­
ment to the effect that the establishment of a Middle East defense 
system was urgent and would be sought with or without Egypt's support 
or cooperation. 2 Determined to safeguard the Middle East against a 
supposedly imminent external aggression, the Western powers went to 
lH. Paul Castleberry, "The Arabs' View of Postwar American Foreign 
Policy," 14; J. W. Spain, "Middle East Defense: A New Approach," 
Middle East Journal, VIII (Summer, 1954), 253; Ralph H. ¥J.8.gnus, "Political­
Strategic Interests," in George Lenczowski, ed., United States Interests 
in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute 
~r~blic Policy Research, 1958), p. 17; Polk, The United States and 
the Arab World, p. 270; Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, pp. 45-48. 
2Hoskins, "Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle 
East," 194. 
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work on new plans. It was understood that, once plans were ready, 
the Arab states and Israel would be invited to join as members. On 
NO\temher 10, 1951, a joint statement by the United States, Britain, 
France, and Turkey, set forth the framework for a Middle East Command 
defense system, to include, in addition to the above-mentioned four 
powers, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa. The 
plan looked peculiar in conception and did not get the full approval 
of the United States. l 
After successive modifications and counter British and American 
proposals, the idea of a Middle East Command was dropped, in August 
1952, in favor of a Middle East Defense Organization, similarly peculiar 
and composed, with the exception of Turkey, of non-Middle Eastern 
nations. It was to consist of a committee of military officers to 
help preserve peace in the area and plan for its defense. Secretary 
of State Dean Acheson bestowed the approval of the United States govern­
ment on the latter, but considered it essential that the Arab states 
2be consulted before the plans were finalized upon. 
At least one simple point had been driven home to Western 
officials, but it certainly was not the most important one. The 
real feelings and convictions, so effectively demonstrated by those' 
for whom defense was being planned, went unheeded. The conviction 
by the Western powers of the validity of their views caused them to 
present essentially unchanged plans for defense. To them that was the 
only way to defend the Middle East. 
lChristian Science Monitor, August 7, 1952. 
2Hoskins, "Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle 
East," 194-95. 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
1952 ended before the West could achieve any of its defense 
objectives in the Middle East. The real negative result was the 
antagonization of the Arabs and their national governments. The 
Anglo-Americ~n views on the area's problems drew closer than ever as 
the United States began to fully share Britain's apprehensions and 
fears. The United States attitude and actions convinced the Egyptians 
that she could not be counted on to play a neutral role in the Anglo-
Egyptian struggle over the occupation of Suez. It is this suspicion 
of the United States that foredoomed any Western defense proposal. 
In general, this was the attitude of most Arab states. 
A dominant factor was the Arab lack of enthusiasm for Western-
sponsored defense plans. On October 23, 1951, the Foreign Minister of 
Syria told the Syrian Parliament that his government will reject any 
proposal for a Western-sponsored Middle East defense scheme.1 
Lebanon's Parliament declared its support for Egypt and, on November 8, 
1951, the Arab League Secretary General declared that opposition to the 
proposed Western alliance was unanimous in the Arab wor1d. 2 
"the :':ate of any national policy in the international field," 
says Halford Hoskins, "rests largely with its attractiveness to those 
toward whom it is directed•.••• Mutual security depends upon the 
mutuality of the ends sought and the means proposed.,,3 Jui.:~d by this 
lHew York Times, October ~4, 1951.
---===­
2Ibid., November 9, 1951. 
3Hoskins, "Some Aspects of the Security Problem in the Middle 
East," 198. . 
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precept, American policy was rolling on the wrong tracks. United 
States policy, during the Truman years, was conditioned primarily by 
cold war considerations and by the "imperial" interests of Great 
Britain in the Middle East. The Israeli issue, though an extremely 
sore spot, did not figure very high in the minds of the contestants. 
At least not-yet. 1 
There was no doubt in the minds of American post-war policy 
planners of the need to win Arab goodwill and friendship. The United 
States, until the end of World War II, was respected in the Arab world. 
But American statesmen failed to exploit the favorable conditions in 
the Arab world. Their adoption of policies and courses of action 
contrary to the wishes and desires of the Arabs made it well nigh 
impossible for the United States to win friends and influence people 
in the Middle East. According to the Egyptian Economic and Political 
Review, President Truman "inaugurated a new era in contemporary American 
history in which the United States, heavily influenced by Western 
. European points of view, had well night accepted European leadership 
in the conduct of world affairs.,,2 With Western allies brought together 
by strong bonds of common colonial interests, the United States found 
herself outvoted. 
Pre-World War II U.S. relations with foreign peoples were limited 
and her interests outside the Western Hemisphere were inspired or 
prompted main:y by sectional rather than national opinion. Therefore, 
her diplomatic experience was, as William McNeil says, "profoundly 
1Uurewitz, "Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East," 8. 
2. ~::,om the Shores of Tripoli to the Oil Fields of Arabia," p. 15. 
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parochial."l As late as the year 1940, and after World War II broke 
out, the American lack of interest in faraway places "was illustrated 
by a brief note that President ROQsevelt wrote with his own h~nd to 
dispose of a perplexing file submitted to him by an aide: 'Arabia 
is too far afield for us. Can't you get the British to do something?, fl2 
Describing this state of affairs, Henry Byroade said, "The United 
States has been thrust into the Middle Eastern scene suddenly and 
without adequate national preparation.,,3 An enormously expanding State 
Department had to recruit personnel with little experience in foreign 
affairs. 
To those men was given the responsibility of shaping a policy to 
contain an enemy threatening the vital interests of the United States. 
The result was a policy militaristic in concept, and designed to meet 
what was thought to be a military threat. The basic assumption of this 
policy was that the only way to limit the enemy's expansion is by a 
military encirclement of his territory and his intimidation under the 
threat of nuclear power. For this policy to succeed in the Middle 
East, Arab friendship and cooperation was necessary. The policy failed 
because the American diplomat "has tended in general towards erroneous 
lWilliam Hardy McNeil, America, Britain, and Russia, 1939-1946, 
Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946, Vol. III (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1953), 761. 
2Max ~eston Thornburg, People and Policy in the Middle East: A 
Study of Social and Political Change as ~ Basis for United States 
Policy (New York: Norton, 1964), p. 5. 
~nry A. Byroade, "The Middle East in New Perspective," U.S., 
Department of State, Bulletin, XXX (April 26, 1954), 628-33. 
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assessment of the strength of Arab Nationalism, and his endeavors to 
apply policies and methods successful elsewhere has usually found them 
unsuccessful in the Middle East."l 
The first active American involvement in Middle Eastern affairs 
alienated the Arabs. Great interest had been demonstrated by American, 
Jews and by the American Congress and politicians in the establishment 
of a "Jewish Home" in Palestine ever since Lord Balfour made his declara­
tion in 1917. But no American president, up to and including Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, had so openly and enthusiastically followed a pro-Zionist 
policy as did President Harry S. Truman. The President's concern for 
the beleaguered Jews of Europe was, no doubt, a noble one. "But the 
solution certainly did not lie in the creation of a Jewish state in 
Palestine," says Muhaxmned Agwani, "for. • • it could not be effected 
without inflicting lasting injuries upon the indigenous Arab population.,,2 
The American President disregarded this and other important 
considerations and constantly succumbed to the pressures of Zionism 
and to considerations of domestic politics. The President's behavior 
prompted Walter L. Wright to make the comment that "The President of 
the United States is supporting the Zionist national interest at the 
expense of the national interest of the United States.,,3 To add 
insult to injury, the United States handled the situation at the United 
Nations in a most unusual way. According to Professor H. A. R. Gibb, 
l"From the Shores of Tripoli to the Oil Fields of Arabia," p. 21. 
2Agwani, The United States and the Arab World, p. 131. 
3walter Livingston Wright, Jr., "Contradictory Foreign Policies 
in the Near East," Virginia Quarterly Review, XXIII (March, 1947), 
189. 
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the methods by which the Near Eastern policy of the United 
States was forced through the Assembly of the United Nations 
in 1947 not only undermined at one stroke, through much of 
Europe and all of Asia, the authority of the United Nations, 
but also undermined respect for the integrity of the United 
States in its dealings with the United Nations. 
The fact that the United States clearly and unreservedly sided with 
Zionism and ~srael against the legitimate rights of the Palestinian 
Arabs for self-determination and justice was bound to inflict lasting 
injuries upon the Arabs in general. Therefore, in the circumstances 
of the post-War era, America's pro-Zionist policy "could hardly be 
called a discreet foreign policy of a nation who had assumed colossal 
responsibilities toward international society."2 
The growing Euro-American cooperation during the Truman years 
had a profound impact on America's relations with the Middle East. 
American officials very carefully avoided following a policy that 
might have caused them to clash with the interests and policies of 
either Great Britain or France. The United States, under President 
Truman, took the position of a benevolent observer in the protracted 
Anglo-Egyptian negotiations over Suez, and supported the British view 
that the importance of Suez made it unthinkable to dispose of it, 
and that Egyptian sovereignty was not in any way compromised by the 
presence of British forces there. 3 
lHamilton Alexander Rosskeen Gibb, "Introductory," in Richard 
Nelson F'~e, ed., The Near East and the Great Powers (Cambridge, 
Mass.: i_,~ard University Press,1951), p. 10. 
2Agwani, The United States and the Arab World, p. 131. 
3"li'rom the Shores of Tripoli to the Oil Fields of An:i:tia, " 
p. 18. 
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In her cooperation with colonial powers such as Britain and France, 
the United States displayed an increasing lack of enthusiasm for the 
principle of "self-determination" of peoples and their "sovereign 
rights," which she had championed for so long. Instead, nationalist 
movements were viewed with distrust and caution. The global consider­
ations of the "containment" policy overrode the interests of nationalist 
movements. Promoting British interests in the Middle East was political 
suicide for American policy in the area. American statesmen overlooked 
the fact that the surest guarantee against Russian intrusions was the 
cultivation of Arab friendship and goodwill through genuine and 
honest support of their national aspirations. There was no way to 
win the Arabs through American support of British-French colonialism 
and political Zionism. "The tragic irony of the situation as far as 
American diplomacy is concerned," says Fayez A. Sayegh, 
is that, in order to promote the cause of freedom in the world 
at large, the United States has allowed itself to become an 
accomplice, or at least to condone the struggle of colonial 
powers against the attainment of national freedom bylthose 
nations now under their total or partial domination. 
As a result of this trend in American policy, it became increasingly 
difficult for the Arabs, as well as the whole Asiatic and African 
peoples, to make the distinction between the policies of the "imperialist" 
powers and those of the United States. 
lpayez A. Sayegh, "The Arab Reaction to American Policy," 
Social Science, XXVII (October, 1952), 190-91. 
PART II. CONTAINMENT: THE DULLES ERA 
CHAPTER IV 
THE BAGHDAD PACT 
By the end of 1952, the NATO alliance had been erected and Greece 
and Turkey had been drawn to it. But the southern flank of NATO, the 
region between the Mediterranean and the Gulf, remained open. 
American policy planners thought it essential to have it covered by 
some kind of a defense arrangement capable of protecting it against 
the Soviet Union, guarding its resources, and keeping its communication 
routes safe. When John Foster Dulles took over as Secretary of State 
early in 1953, he began to put into effect a policy that, on the cold 
war issue, was basically not different from that followed by Truman 
and Acheson except in its vigor. Secretary Dulles sought to continue 
the encirclement of the Soviet Union with Western defense pacts and 
alliances depending on America's superiority in armaments. l 
I. DULLES MEETS NASSER 
The Secretary of State paid a visit to the Middle East in the 
spring of 1953. His first stop was Egypt. MOhammed H. Haykal says 
that the objectives of his visit were, (1) "to proceed to complete the 
encirclement of the Soviet Union with political and military alliances-­
lCampbell, Defense of the Middle East, pp. 49-50. 
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an objective in which he was so engrossed as to appear hysterical and 
from which, in effect, sprang all his actions in regard to the Middle 
East," and (2) lito feel the possibility of effecting a settlement 
between the Arab states and Israe1."l The first objective, no doubt, 
was Dulles's main concern. He wanted to sell Nasser the idea of 
collective Miadle East defense. One of Nasser's first questions 
was, "Defense against whom?" When Dulles said that it was to be 
against the Soviet Union, Nasser pointed out that there was a distance 
of about five thousand miles separating the Soviet Union from Egypt 
and that the Soviet Union never attacked Egypt at any time in history. 
The only enemy Nasser feared then was Great Britain, whose forces 
were still in Egypt. 2 
Nasser patiently explained to Dulles his views on the problem 
of Middle East defense. Excerpts of what Nasser said in Dulles's 
presence are included here because of their importance to the under­
standing of the failures of "containment" in the Middle East and 
'the subsequent deterioration of American-Egyptian relations. Nasser 
thought it absurd for the United States to ignore British occupation 
of Egypt and ask her to join a Western-sponsored alliance directed 
against an enemy of the West that was five thousand miles away. 
"People in Egypt are smart," Nasser told Dulles, 
lal-Ah~am (Cairo), September 17. 1971. References to al-Ahram, 

September 17 and 24 and October 15, 1971, refer to parts of a book 

about Jamal Abdel Nasser by Mohammad Hasanayn Haykal being published 

in London. 

2MOhammad Hasanayn Haykal, Nahnu ••• wa-Amrika (Cairo: Dar 
al-'Asr al-Hadith, 1967), p. 77 •
. 
107 

and have behind them thousands of years of civilization. They 
would quit trusting me if I tell them that we are going to 
forget British occupation of Suez that is here and now • • • 
so we may participate in a defense organization against imagined 
danger from the Soviet Union. l 
Secretary Dulles asked with astonishment, "Don't you see any 
Soviet danget.:?" 
Nasser answered, 
I like to ask you first, how do you see the Soviet Union 
coming to us? Will the Red Army try to occupy the whole 
Middle East to get to us? In our opinion, that is impossible. 
The Soviet Union cannot do so even if she wanted, because 
that will trigger a nuclear war. The atom has practically 
made war impossible. It has become extremely risky for any 
of the contending world powers to launch a military attack 
even if it had the capability to do so. That means a nation 
trying to influence another in our age will choose to subvert 
its internal front rather than attack its outer frontiers. 
This is the possibility of war we see--internal subversion 
directed against the internal front. In our opinion, our 
participation in Western military alliances or in any foreign 
power alliances does not strengthen our internal front but 
weakens it. The only guarantee against subversion is national­
ism, the people's faith in freedom, and the realization that 
it is within their grasp. It is very easy for me to sign with 
you an agreement to join a pact meant to defend the Middle 
East. My signature will bind me, but it will not bind the 
Egyptian people. They will definitely refuse to be bound by 
it, and they will, no doubt, reject me. The result will be 
an estrangement of the people and a feeling on their part 
that their government does not represent them. Such a situation 
would provide the most suitable circumstances for an assault 
against the internal front. How do you propose to deal with 
this kind of subversion through military bases when numerous 
secret bases would be erected to work against you in our 
country and to paralyze, when necessary, any usefulness of 
your pacts and alliances?2 
1Ibid., p. 78. 
2Ibid., pp. 78-80. 
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II. THE "NORTHERN TIER" 
Though Dulles believed Nasser spoke with conviction, it was not 

what he wanted to hear. MOreover, he did not believe that Nasser 

could pose a serious threat to his plans for Middle East defense. 

Upon his return to Washington, Secretary Dulles reported, 

A Middle East Defense Organization is a future rather than 
an immediate possibility. Many of the Arab League countries 
are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel or with 
Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to the menace 
of Soviet Communism. However, there is more concern where the 
Soviet Union is near. In general the northern tier of nations 
shows awareness of the danger. l 
This was the origin of the "northern tier" concept of defense, which 

was later replaced by the Baghdad Pact. Dulles acknowledged that a 

regional defense system must spring from the desires of the peoples 

and governments of the area "out of a sense of common destiny and 

common danger.,,2 

Nasser's attempt to pOint out that internal subversion was the 
, grave communist danger in the Arab world and that the most effective 
way to fight it was through social reform and satisfied nationalism, 
constituted a sound assessment of the situation. Dulles's preoccupation 
with bases, pacts and power strategy, however, prevented him from giving 
proper weight to Nasser's considerations. Instead, the plan for a 
"northern tier" alliance emerged soon after, and Dulles adopted an 
attitude of intolerance toward neutralists. To him neutralism was 
"immoral" and "short-sighted." He believed that a "northern tier" 
lJohn FOflter Dulles, "Report on the Near East," U.S., Department 
of State, BuIlt. ,Ln, XVIII (June 15, 1953) t 835. 
2Ibid• 
109 

alliance would block Soviet attempts to penetrate the Middle East. 
Dulles assumed that the danger posed by the Soviet Union was mainly 
military. The possibility of su~version or other means was secondary.l 
According to M. A. Fitzsimons, a pact "was not a necessary development 
of the containment policy, for strength might have been better promoted 
by other mea;ures. But at this time military considerations were very 
influential in American policy. ,,2 
In the spring of 1953, the United States gave Pakistan 700,000 
tons of wheat to help relieve her food shortage. As a result the 
United States became very popular with the Pakistanis. When Secretary 
Dulles visited Pakistan that spring, he was given a very warm welcome. 
In early November 1953, it was reported that defense talks were to 
begin soon between Pakistan and the United States.3 On February 2, 
1954, President Eisenhower approved a request for military assistance 
to Pakistan and, during March and April, a United States military 
mission surveyed Pakistan's arms needs. On May 19, the United States 
signed a military assistance pact with Pakistan. During March, 
King Faysal II of Iraq paid a visit to Pakistan and spoke of closer 
relations between the two nations. Upon his return to Baghdad, the 
King and his Prime Minister, Fadhil al-Jamali, expressed the view that 
the new alliance would be beneficial for Iraq. On April 2, a Turkish-
Pakistani Pact was signed in Karachi and, in mid-June, an agreement 
lRamazani, "Changing United Policy in the Middle East," 371-72. 
2M• A. Fitzsimons, "Suez Crisis and the Containment Policy," 
Review £f Politics, XIX (October, 1957), 434. 
3New York Times, November 2, 1953. 
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on the methods of its implementation was reached in Ankara between 
the two countries. By then the al-Jamali government had fallen mainly 
because of strong popular opposition to the Pact. Nevertheless, four 
days following its fall (on April 21) the United States agreed to grant 
Iraq military assistance and an American military mission followed to 
assess the military needs of Iraq.l 
Both India and Afghanistan voiced their objections to these 
developments. In Iran, however, where the United States significantly 
increased her military assistance after the fall of Mossadegh, the 
Turkish-Pakistani Pact was welcomed by the government of Reza Shah. 
Egypt, whose foreign policy had been reviewed by her foreign service 
officials in a series of meetings lasting from December 1953 to the 
end of February 1955, strongly opposed the Pact. Her opposition was 
in harmony with her foreign policy, which was set during those meetings. 
It stressed the need to establish "an Arab bloc, free from imperialist 
influence, to protect the interests of Islamic, Asiatic and African 
peoples." Neutrality was highlighted in those meetings. Egypt's 
neutrality meant seeking complete national independence and insisted 
on the sort of cooperation which gave full recognition of Egyptrs 
rights, national sovereignty and prestige. On February 10, 1954, 
Major Salah Salim declared Egypt's determination to oppose and 
refuse to 
co-operate in any way whatsoever with anyone who opposes our 
dignity and freedom. We will co-operate with and support all 
ISpain, "Middle East Defense: A New Approach," 224-26; Campbell, 
Defense of the Middle East, pp •.50-54; Polk, The United States and 
the Arab World, p. 271. 
who assist and support us. • •• We will not discriminate 
between one state and another, except in the measure of its 
response to our demands and its support of us in the economic 
and political fields, which respect our Egyptian nationality; 
we will not tag along behind anyone. l 
A similar view was expressed in Syria on March 4, three days 
after the overthrow of Adib al-Shishakli. The new Prime Minister, 
Sabri al-Asa!i, warned against the broader implications of the Pact. 
Be declared, "no Arab state can take a decision concerning it until 
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it has been approved by the Arab League in accordance with the provi-
sions of its charter.,,2 In the same month, the Egyptian government 
informed Jefferson Caffery, the American Ambassador in Cairo, that 
Egypt would, "by every means," resist any attempt to include Iraq 
in the contempiated Pakistan-Turkey alliance because it tended "to 
weaken Egypt and her cause.,,3 When the Arab League Council met in 
April, member states resolved not to "accept any responsibility 
undermining their responsibilities as members of the Arab League.,,4 
This American diplcrmatic activity was the result of the shift 
in Washington from the concept of defense based on Suez to the 
multi-lateral concept of the "northern tier." The initiative had 
been Washington's. Britain took no part in those negotiations and 
British statesmen could not hide their resentment of those American 
lQuoted in Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 196. 
2New York Times, March 5, 1954; see ~lso, Torrey, Syrian Politics 
aDd the Military, pp. 277-78. 
3Times (London), March 23, 1954, quoted in Spain, "Middle East 
Defense: A New Approach," 258. 
4New York Times, April 2, 1954. 
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incursions into what was considered Britain's sphere of inf1uence.1 
Although the two powers agreed in principle on the need to defend 
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the Middle East, they disagreed ~s to how defense should be implemented. 
Britain was still concerned over her dwindling position in the area 
and was desperately trying to salvage what she could of it. To do 
so, she fought for the retention of her existing treaty rights and 
military facilities with certain states of the Middle East. A Western-
sponsored system of defense, the British thought, would help toward 
that end. But the United States had little respect for those British 
objectives. Washington was mainly concerned over the area's defense 
against Russia, and felt that British tactics were keeping the Arabs 
from cooperating. 
Thotlgh this difference was not very pronounced before 1952, 
it came to be clearly seen by 1954. During the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations 
over the evacuation of Suez, the British sought a settlement that 
would be conditional on the agreement by Egypt to join a Middle East 
defense system. The United States, however, tended to be rather 
impatient ?Nith this British requirement. In fact, the United States 
often ref~ected the Egyptian view that it was unreasonable to ask 
Egypt to join a Western alliance while British troops were still 
on Egyptian soil. 2 In his memoirs, Anthony Eden says, "It was 
unfortunate that the United States Government and in particular, their 
Ambassador in Cairo LJefferson Caffe~7, were not prepared to put 
lSeale, Struggle for Syria, pp. 189-90. 
2Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, pp. 151-59. 
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any pressure upon the Egyptians. lIl EdEm goes on to say that, 
Anglo-American differences about Egyptian policy persisted. 
In a report home on the year our Ambassador in Cairo com­
mented that American policy in general seemed to be conditioned 
by a belief that Egypt was still the victim of British 
Ifcolonialism, If and as such deserving of American sympathy. 2 
III. THE FIGHT OVER THE BAGlIDAD PACT 
Having been outmaneuvered by the U.S. and having concluded an 
agreement with Egypt in October, 1954, to evacuate the Suez base, 
Britain welcomed an initiative, in late 1954, by Nuri aI-Said of 
Iraq to work "on a plan to strengthen the Arab League Pact, by the 
inclusion of Turkey and with the help of the United Kingdom and the 
United States.,~3 As it turned out, however, Nuri's plan only worked 
to undermine the Arab League and received little, if any, support 
from other Arab states. In his attempt to present Nuri's defense 
proposals to the Syrian representative at the United Nations, Eden-
was told 
in terms expressive of much_Arab opinion, then and since. 
"The people of Syria," he Lthe Syrian representativ~/ said, 
"are by no means opposed to the Anglo-Saxon countries, nor 
do they have strong anti-Soviet feelings; they have, in fact, 
very little feeling at all about the Soviet Union. The 
threat of aggression to them is not from Russia, but from 
Israel."4 
The Cairo "Voice of the Arabs" bitterly attacked Nuri's plan. 
Major Salah Salim paid visits to Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Lebanon to 
lEden, Full Circle, pp. 280-81. 

2Ibid., p. 284. 

3Ibid., p. 283. 

4Ibid., p. 252. 
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point out the necessity of a unified Arab policy on major issues 
and the unwisdom of adhering to foreign-inspired military alliances. 
With Nasser's strong support, Arabism became Egypt's official ?olicy-­
a policy aimed at achieving unity through non-alignment. Non-alignment 
was to be the surest guarantee of Arab independence. The points of 
view of Egypt and Iraq were so different that two meetings between 
Egyptian and Iraqi officials (one at Sarsank in Iraq during August 
1954, and one between Nuri and Nasser in Cairo during September of 
the same year) could not help resolve Iraqi-Egyptian differences. 
Failure to reconcile the points of view of Egypt and Iraq did not 
hinder Nuri from pursuing his objective of forging an alliance, in 
Which Turkey was to be a partner and, in the achievement of which, 
I the U.S. and Britain were to assist. After visits to London and Ankara, 
I Nuri advanced his plan, according to which Turkey was to move away
I from Pakistan and brought closer to the Arab states. On January 13, 
1955, Nuri aI-Said and the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes 
issued in Baghdad a jOint statement on the conclusion of a mutual 
defense pact. On February 24, Turkey and Iraq signed an agreement, 
since then known as the Baghdad Pact. Soon after, Britain, Iran 
and Pakistan joined it. l 
Though the United States supported the Baghdad Pact financially 
and militarily, joined its committees and has attended its meetings 
ever Since, she had not officially joined it. According to Herman 
Finer, "Dulles had been intimidated by the ferocious uproar in the 
lCampbell, Defense of the Middle ~, pp. 52-55; Torrey, 
Syrian Politics and the Military, pp. 279-82. 
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Middle East against Iraq."l The explanation given by the State 
Department was that the United States wished to avoid offending Nasser, 
Kiig Saud, Israel or pro-Israeli elements. "No one was fooled, however," 
says Richard Nolte,"and the U.S. has been roundly criticized both by 
opponents of the Pact for supporting it and proponents for not 
supporting if fully and openly. ,,2 
On January 22,. 1955, upon the invitation of Egypt, Arab premiers 
met in Cairo to censure Iraq for her policy. Although Nuri did not 
attend the meeting, the participants did not issue a statement of 
censure. There was, however, general disapproval of IraqIs policy. 
The government of Premier Faris aI-Khoury of Syria fell on February 7 
due, in part, to the Premier's unwillingness to censure Iraq during 
the Arab Premiers Conference in Cairo (January 22 to FebruarJ 6, 1955). 
On February 13, a leftist coalition, dominated by the Ba'th Party, 
was called upon by the Syrian President to form a cabinet. This was 
a major victory for Egypt, since Syria was the key to the success 
or failure of Egypt's policy, and marked the beginning of the ascendancy 
of the neutralist left in Syrian politics. 3 
Egypt and the Ba'th were drawn closer together by the similarity 
of their views on foreign policy. To face the rightist .forces in 
Syria, the Balth began edging towards the communists. This Ba'thist­
lHerman Finer, Dulles Over Suez: The Theory !.!!.£ Practice of 
his Diplomacy (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), p. 18. 
·2B.ichard H. Nolte, "American Policy in the Middle East," Journal 
of International Affairs, XIII, No.2 (1959), 118. 
3See Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, pp. 275-315. 
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Egyptian-Communist relationship put Syria on the side of Egypt and 
made her an object of Soviet interests and hopes. The Foreign Minister 
in the new cabinet, Khalid al-Azm, reflected on his government's 
policies in an interview with Patrick Seale in late 1960. He said, 
We felt we needed the support of a group of nations which had 
no preconceived notions on the Israeli issue and which could 
give us their backing at the United Nations. 
This was the reason we became pro-Russian deriving great moral 
and material support from the eastern bloc. Our rapproachment 
with the East continued when I became Foreign Minister after 
Faris al-Khuri's downfall. It was to stand us in good stead 
at the time of Suez. But it must not be supposed that we be­
came converts to communist ideology. We distinguished between 
international affairs and internal social and political questions. 
It was only on the international level that we were prepared 
to go along with the communists. l 
The Syrian left received full support from Egypt. Being in the midst 
of a circle of pro-West states (Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, Israel and 
Lebanon), Syria badly needed the. support that both Egypt and the 
Soviet Union gave her. 
According to Patrick Seale, the Baghdad Pact "WdS intended for a 

dual purpose: as a military weapon against the Soviet Union and as a 

'political instrument of British and Iraqi power in the Arab world.,,2 
Hurl aI-Said had helped the British to outmaneuver the Americans. 
The Baghdad Pact differed from the "northern tier" concept in that it 
made the Arab world once more the center of gravity for Middle East 
defense. While Dulles was trying to construct a line of defense against 
lal-Az!U to Seale, Damascus, November 8, 196.0, in Seale, Struggle

12! Syria, pp. 219-20. 

2Ibid., p. 186. 
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Russia's borders by binding mainly non-Arab states in an alliance, 
Britain supported Nuri's plan in an effort to harness the Arab 
Collective Security Pact through Iraqi leadership. On January 11, 
1956, Secretary Dulles stated that the U.S. "has been ••• sympathetic 
toward the formation of the Baghdad Pact; indeed it comes out of an 
idea I developed ••• the 'northern tier' concept."l Herman Finer 
notes, however,that 
At the end of April 1956, the Secretary of State told some 
Washington correspondents in a private "background" session 
that the British had "perverted" his idea of a pact which 
would include only nations facing north, when they brought 
in Iraq, and in doing so had aroused the hostility of the 
other Arab nations. 2 
The Egyptian Economic and Political Review tries to show that the 
Baghdad Pact was nothing less than a British coup that foiled a 
promising Egyptian-American relationship. 
Britain, through her ever willing servant Nuri e1-Said • • 
had frustrated the Egyptian intention to strengthen the Arab 
Collective Pact. The angry Egyptian reaction and Egypt's 
determined stand for Arab unity against the Baghdad alignment, 
placed a worried American State Department in the dilemma of 
having to choose between a promising new relationship with 
Egypt, and loyalty to an alignment America had done much to 
sponsor, and which itself was associated with her European 
allied via N.A.T.O.3 
Advice from American foreign service personnel in the Middle 
East was generally opposed to the idea of the Baghdad Pact. But none 
could possibly "shake the views of Washington policy makers at that 
lu.s., Department of State, American Foreign Policy, Current 
Documents, 1956 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1959), p. 561. 
2Finer, Dulles Over Suez, p. 18. 
3"Isolation or Entanglement," p. 16. 
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time," says Miles Copeland, 

Here were gentlemen who saw world affairs in the perspective 

of the atom bomb, the East-West cold war, NATO and the Warsaw 

Pact; their thinking about the Middle East was in terms of its 

economic problems and resources--apart from the question of 

Israel, that is, which, for reasons of domestic politics in the 

United States, demanded an awareness out of all proportion to 

its strategic importance. l 
There was and' will, perhaps, always be a "'field perspective''', says 
Copeland, and a "'Washington perspective,' and except for brief 
lightning flashes every now and then, the two remain utterly incommu­
nicable.,,2 
There was grave doubt that the Baghdad Pact could make any 
3progress in winning the popular support of the Arab masses.
Nevertheless, Arab governments were vulnerable to it. According 
to Patrick Seale, "Syria enjoyed what amounted to a casting vote on 
the Pact's future: had she applied for membership, other Arab states 
would have followed; in the event, her abstention and hostility 'froze' 
the alliance, isolating its only Arab member, Iraq.,,4 But the very 
'fact that Iraq began receiving Western arms could have enabled her 
to build a military might and expose the relative impotence of Egypt's 
power. Besides, Iraq's joining the Pact could make of her a formidable 
opponent of Egypt. Nuri might revive the "Fertile Crescent" scheme 
lCopeland, The Game of Nations (New York), pp. 212-13. 

2Ibid., p. 213. 

3Paul Hanna, "America in the Middle East," Middle Eastern 

Affairs, X (May, 1959), 188. 

4Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 213. 
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and undermine the whole idea of a pan-Arab movement and exclude Egypt. 
This was completely unacceptable to Nasser and the progressive 
movement of Arab nationalism. Nuri was attacked by both Caire and 
Damascus radios and labeled as traitor to the Arab cause of nationalist 
unity. "Nasser also intensified the ideological campaign against 
Zionism," says James Doughe.rty, "in order to highlight the artificiality 
of any anti-communist pact which relegated to a subordinate place the 
'real threat' to the Arabs, namely, Israel."l Egyptian and Syrian 
officials paid visits to Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon to try and 
achieve some sort of Arab unity and cooperation in foreign policy, 
in military, cultural and economic affairs. Saudi Arabia promptly 
supported the Syrian-Egyptian initiative; Lebanon and Jordan wanted 
to take their time. 
Huri's challenge was countered, partly through the Syrian-
Egyptian-Saudi alliance. The Baghdad Pact was already a lost cause, 
for when England joined it, no hope remained of winning any Arab state 
to it. ''Most Arabs were convinced," says Senator Humphrey, 
that the charges of Radio Cairo were really true • • • that the 
Pact was • • • a backhanded way of perpetuating old imperialist 
interests and keeping the Arab world divided against itself. 
When the U.S. government in turn established political and 
military liaison with the Pact members in Baghdad, Egypt ~d 
its friends saw further confirmation of their suspicions., . 
IV. REASONS FOR FAILURE 
The battle over the Baghdad Pact was a battle between the traditional 
lDougherty, "The Aswan Decision in Perspective," 36. 

2Uumphrey, "A Chronology of Failure," 12. 
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world of Nuri and the new progressive world of Nasser--a battle that 
Nasser was prepared for and enjoyed tremendous advantages over Nuri. 
In 1955, Iraq was still backward and its peasants were in debt to their 
lords. According to Harry Hopkins, "the entire cultivated area was 
owned by only 4 per cent of the popu1ation.,,1 The Development Board, 
established i~ 1950 to use 75 percent of Iraq's oil revenue on public 
works projects, had not proved its effectiveness. When in 1952, 
Egypt announced her land reform program, riots broke out among Iraq's 
poor sharecroppers. The Baghdad Pact, under these circumstances, was 
viewed by "politically conscious Arabs everywhere," says Hopkins, as 
"a Holy Alliance designed to repress the gathering Arab Revolution and 
to maintain that fatal old status quo in which Arab feudalism made 
common cause with Western Imperia1ism.,,2 
One can only conclude that the Baghdad Pact was advanced without 
careful consideration of its possible impact on the peoples concerned. 
It inflamed Egypt and aroused her opposition, and British participation 
made it completely unacceptable to the Arabs. The fact that it was 
proposed through Turkey and Iraq, the former a recent imperial power 
in the Middle East and the latter still a puppet under British influence, 
foredoomed it. It bypassed the Arab League and undermined the concept 
of Arab unity. It presupposed an enemy that the Arabs did not fear 
and ignored the Jne they did fear. Iraq's politicians may have been 
drawn to it beca.:se of a feeling of proximity to Russia, or because of 
~pkins, Egypt, the Crucible, p. 163. 

2Ibid., pp. 166-67. 
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the Soviet-oriented Kurdish minority in Iraq's north. Those may have 
~oOft the feelinge of pro-West politicians in Iraq, but in reality Iraq 
do•• not 'bo~der on RUleia and if. essentially "in and of the Arab 
world.. ,,1 A _jor factor, no doubt, was the influence of such Anglophile 
politician8 as Nuri aI-Said and their wish to preserve a British· 
Iraqi friendship under te~s of equality after getting rid of unequal 
troaty arrangements. Britain sponsored the Pact because she put 
Iraq ~efore Egypt, whose sin was that she did not cooperate with her. 
Jritain was allo bound to the Iraqi royal house and to Nuri by a long­
,tanding frieno.hip.2 Besides, the Baghdad Pact provided Britain with 
military advantagel and a substitute for the Saadabad Pact and the 
Aft,lo-Iraqi treaty due to expire in 1957.3 
Tho neslect of Arab public opinion and the Westrs insensitivity 
to the forces of nationalism and neutrality were serious blunders. 
thole forces received a tremendous boost at the Bandung Conference, 
at which the nations of the Third World "proclaimed that the peoples 
of their two continents were resolved to put an end to the disgraceful 
colonial yoke and eliminate its pernicious afte~ath.,,4 Nasser's 
policies had already been supported by President Tito of Yugoslavia 
lCampbell, !h! Middle ~ !n ~ Muted Cold War, p. 445. 
lEdeu, Full Circle, pp. 245-46 • 
........... 

3Ca.tleberry, "The Arabs' View of Postwa: American Foreign 
Policy," 14..16; Fitzsimons, "Suez Crisis and L:e Containment Policy," 
434; Seale, Struggle i2! Syria, p. 228; Campbell. The Middle East ~ 
the Muted Cold War, p. 445; George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in 
rr;n, 19l8:r948~thaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Pres~1949):----­
PP:-305 ..306n. 
4a. Titov, "The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Peoples of the East," 
International Affairs (Moscow: May, 1958), p. 41. 
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and Prime Minister Nehru of India. While Russia welcomed neutralism 
as an ally, the West denounced it as "immoral. II The Soviets saw 
in it a means of foiling Western defense plans--hence their support 
of the Bandung Conference. On this issue both Cairo and MOscow agreed; 
both saw Syria as the key to the success of a neutralist policy in 
the Arab world, and they both supported that country's stand against 
the Baghdad Pact. When Syria's purchase of German Mark IV tanks from 
Czechoslovakia in 1954 drew threats and protests from Iraq and Turkey, 
the Soviet Union stood firm on Syria's side. l Syria continued to 
enjoy Soviet support. 
In a published interview with g. ~. News in the summer of 1954, 
Nasser asserted that any alliance with the U. S. or Britain would give 
cause to the communists to exploit it for their own advantage and would 
enable them to make the accusation that the West has returned to its 
policy of exploitation and that defense pacts and plans serve only 
Western aims. Such schemes, Nasser argued, would backfire and prove 
disasterous to both the Arabs and the West. lilt is also a matter of 
psychology," said Nasser, "you must deal with this area from the 
psychological point of view--not with agreements, treaties, etc. n2 
It is unfortunate that his ideas were not given more serious considera­
tions by the West. 
The West assumed that the Soviet Union was not about to sell 
lSeale, Struggle for Syria, pp. 233-36. 
2'~at Should the U. S. Do in the Middle East? Interview with 
Egypt's Prime Minister Lieut. Col. Gama1 Abdel Nasser," 1':. ~. News 
&World Report (September 3, 1954), p. 29. 
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'~dern arms to non-Communist nations in the Middle East, and that 
even if it did, there would be no Middle East takers. The formation 
of the Baghdad Pact," contends J_ C. Hurewitz, "gave Russia its 
opportunity to prove the Western assumptions wrong."l Washington did 
not realize that the Arab states could not be forced into an alliance 
against the Soviet Union. According to Nasrotallah Fatemi, Dulles's 
efforts were "tantamount to construcing a skyscraper on the sands 
of the Arabian desert.,,2 The Baghdad Pact gave Russia the chance to 
leapfrog into the heart of the Middle East not as a conqueror, but 
as a welcome guest, and to confront the West in a region that, up to 
1955, was considered part of the West's sphere of influence. 
The only Arab country that was drawn to the Baghdad Pact could 
not be held in a state of unnatural isolation from her sister states 
in the Arab world. It was evident that Iraq would eventually respond 
to the stronger pull of the Arab world. Therefore, Western relations 
with Iraq depended largely on the success or failure of the West to find 
a sound basis for a mutually advantageous relationship with the rest 
of the Arab Middle East. In the event the West could not find a basis 
for common interests with the Arab world, Iraq's association with the 
West became "too great a burden for Iraq to carry.,,3 This seems to 
lJacob Coleman Hurewitz, ed., "Soviet-American Rivalry in the 
Middle East," Academy of Political Science Proceedings, XXIX (March, 
1969), 9. 
2Nasrotallah S. Fatemi, "The Present Crisis in the Middle East," 
in Samuel Merlin, ed., The Big ::owers and the Present Crisis in the 
Middle East: !! Colloquium (Ru~.2rford: Fairleigh Dickenson Uni"T,;'rsity 
Press, 1968), p. 36. 
3Campbell, The Middle East in the Muted Cold War, p. 445. 
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have been the great obstacle in the way for successful U. S.-Mideast 
relations. There had to be mutual advantages and common interests. 
In~tead of seeking those common interests, each side tried to convince 
the other that his way was right. The continued American disregard 
for Arab nationalist aims and aspirations; the American insistence on 
involving the Arab world in the cold war; U. S. support of rival 
nationalisms (Zionism and regional nationalisms); and the continuing 
American association with colonial allies made it impossible for the 
Arabs to cooperate. "To the extent that common interests have been 
found with the states directly bordering on the Soviet Union," says 
J. C. Campbell, 
the northern tier concept had merit. Unfortunately the Baghdad 
Pact was by no means the best way to bring the concept to 
concrete realization. Leaving aside the question whether its 
formation provoked the Soviet jump into the "southern tier", 
the failure of the West to find a basis of common interest 
with the Arab States other than Iraq is what brought on the 
grave crisis that began with the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal 
and has deepened ever since. 1 
Nasser's campaign against the Baghdad Pact succeeded. Its success 
dramatically demonstrated that Nasser was only expressing what most Arabs 
felt and wanted. His victory made him the uncontested leader of the 
progressive Arab movement, and his alleged intrigues against pro-West 
Arab governments became a major cause for the deterioration of 
American-Egyptian relations. He was blamed for almost all that took 
place in the Arab world since, and was often accused of plotting to 
overthrow the friends of the'West. Nasser in his turn believed that 
lIbid., p. 446. 
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the U. S. and Britain were inciting opposition to him through such 
pro-Western politicians as Nuri al-Said of Iraq, King Hussein of Jordan 
and President Chamoun of Lebanon. He was always fearful of an 
American CIA-inspired coup to topple him or to install a pro-Western 
regime in Syria. He could recall very well how Dr. Mossadegh fell 
in Iran in l~53. As suspicions mounted on both sides, confidence 
was lost and cooperation seemed further than ever. On his part, 
Nasser explained that his only means of reaching the Arab people was 
the "Voice of the Arabs" and that nationalist activity in the Arab 
world was inspired and prompted by legitimate local aims, desires, 
hopes, fears and aspirations. l 
lEllis, Challenge in the Middle East, pp. 37-40. 
CHAPTER V 
THE RUSSIAN ARMS DEAL 
The United States looked with favor upon the July Revolution of 
1952 in Egypt, in which King Farouk was outsed and a group of military 
officers assumed power. Washington was hoping Egypt would become the 
cornerstone of United States foreign policy in the Middle East. 
Egypt's revolutionary officers were busily trying to cope with Egypt's 
internal problems and General Neguib seemed moderate and cooperative. 
In late 1952, Henry Byroade, then Assistant Secretary of State, declared, 
The policy goals and actual accomplishments of the new regime 

in Egypt are such as to deserve our full support. • • • We 

believe that this regime deserves the support of the Western 

powers. We should all be ready to assist where possible in 

helping it attain its proclaimed goals for the future. 

American sympathy with the officers' aims had been unofficially 
expressed before the Revolution took place in July 1952. American III"~ ~I~ 
':'1 
:liI~ 
"~CIA agents became aware of the officers' plans to overthrow the '1 
Farouk regime as early as March 1952. However, Colonel Gama1 Abde1 
Nasser, the officers' guiding spirit, showed coolness toward their 
approaches. He was aware of the fact that, for it to be genuine and 
to succeed, his revolution had to be purely Egyptian in nature and 
free from for.eign interference. The new regime, he believed, had to 
have a free hand in making decisions and moves that were solely for 
1Henry A. Byroade, flU. S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East," 
U. S., Department of State, Bulletin, XXVII (December 15, 1952), 934. 
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Egypt's good, regardless of Great Power interests. These were 
couvictions which constituted the basis of his later policy of "positive 
ne':,:,~trality"--a policy that had other exponents such as Akram al-Hourani 
and the Ba I·th leaders in Syria, who had advocated it long before the 
Egyptian officers came to power. This policy was stated and restated 
repeatedly in various ways and forms to both Western and Soviet govern­
ments when Nasser felt an attempt was being made to influence him.l 
Despite his apparent coolness toward American approaches and 
despite his obvious nationalistic and independent stance, Nasser still 
could count on American support and backing. He enjoyed the friendship 
of a number of Americans in Egypt. American Ambassadors such as 
Caffery and Byroade were his friends. Among his other American friends 
were William Lakeland, the political officer at the American Embassy 
in Cairo, Kermit Roosevelt and Miles Copeland, who were CIA men. 
These and other friendships among American private citizens, engaged in 
various enterprises in Egypt, provided a rare opportunity for Americans 
to exchange views with an outstanding Middle Eastern leader in a 
key Middle Eastern state. 2 
According to M. H. Haykal, a confidant of Nasser and editor of 
al·Ahram newspaper, the opportunity was there for Egypt and the United 
States to cooperate. He gives the following reasons why cooperation 
was possible: (1) Britain was the main enemy and the dominant Egyptian 
concern was to force her out; (2) The United States, among the Great 
IE1lis, Challenge in the ~dle ~, pp. 35-36; Copeland, The 
~ of Nations (New York), pp. 65-72, 148. 
2E1lis, Challenge in the Middle East, pp. 35-36. 
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Powers, was the most acceptable because of her clean war record, her 
economic strength, her four freedoms, her lack of colonial history in 
the area; (3) The Soviet Union w~s far, unattractive under Stalin, and 
appeared to be preoccupied with European problems; (4) Though the 
United States was one of the main supporters of the creation of the 
state of Israel, it was Britain that received most of the blame because 
it was she who issued the Balfour Declaration and under her mandate 
Zionism prospered; (5) Before the Baghdad Pact, the United States was 
still in the fog and, therefore, could choose what to do before a 
verdict was passed on her. Haykal goes on to say that on the morning 
of July 23, 1952, the day of the Revolution, the officers made their 
first diplomatic contact with Mr. Jefferson Caffery, the American 
Ambassador. A representative was sent to inform him of the fall of 
the Farouk regime and of the aims and objectives of their Revolution, 
which indicates that the new Egyptian regime was anxious to establish 
good relations with the United States. l 
, 
'i
,I 
"I 
I~:'n 
1. THE REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATICN'S "NEW OUTLOOK" ~ 
When the Republican Administration took over in early 1953, a 
"new outlook" in foreign policy was announced. 2 Greater understanding 
of Asiatic and African peoples was sought in an effort to develop a 
policy that would help win them as friends and allies. 3 The obvious 
lMohammad Hasanayn Haykal, Nahnu ••• wa-Amrika, pp. 55-58; 
see also, Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York), pp. 74-75. 
2Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, p. 49. 
3"From the Shores of Tripoli to the Oil Fields of Arabia," p. 16. 
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lack of success on the part of the Truman Administration to win Arab 
friendship prompted the Eisenhower-Dulles Administration to work on 
re:::toring Arab confidence and goodwill. On March 12, 1953, President 
Eisenhower assured Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia that his Adminis­
tration "was determined to restore the spirit of confidence and trust 
which had previously existed between the United States and the Arab 
nations. ,,1 
From 1953 to 1956, the Eisenhower administration tried to forge 
a new relationship with the Arab world. An attempt was underway to 
tone down the previous Administration's pronounced support for Israel 
and to, as much as possible, free U.S. policy from the stigma of full-
fledged cooperation with Britain and France in the Middle East. The 
idea was that, for U. S. policy to succeed, the U. S. was to disassociate 
herself from English and French colonialism in the region and to assume 
an impartial role in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Once this policy proved 
successful and Arab friendship was won, they then would be encouraged 
to build their own system of defense against Communist Russia. 
Following Dulles's visit to the area in 1953, Washington concluded 
that the idea of a broad defense system was unrealistic and that it 
should be substituted by an alliance between those countries ready 
and willing to join it. Washington also concluded that the irritating 
disputes, between Britain on one side and Egypt and Iran on the other, 
should be settled because they were keeping the Arabs and the Iranians 
from cooperating with the West. But as long as the United States 
lRichard H. Sanger, "American Policy in the Middle East during 
1953," U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XXX (February 8, 1954' 209. 
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sought alliances to include the Arabs, to maintain positions of influence 
earlier assumed by Britain and France, and to support pro-West reaction­
ary regimes in the area, it was useless to expect either Nass~r, the 
Ba'th Party, or other Arab nationalists to cooperate. The United 
States persisted in seeking these objectives and her persistence 
eventually drove the Arabs to seek Russia's assistance. l 
America's new profession of policy met with Great Britain's 
hostility. While the United States saw in the dynamic and progressive 
Egyptian regime a new element and a possible chance for an Egyptian-
Israeli peace and, perhaps, a defense system, Britain saw in it a new 
danger to her interests. "So seriously did Whitehall look upon the 
American support of the Egyptian Revolutionary Government," says the 
Egyptian Economic and Political Review, 
that on Mr. Churchill's and Eden's visit to Washington in 
the spring of 1953 the British government sought American 
assurances that the United States would not follow indepen­
dent policies in Cairo without consultation with their British 
allies. 2 
Meanwhile, formal and informal contacts continued between Nasser 
and American personnel. Nasser was confident that Egypt could deal 
with the United States on an independent basis. He, therefore, turned 
to the United States for his first request of economic aid. His aim 
continued to be complete Egyptian independence and an ability to make 
political decisions with Egypt's interest in mind. He saw no basic 
reason why the United States might not fully support such a policy or 
lCampbell, "America and the Middle East," 143-45. 

2"Isolation or Entanglement," p. 15. 
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why the U. S. and Egypt should not cooperate. Harry Ellis contends 
that "when Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was asking nations 
to 'stand up and be counted' on lhe issue of cOl1UI1unismt Nasser could 
not believe this meant the U. S. would give Egypt economic aid only if 
Nasser joined what he regarded essentially as a foreign effort against 
a foreign en~y."l 
Nevertheless, in hannony with its "new outlook" policy, the 
U. S. Government applied pressure on Britain to evacuate Suez. At 
the same timet American economic aid was withheld from Egypt until an 
agreement was reached with Britain.2 Britain held out until 1954 
in the hope that Egypt would join a Western-sponsored defense system 
before the lease on the Suez Base expired. Under such a system, her 
troops, Britain hoped, could stay in Egypt. But the Egyptians made it 
perfectly clear that they would not tolerate British presence any 
longer under any circumstances. Both sides, therefore, were pressed 
by the U. S. to reach an agreement. In October 1954, an Anglo-Egyptian 
agreement settled the matter. Britain agreed to evacuate the Canal 
Zone by June 19, 1956. Egypt conceded to maintain the base installations 
and agreed to a short-tenn legal guarantee of Britain's right to 
reoccupy it in case of an attack against a Middle Eastern country.3 
The victory for Egypt was less than total and the Egyptian 
Government did not escape public criticism. The concession made to 
lEl1iS, Challenge in the Middle East, p. 37. 
2Robert Strausz-Hupe, Alvin J. Cottrell, and James E. Dougherty, 
eds., American-Asian Tensions (New York: Praeger, 1956), pp. 81-83. 
~iddle East Journal, VIII (Winter, 1954), 460. 
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Britain was criticized by the Muslim Brothers. B~t in general the 
Arab world considered the agreement a significant achievement and a 
cause for joy and hope. The sterner tone of the United States Govern­
ment toward the state of Israel took the form of occasional censure 
through the United Nations of her war-like policy, gradual reduction 
of official U. S. Government aid to her, and refusal of her requests 
lfor U. S. arms. Between 1948 and 1954, Israel received more than four 
times in U. S. Government aid than all the Arab states combined. 
Impartiality was the professed U. S. policy. Assistant Secretary of 
State Henry A. Byroade declared, "a pro-Israeli, or pro-Arab policy, 
has no place in our thinking. The United States must consider with 
great care the implications of throwing whatever influence we may have 
in such situation to one side or the other.,,2 
II. PERSISTING IRRITATIONS 
By 1953, the Soviet Union began to make certain gestures indica­
tive of a basic change in her policy. Soviet officials began visits 
in Asia and Africa, and tensions with Turkey and Iran were relaxed. 
The dominant Soviet theme was the support of "national liberation 
movements." Arab nationalism and neutralism began to be seen by the 
Soviets as a combination of forces capable of driving the West out of 
lPolk, The United States and the Arab World, pp. 265-67. 
2Byroade, nTh }1iddle East in New Perspective," 632. 
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the area and opening it for Soviet pen~tration.1 To Nasser and Arab 
nationalists, this was an excellent chance to relieve them of complete 
reliance on the West. Nasser's basic aim was to enable himself to 
secure Western economic and military aid without giving up the objec­
tive of Arab world leadership and without having to subscribe to any 
of the West's strategic defense plans. When the West made the 
achievement of these aims impossible, Nasser began to display an 
ability to obtain aid from the East and to seriously endanger Western 
interests in the region. 2 
The new Soviet approach caused the U.S. and the West greater 
alarm, and U. S. policy was further stiffened. America's concern 
over the Middle East was explained in the spring of 1954 by Mr. Henry 
Byroade. 
To understand our concern over developments in this part of 
the world, it is necessary to understand that we do see an 
increasing danger that the Middle East may be relegated to a 
satellite status under the Soviet Union. MOst people in the 
Middle East who read this statement will label it as "alarmist" 
and without foundation of fact. The very fact that thi~ 
reaction will exist is partly the cause of our concern. 
It is this difference in opinion between the West and the Arab world 
that was the main cause of difficulty and the reason for the drift 
1Geoffrey Wheeler, "Russia and the Middle East," Political 
Quarterly, XXVIII (April, 1957), pp. 134-35; Walter Z. Laqueur, The 
Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union and the Middle East, 
1958-68 (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1969), p. 9; Idem, The Soviet 
Union and the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1959), pp. 211-13. 
2Kerr , "'Coming to Terms with Nasser'," 71. 
~enry A. Byroade, "Facing Realities in the Arab-Israel Dispute," 
U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XXX (May 10, 1954) 709. 
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toward the Soviet Union. Washington failed to win the Arab world 

and relations with Egypt remained cool. 

What further contributed to the failure was the fact that 
Washington's professed policy of disassociation with Britain and 
France was not earnestly followed. The United States also failed 
to strike a posture of strict tmpartiality in the Arab-Israeli sphere. 
As a result, Washington was not able to convince the Arabs that it was 
capable of detaching itself from London and Paris. France, as a 
matter of fact, was using American arms in North Africa supplied to 
her through NATO. Moreover, Israel proved to be a major U. S. interest, 
and any attempt at impartiality by the U. S. was regarded by the 
Arabs as fiction,and any reference to the maintenance of a power 
balance was taken as a reflection of Washington's excessive concern 
for the security of the state of Israel. 
The Tripartite Declaration of May 1950 was interpreted in this 

light. The Arabsviewed this agreement among the three powers as 

'equating seventy million Arabs with little over one million Jews. 
liThe Arab nationalists were sure," says James Dougherty, "that, 
however much the State Department might wish to curry the favor of the 
Arabs, the United States was irrevocably committed to the support 
of the Zionist experiment." Neither were they impressed by the 
reduction of direct U. S. aid to the Jewish state, for they believed 
West Germany I s payments of repatriations to Israel were due to American 
persuasions. Dougherty concludes, 
So far as the Arabs were concerned, the crucial test of 
Washington's sincerity was the degree to which it was willing 
to build up the economic and military strength of Israel's 
,. 
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neighbors. The Egyptians were convinced by Washington's 
steadfast refusal to furnish them arms that the United 
States failed this test. l 
III. EGYPT'S BID FOR ARMS 
Ever since the end of World War II, Egypt tried to acquire arms. 
Egypt sought-arms from the United States, Great Britain, France, the 
Soviet Union, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, and India. Some 
arms were obtained but not in the desired quantities. For one reason 
or another, Egypt's efforts to acquire arms failed. The United States 
never came out with a clear explanation as to why she withheld arms 
from Egypt. Britain and Sweden refused to supply Egypt with arms as 
long as Anglo-Egyptian negotiations over the Suez Base were not yet 
concluded. France's reason was Nasser's support of Algeria's rebels. 
And according to Khrushchev, Stalin refused to sell King Farouk arms 
because the Middle East was within Britain's sphere of influence; 
"therefore, we couldn't go sticking our nose into Egypt's affairs. 
Not that Stalin wouldn't have liked to move into the Near East--he 
would have liked to very much--but he zealistically recognized that the 
balance of power wasn't in our favor and that Britain wouldn't have 
stood for our interference."2 
Nasser's first request for U. S. arms was made in the fall of 
1952. Washington did not refuse his request. A prompt American reply 
IJames E. Dougherty, liThe Aswan Decision in Perspective," 
Political Science Quarterly, LXXIV (March, 1959), 33. 
2Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, with an introduction, 
commentary and notes by Edward Crankshaw, trans. and ed. by Strobe 
Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), p. 431. 
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revealed that there existed a secret agreement between the former 
govermnent of Egypt and the United States. The agreement was signed 
in February 1951, but was not fully implemented. In accordance with it, 
the U. S. was ready to supply Nasser with the arms agreed upon with 
King Farouk. But the new Egyptian regime did not wish to bind itself 
by that secret agreement because the type of arms agreed upon was not 
what the new regime needed. What the Farouk regime contracted to 
purchase were arms useful for protecting the regime and keeping internal 
peace. Egyptrs new rulers sought the type of arms that would help raise 
the morale of the army and defend Egypt against external threats. l 
In November 1952, Assistant Secretary of Defense William Foster 
arrived in Cairo to discuss Egypt's military needs. Nasser submitted 
to him a list of the military equipment Egypt wanted, which Foster 
approved after minor modifications. Upon his return to Washington, 
an Egyptian delegation, headed by Wing Commander Ali Sabri, then 
Director of Nasser's office as Acting President of the Revolutionary 
Command Council, was invited to the U. S. to sign the agreement. The 
delegation arrived in the midst of the presidential elections in the 
fall of 1952. Sabri's mission, however, was unsuccessful and Nasser 
requested an explanation from Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, who apparently 
had no explanation to give. The facts were that Sabri's mission ran 
into serious difficulty. The,nswer can be found in a conversation 
between General Olmstead, then tL. charge of foreign military aid at the 
Pentagon, and M. H. Haykal in Washington. Haykal reports that General 
lHaykal, Nahnu ••• wa-Amrika, pp. 63-64. 
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Olmstead was not sure why Egypt was trying to pttrchase arms when she 
could get them free by aiding the United States in solving mutual 
defense problems. General Olmstead went on to explain that th~ U. S. 
could not give arms to Egypt as long as the British thought they would 
be used against them, or as long as Egypt was trying to defeat Israel 
when the real' enemy was the Soviet Union. It was impossible, concluded 
General Olmstead, to get congressional approval of such a deal as long 
as Egypt continued to refuse to join an alliance against a dangerous 
enemy. I 
When the official explanation finally came from Ambassador 
Caffery after Sabri returned empty-handed, it stated the same reasons 
given by General Olmstead, plus a few more details. First, said 
Caffery, William Foster was not authorized to conclude an agreement; 
he allowed himself to be carried away and committed himself beyond 
what he was instructed to do. Second, Washington was still willing 
to grant part of Egypt's request were it not for a telephone call 
to President-elect Eisenhower from Prime Minister Churchill, reminding 
him that U. S. arms in Egyptian hands could be used to kill England's 
children, some of whom served under General Eisenhower during the last 
war. Finally, Caffery made reference to Nasser's latest utterances 
against Britain, which were viewed as threats to use force against 
British forces in Egypt. In particular, Caffery mentioned Nasser's 
interview with Margaret Higgins, published in the New York Herald 
Tribune, and a speech delivered at Shibun al-Koum. In the interview, 
I ~., pp. 67-69. 
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Nasser is supposed to have said that armed resistance would begin if 
negotiations with Britain did not yield the desired results. In theI 
I, speech, he naid that Britain muFt leave or be ready to defend her 
I 
!, forces in Egypt. 1 
I IV. TIlE GHAZZAH RAID OF EARLY 1955 
r 
l 
-; 
The problem of arms supply was not the only one facing Egypt's 
new rulers. They had to cope with domestic problems, both economic 
and political. The burden of facing those problems forced the Israeli 
issue to the sidelines. Nasser's general policy was to keep tension 
as low as possible while internal problems were being studied and 
attempts were being made to solve them. But by early 1955, Nasser 
could not possibly continue to follow such a policy and hope to stay 
in power. Several events aggravated the situation and made the supply 
of arms Nasser's most pr.essing need. In October 1954, thirteen 
Egyptian Jews were arrested on charges of planting explosive charges 
in U. S. and British installations in Egypt to embroil Egypt with those 
two nations. Their trial ended on January 27, 1955. Two were condemned 
to death and hanged on January 31; two were acquitted; the rest received 
sentences of hard labor, some for life. They had a fair trial and 
Nasser reasoned they ought to pay the penalty for their crimes. 
According to the Christian Science Monitor correspondent Harry Ellis, 
itA French lawyer permitted by Nasser to attend the trial testified 
1Ibid., pp. 69-71. 
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afterward to its fairness."l 
Israel's answer came in a month's time. In retaliation for the 
tr~a1 and for Fidaiyeen raids, Israel staged a massive raid on 
February 28 against Egyptian positions in the Ghazzah strip, in which 
thirty-eight2 Egyptian soldiers were killed. According to M. H. 
Hayka1, the Ghazzah raid was intended as a shock and a reminder that 
Egypt did not possess arms and there was none to protect her. There­
fore, her only salvation was through joining the Baghdad Pact. 3 
On March 1, Nasser said, in a speech to the Military College 
cadets, "The raid against Ghazzah is going to be the turning point 
in the history of the Middle East.,,4 Two days later, he told Ambassador 
Byroade that the danger Egypt feared was real and America must give 
a no-or-yes answer to Egypt's requests for arms. He also told Byroade 
that his government had committed a grave error in cutting its defense 
budget to concentrate on internal reform. "I still believe," continued 
Nasser, 
that our conflict with Israel is one that is mainly dependent 
on economic and social progress in the long run, but I am now 
convinced that our defense budget should be increased. I 
cannot fight Israel with schools, hospitals, and factories. 
If we build schools, hospitals, and factories without the 
necessary armed force to protect them, Israel would be able 
to take possession of what we build any time. That is why 
lE11is, Challenge in the Middle East, p. 41. 

2Hayka1 gives the number 39. 

3Hayka1, Nahnu ••• wa-Amrika, p. 92. 

4Ibid., p. 93. 
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we are determined to acquire arms ftom other sources if you 
finally decide not to supply us with what we want and need. 1 
From an initial request for $100,000,000 worth of military 
equipment, Nasser finally settled for about $20,000,000. It was 
evident that the amount requested could not help defeat Israel. That 
i. why American Embassy officials in Cairo favored the sale. They
-. 
rea.oned that Nasser had to improve the morale of his troops and to 
quiet unrest in his army. But Washington showed no signs of relaxing 
it. policy.2 The Gha~~ah raid of winter 1955 was the first serious 
attack .gainst Egypt since the cease-fire of 1948, and became an 
open challenge to Egypt's army. Bitter and humiliated, Egyptian army 
officer. intensified their demand for arms. This raid triggered the 
.larm in Egypt and set the stage for an end to a frustrated and long-
delayed bid by Egypt for American arms. The Egyptians believed 
that the U. S. was delaying and setting impossible conditions in an 
effort to forestall any arms agreement. But Nasser could not stand the 
delay, .nd the restraint he had shown toward Israel up to 1955 could 
not h.ve been continued without permanent damage to his regime's 
po.ition and standing in the eyes of the Egyptian army, the Egyptian 
people, and the Arab world. 
General Eedson Burns, the United Nations military representative 
in the area, testified that Nasser was cooperative in trying to reduce 
border tension; in abiding by agreements; a~d in demonstrating a 
1l2!&., pp. 93-94. 
2Cope1and, The Game of Nations (New York), p. 156; Ellis, 
Challenge ~ the Middle East, p. 42. 
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willingness to avoid trouble. Nasser had actually been seeking a 
peaceful settlement with Israel. In 1954, he tried to arrange a secret 
meeting with Moshe Sharett, then Prime Minister of Israel, through 
the mediation of India's Ambassador in Cairo. On a visit to Israel, 
Don Mintoff, later to become Prime Minister of Malta, and Maurice 
Orbach, a Bri"tish M.P., carried a letter addressed to Sharett from 
Nasser. Even after the Ghazzah raid of early 1955 and the Russian 
arms deal, Nasser warmly welcomed Anthony Eden's proposal in his 
November Guildhall speech for a negotiated settlement of the Arab-
Israeli dispute. It seems therefore, unfair in the light of the historic 
evidence for the West to label Nasser as an aggressive militaristic 
dictator, whose only passion was to incite hatred for Israe1. 1 
It does not take a close examination to find out who obstructed 
peace efforts. The solution recommended by the United Nations for 
settling the Palestine refugee problem, through its resolution of 
1948, had been reaffirmed by the U. N. General Assembly every year. 
But Israel never accepted it for the obvious reason that it was not 
consistent with the basic concept underlying the existence of a Jewish 
state. Therefore, the U.N. call to allow those Palestinian refugees 
who wished to return home was not heeded; neither were they repatriated. 
In fact the departure of the refugees seemed necessary, and Israel's 
policy worked to keep them out. Commander E. H. Hutchinson, the 
American Chairman of the United Nations Jordanian-Israeli Mixed 
lIbid., p. 41; Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York), p. 156; 
Hopkins, Egypt, The CrUCible, pp. 169-71. 
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Armistice Commission from 1949-1954, reported, "Few, if any of Israel's 
offers of peace, were matched by deeds that would invite cooperation. • • 
18~e1 led by a good margin in serious violations of the border and 
armistice agreements."l 
V. 'l'BE RUSSIAN OFFER. AND NASSER'S ACCEPTANCE 
-: 
In April of 1955, Nasser left for the Bandung Conference. On 
his way, he met Chou En-Lai in Rangoon, Burma, to whom he spoke of 
his dilemma, and asked if he thought the Soviet Union would sell 
arms to Egypt. Chou promised to convey Nasser's inquiry to the leaders 
of the Soviet Union. In May, after Nasser had returned from Bandung, 
the Soviet Ambassador Solod called on Nasser to hand him an important 
and secret message from Moscow, which is summarized by Mohammad H. 
Bayka1 as follows: 
The Soviet Union respects Egypt's determination not to allow 
her land to become a military base in the Western plan to 
encircle the Soviet Union and place her under seige. Though 
the Soviet Union realizes that Egypt did so in her determination 
to preserve complete national independence, the Soviet Union 
does not feel that Egypt should be respected less for her 
stand. The least the Soviet Union can do to show her respect 
and appreciation is to grant Egypt's request to buy arms from 
her. 2 
Several days later, Nasser told Ambassador Byroade that he was 
serious about getting arms elsewhere should Washington's policy 
continue unchanged. Ambassador Byroade knew that Nasser was not 
bluffing. But when he informed the State Department, he was not taken 
1Quoted in Ibid., p. 171. 

2Hayka1, Nahnu ••• wa-Amrika, p. 95. 
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seriously. Nasser's last bid for U.S. arms came in June 1955. The 
conditions set by Washington and the assurances sought irritated him. 
He wanted arms with no strings attached. To make it difficult for 
Nasser, the U.S. Government informed him that the only way he could get 
u.S. arms was to pay for them in cash. His threats to buy arms 
from Russia were interpreted as blackmail by Washington. In his 
memoirs, former President Eisenhower says, "Our State Department, 
confident that he was short of money, informed him that payment would 
be expected in cash rather than barter • • • his threats to begin 
negotiations with the Soviets sounded suspiciously like blackmai1.,,1 
Eisenhower goes on to explain that though this American attitude may 
appear unrealistic, the truth was that his government was obliged to 
abide by the terms of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 to help 
"maintain a rough balance between the military strength of Israel 
and the neighboring Arab states, a balance that this arms sale would 
have drastically disturbed.,,2 
Nasser obviously could not afford to enter "into a purely 
commercial contract for 'dollar arms. ,,,3 A loan from the U.S. for 
this purpose was out of the question. A military alliance with the 
West was not in accord with his policy of non-alignment and the 
Bandung spirit. In fact, a military alliance with the West would 
have been self-defeating because it would have never allowed any 
lDwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961: The White House 
Years (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 24. 
2Ibid., p. 25. 
3Dougherty, "The Aswan Decision in Perspective," 34. 
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military operation against Israel--a restriction that he and other 
Arab nationalists would never have accepted. 
If Nasser could suspend the idea of joining a Western alliance, 
he could not afford to keep his army officers without the arms they 
had been demanding. Neither would it have been wise to allow the 
military balance to tip in favor of Iraq and her "northern tier" 
neighbors. With Western help, those states were making noticeable 
lmilitary progress. Moreover, France agreed to sell fighter planes 
to Israel as early as 1954.2 
In July 1955, Ambassador Byroade made a special appeal urging 
Washington to grant Nasser's request. 3 He was sure Nasser was going 
to obtain Soviet arms if his request was not granted. Byroade knew 
that Nasser was in danger of risking disaffection within his army. 
But Byroade's appeal had no positive effect. In fact, as Ambassador, 
he had by then lost most of his effectiveness in his efforts to help 
shape U.S. policy toward Egypt. He was constantly seen as one who 
had fallen under the spell of Nasser and his opinions were not taken 
seriously, especially when his views as Ambassador began to differ 
so much from his former views as Assistant Secretary of State. His 
troubles multiplied following an incident described by Miles Copeland 
and Mohammad H. Haykal as humiliating, and one that had adverse 
effects on his job as Ambassador. 
1Paul E. Zinner, ed., Documents ~ American Foreign Policy, 1955 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 342-44. 
2Hopkins, Egypt, the Crucible, p. 174. 
3Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York), p. 155-56. 
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The incident is reported to have taken place during a meeting 
in early 1955, including, among others, Nasser, Byroade, Kermit 
Roosevelt, Eric Johnston, and J~iOOS Eichelberger. Roosevelt was a 
special Washington messenger, who used to often appear in Egypt and 
in Nasser's company without the knowledge of the Embassy. Johnston 
was President Eisenhower's special envoy to help settle the problem 
of the Jordan waters. Eichelberger was an expert on military regimes 
in developing countries. Out of his frustration with his government 
and out of anger over the presence of Kermit Roosevelt with Nasser 
without his knowledge, Byroade abruptly tried to change the subject 
of the discussion by asking Nasser why one of the American Embassy's 
men was beaten up at Suez. Nasser replied that the man was a CIA 
agent and that the Embassy had been asked to keep him out of labor 
districts. Byroade then told Nasser that the Egyptian laborers' 
behavior (Copeland mentfons the Egyptian police) was uncivilized. 
To which Nasser retorted, "I shall leave you tODight so you can read 
a book about Egyptian civilization and its ancient history, and when 
you learn something from it, we shall talk again!u1 
This is what Hayka1 calls the "Byroade Crisis." Byroade knew 
he committed a mistake and did not know how to apologize while Roosevelt 
and Johnston walked with Nasser to his car trying to apologize for 
him. The following day, a cable was sent to Washington by Johnston 
and Roosevelt to Dulles reporting the incident and stating that 
Byroade was no longer suitable to function as U.S. Ambassador in 
1Ibid., pp. 161-62; Hayka1, Nahnu ••• wa-Amrika, p. 85. 
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Cairo. This had taken place after a period of close friendship between 
Nasser and Byroade, during which the latter showed great understanding 
an~ sympathy for the Egyptian point of view; perhaps more than Washington 
wished him to. Nasser soon forgave him, but did Secretary Dulles?l 
Nasser waited. He was actually trying to avoid accepting the 
Soviet offer: To Nasser's army officers, his stalling was unwarranted 
and his policy incomprehensible. The Soviet offer, they felt, should 
have been accepted immediately. In June Nasser had proposed to General 
Burns the physical separation of Egyptian and Israeli forces by a 
demilitarized zone, and was prepared to accept Burns's proposal for 
jOint Israeli-Egyptian patrols. Israel, however, rejected both of 
these proposals. On August 31, 1955, Israel struck once more with 
ferocity at Khan Yunis in Ghazzah, in retaliation for Fidaiyeen 
raids, and killed thirty-six Egyptians and Palestinians. Nasser could 
not possibly wait any longer. 2 
When Washington finally discovered that Nasser's threat to buy 
Russian arms was not a bluff, Kermit Roosevelt was dispatched to 
Cairo to try and dissuade Nasser from going ahead with the deal. 
When Nasser learned of this, he realized that Washington had discovered 
the facts and was about to apply pressure. He, therefore, decided to 
announce his acceptance of the Russian offer before the arrival of 
Washington's special messenger, and to an audience of not more than 
1Ibid.; Copeland, The ~ of Nations (New York), pp. 162-65. 
2Hopkins, Egypt, the Crucible, p. 176; Ellis, Challenge in the 
Middle East, pp. 42-45. 
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a hundred people in a small hall. Neverthe1ess,the news was out and 
was soon heard allover the world. Roosevelt met with Nasser for three 
days. He knew perfectly well what Nasser's dilennna was; he r""alized 
that Nasser had done his best and is reported to have had much sympathy 
for Nasser's position. Roosevelt, however, could not be of much help 
since Washington was adamant in its refusal to favorably consider 
Nasser's request. l 
While Roosevelt was still in Cairo, news was released through 
the Associated Press, not through the American Embassy in Cairo, of 
George Allen's expected arrival in Cairo with a note that contained 
a warning and a threat to take economic measures against Egypt. 
Allen was met at the Cairo Airport by Byroade and Roosevelt, who urged 
him not to deliver the note. They both felt that his trip was un­
warranted and its intended objective could only do further harm to 
U.S.-Egyptian relations. Allen was told that Nasser was doing his 
best under the circumstances. News of the note, however, had already 
done its damage and Allen said very little to newsmen at the airport 
because, before landing, his plane received a message from Byroade 
and Roosevelt describing the situation in Cairo as very explosive. 
Therefore, he should not, in any way, reveal that he had a warning 
or ultimatum to deliver to Nasser.2 Haykal reports that the Embassy 
officials' alarm was intensified when Nasser threatened not to 
receive Allen and to sever diplomatic relations with the United States 
lCampbell, Defense of the Middle East, pp. 72-73; Haykal, 
Nahnu ••• wa-Amrika, pp. 86-92. 
2Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York), pp. 65-67. 
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should he even hint that he had an ultimatum. l Allen met Nasser but 
only after waiting for an hour and a half in an outer office, and 
left without delivering the note. 2 The secretary in Nasser's office 
explained later, '~e kept Mr. Allen waiting because we heard he 
intended to bang the table and give us a lecture. We kept him waiting 
to cool off. ~ We kept him waiting until he agreed not to present the 
note he had been sent to deliver.,,3 "It seemed that the incredible 
was happening," says Harry Hopkins, "the years of humiliation before 
the moral arrogance and material superiority of the West had at last 
begun to be repaid.,,4 
Nasser's acceptance of Russian arms was greeted with enthusiasm 
throughout the Arab world. He received congratulations even from Nuri 
aI-Said of Iraq. He "had almost overnight," says Harry Hopkins, 
"shattered the moral proprietorship which the British, French and 
Americans had so long, and so anachronistically, exercised over the 
whole region." Nasser accomplished that "by daring to deal with the 
Russians."S Through Nasser's action, Russia made her first major 
debut on the Middle Eastern scene. Besides accepting Soviet arms in 
September, Nasser sent educational, political, and military missions 
lIbid., p. 101. 
2Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York), pp. 165-69; Ellis, 
Challenge in the Middle East, pp. 41-46; Hopkins, Egypt, the Crucible, 
pp. 174-78. 
3Robert St. John, The Boss: The StOry of Gamal Abdel Nasser 
(New York: McGraw-Hill,-yg60), p. 210. 
4Ibid ., p. 178. 
5Ibid., p. 177. 
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to Arab capitals such as Amman, Beirut, Damascus, and Baghdad to help 
t 
I 
,[ launch a campaign aimed at discrediting the policy of Nuri's government 
1 
I in Iraq and to carry a program c-t mass-ed'.lcation against the Baghdad ~ Pact. Egypt's superior intellectual and ideological Arab leadership! 
insured the success of this propaganda campaign against Iraq's pro-t 
r West policies. With the Russian arms deal came the end of the Western 
I monopoly and with it the end of the efficacy of the Tripartite Dec1ara­
tian of 1950. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE SUEZ CRIS IS 
Following Nasser's acceptance of Soviet arms and the failure of 
Kermit Roosevelt and George Allen to dissuade him from going ahead 
with the deal, Washington took several days to recover from the shock. 
The report delivered to Dulles by Roosevelt and Allen stressed the fact 
that there was nothing the United States could do, for Nasser had attained 
an impregnable position and was in the midst of an ocean of popular 
• 
support and enthusiasm that was sweeping across the whole Arab world. 
In a report from Washington, Egypt's Ambassador Ahmad Hussein mentions 
that one of Dulles's aides told him that he could not avoid accepting 
the defeat at the hands of Nasser. In early November 1955, following 
extensive discussions at the State Department, in which the Depa.rtmer..t 
of Defense and the CIA participated, Dulles seemed to have been convinced 
that intimidation was not likely to influence Nasser but that an 
attractive offer might be successful. l 
With the hope that Nasser could still be won over, the U.S. 
continued to resist Israel's attempts to acquire American arms. When 
Israel intensified her demand for arms following the Egyptian-Soviet 
arms deal, the Egyptian government warned through its Ambassador in 
Washington that, if the United States supplied Israel with arms, the 
lDougherty, "The Aswan Decision in Perspective," 36; Haykc:.l, 
Nahnu ••• wa-4~nrika, pp. 108-10. 
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whole Arab world would assume that the U.S. had chosen sides and decided 
to openly invalidate her claim of being impartial. Dulles's reply to 
Is~ael was that she still had a military advantage over her Arab 
neighbors and that the arms balance had not yet turned against her. 
To an inquiry by forty members of the House of Representatives, 
Secretary Dulles replied on February 6, 1956, 
the security of Israel can perhaps better be assured by means 
other than an arms race ••• it is our belief that ~hc security 
of states in the Near East cannot rest upon arms alone but 
rather upon the international rule of law and upon the establish­
ment of friendly relations among neighbors. l 
Israel continued to press for arms, however, and to argue that she 
could not afford to wait until the balance shifted in favor of the 
Arabs. 2 
I. THE ASWAN DAM OFFER 
To lure Nasser, Dulles selected a project that was important 
to Nasser and the Egyptians; one that was being intensively studied 
in Egypt and was the great hope for continued economic development, 
namely the High Aswan Dam. It was this Dam that the U.S. and Britain 
made a definite offer to help Egypt build. The offer was formally 
made in December 1955 in an apparent attempt to persuade Nasser to 
either cancel the arms deal with Russia or to, at least, keep him 
from making further purchases. A most effective way to keep Nasser 
from making further arms purchases from the Soviet Union would have 
IU.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XXIV (February 20, 1956), 
285-86. 
2Fitzsiroons, "Suez Crisis and the Containment Policy," 436-37. 
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been to sell him American arms. But since the creation of the 
State of Israel, the U.S. steadfastly refused to supply Egypt with 
arms. American arms went to pro Western Arab states such as Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon, but not to militant Egypt and 
Syria. The U.S. hoped the Aswan Dam offer might induce Nasser to 
concentrate his efforts and financial resources on internal reform 
and development and forsake his other ambitions, making arms un­
necessary. Western aid and influence and the employment of Egyptian 
resources, it was hoped, would help keep Nasser from devaloping 
closer relations with the Soviet Union and from making further 
1purchases of eastern bloc arms.
The estimated cost of th.e Dam was $1,300,000,000. The U.S. 
was to lend Egypt $56,000,000, Britain $14,000,000, and the World 
Bank $200,000,000. The rest was to be supplied by Egypt in the 
form of materials and lahore Had this offer been agreed upon, 
its terms would have compelled Nasser to practice moderation and 
economic austerity for a period of not less than ten years, if not 
fifteen. Egypt would have had to comply with the demands of the 
World Bank to fight inflation and to have her investments, expendi­
tures, as well as the Dam Project's requirements reviewed period­
ica1ly. Egypt would also have had to avoid foreign debts in excess 
of amounts both Egypt and the World Bank agreed upon. There are 
indications that Nasser had tentatively agreed to some of these 
lIbido, 437; Dougherty, "The Aswan Decision in Perspective," 
36-37; Finer, Dulles ~ Suez, p. 36; t~ykal, Nahnu ••• wa-Amrika, 
pp. 109-10. 
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terms of the offer. l 
By early 1956, however, the Egyptian government had already 
ma~e enough commitments to cause concern in Washington. 2 Nasser 
obviously wanted and needed arms as much as he needed economic aid. 
He thought his policy of tactical positive neutralism would guarantee 
him arms from the East and economic aid from the West. But the 
heart of the problem was that the West did not wish to grant economic 
aid to a regime that was becoming increasingly dependent on the 
Soviet Union for the supply of arms. They also were sensitive to 
any development that carried with it any signs of possible danger 
to the safety and security of Israel. According to James Dougherty, 
Assistant Professor of Political Science at St. Joseph University, 
Philadelphia, and Fellow of the Foreign Policy Research Institute 
of the University of Pennsylvania, "a major objective of American 
policy became the prevention of a situation from arising in which the 
United States might be forced to go to the aid of Israel in the event 
of a formidable Arab attack.,,3 
Nasser, too, was aware of the irritations the Western offer 
contained. Malcolm Kerr observes, "the requests by Mr. Eugene 
Black, the President of the Bank, for powers of supervision of 
Egyptian finances served the purpose, whether intentionally or 
not, of reminding Nasser of Anglo-American political requirements.,,4 
lPiner, Dulles .QY!IT. Suez, pp. 39-41; Fitzsimons, "Suez Crisis 
and the Containment Policy," 438. 
t)
'New York Times, February 10, 1956. 

3Dougherty, "The Aswan Decision in Perspective," 37. 

~err, '''Coming to Terms with Nasser'," 71. 
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Those political requirements included veiled demands that Egyptian 
incitements and attacks aimed at them and their friends in the 
area be stopped. A Nasser-West cooperation depended on those dec­
1ared and undeclared Western conditions. But Nasser had demonstrated 
clearly enough that he was not about to acquiesce to all Western 
demands. His attacks against the Baghdad Pact continued; Egypt 
recognized mainland China; terrorist attacks against Israel were 
intensified, and purchase of eastern bloc arms increased. Nasser 
was determined not to pay the price the West was asking of him. He 
was convinced aid was coming either from the West or from the East 
on his own terms. If it came from the West, it would have meant 
1that the West had acknowledged him as leader in the area.
In October 1955, a consultant and an engineer from the World 
Bank went to Egypt to study the project in compliance with an Egyptian 
request. Egyptian officials were apparently anxious to get a 
firm commitment that the Bank would help finance the High 
Dam project. Egypt indicated that she intended to go ahead 
with the project either by financing the dam with funds from 
the Bank, the United States and other Western sources of 
credit or by accepting help from the Soviet Union. 2 
During and after Dimitri Shepi1ov's visit to Cairo in June 1~56, 
Egypt was reported to have received an offer of a $1,120,000,000 
loan for 20 years at the rate of 2% interest. 3 But Mr. Shepilov, 
the Soviet Foreign Minister who was reported to have made the 
lIbid., 71--72. 

2Internationa1 Organization, X (February, 1956), 194. 

3New York Times, June 20, 1956. 
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offer~ never came out to publicly confirm it. In fact, the Soviet 
Embassy in Cairo denied the report a few days after Shepilov 
left Cairo. Shepilov himself, w:.en back in Moscow, stated that the 
Soviet Union would favorably consider Egypt's requests for Soviet 
aid in her industrial development, but that aid for the High Aswan 
Dam was not being considered then. l Nevertheless, Nasser continued 
to show confidence that Soviet aid was available. 2 Secretary Dulles, 
according to John Beal, his biographer, "firmly believed the Soviet 
Union was not in a position to deliver effectively on all her 
economic propaganda offers."3 The assumption in Washington, there­
fore, was that the choice for Nasser was either to accept the 
Western offer and abandon his policies or pursue the same policies 
and go without the High Dam. 
I I. THE WITHDRAWAL 
If Nasser's plans for Egypt's army were not yet known to 
some, the military parade of June l8~ 1956, was a dramatic demons­
tration of his unbending determination to make Egypt capable of 
defending herself against Israeli attacks. That parade made it 
plain that the hope of achieving the intended objective of the Dam 
offer was dubious. The United States had obviously not concerned 
herself much with the question of the value of the Aswan Dam for 
lIbid., July 22, 1956. 

2Ibid., July 24, 1956. 

3John Robinson Beal, John Foster Dulles: 1888-1959 (New York: 

Harper, 1959), p. 25. -- , 
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Egypt's economy or whether it would help feed the hungry or improve 
the every-day life of the Egyptian poor. These were not the primary 
American concerns. In the mind of Dulles were greater global and 
local issues: (1) Russia was not to be allowed to capitalize on 
her success and (2) Israel's security was not to be threatened at 
any cost to the U.S. even the loss of Egypt's and Arab friendship. 
The June parade seems to have caused Washington to resolve to 
follow different means of achieving its objectives in the Middle 
East. In the following months, signs of change in the American 
attitude began to shmv. Rumors were heard of possible reassessment 
of the Aswan Dam offer due to Nasser's recognition of the People's 
Republic of China, his close ties with communist countries, and his 
increased purchases of eastern bloc arms, which supposedly disturbed 
Egypt's balance of payments. On July 6 a Department of State 
announcement revealed that funds set aside for the Dam project 
were re-allocated, even though the U.S. was still ready and willing 
to help Egypt. l 
The withdrawal of the Dam offer on July 192 came after the 
U.S. had apparently given up on Nasser. But it was done hastily 
and without much thought as to its possible impact on Nasser, the 
Arab people in general, and as to its consequences for the U.S. and 
her allies in particular. Muhammad H. Haykal states that Dulles 
changed his mind about the offer two weeks after it was made, and 
did so for the following reasons: (1) he felt Nasser had injured 
INe\v York Times, July 7, 1955; Finer, Dulles ~ Suez, pp. 44-45. 
2Current Documents, 1956, pp. 603. 
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America and challenged him (Dulles) personally by refusing to cancel 
the arms deal with Russia; therefore the U.S. should not have decided 
to reward him by helping him to build the Dam; (2) the reports from 
the American Embassy in Cairo indicated that Nasser persisted in 
buying additional Soviet arms and was not likely to respond to 
American pressures; (3) America's major allies were very unhappy 
with Nasser. Britain held him responsible for her troubles in the 
area and France was irritated over the help the Algerian rebels were 
supposedly receiving from Egypt; (4) America's minor allies were 
filled with bitterness. The reports of American embassies in Baghdad, 
Ankara, Tehran and Karachi, reflected the fears and sorrows of Nuri 
aI-Said, Adnan Menderes, Mohammad Ridha Pahlavi and Sahrawardy, 
and they all said it as it were in one voice: "Nasser has proved 
to our people that to rebel against U.S. policy is more rewarding 
than loyalty to it. lIl 
The decision to withdraw the offer was kept for six months in 
Dulles's "pocket," contends Haykal, in order that it might be 
announced at a time when it could be most effective. In the meantime 
Nasser felt that his Soviet source of arms might be blocked when 
Bulganin and Khrushchev went to London and were asked about the 
possibility of an agreement to control the supply of arms to the 
Middle East. Though the two Soviet leaders refused to sign such an 
agreement, Nasser felt he had to have another source handy just in 
case. That is mainly why he recognized the People's Republic of 
lHaykal, Nahnu ••• wa-Amrika, p. 111. 
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China.1 
Both Hugh Thomas and Muhammad H. Haykal contend that Nasser 
was convinced the U.S. was not guing to make good her offer. 
Baykal notes that Nasser told Dr. Ahmad Hussein, his Ambassador to 
Washington, "even if we accept all their conditions, they will still 
refuse." Thomas argues that Nasser was not even sure whether he 
really wanted the money from the West. But while Thomas says that 
it was Dr. Hussein who persuaded Nasser "to make a final bid for 
Western aid," Haykal says that Nasser directed his Ambassador to 
return to Washington and tell Secretary Dulles that Egypt had accepted 
all his conditions for America's participation in financing the Dam 
project because he wanted to bring the matter to a head. Haykal 
goes on to say that even Dr. Hussein's statement in London, to the 
effect that Egypt had accepted America's conditions and that he was 
on his way to inform Dulles of Egypt's acceptance, was prearranged. 2 
When the Egyptian Ambassador wentto see Dulles, the Secretary 
met him with a copy of the withdrawal announcement. As he left 
Secretary Dulles's office, the Ambassador saw, to his surprise, 
that the representatives of the press had already received copies 
of the same announcement. Part of the State Department announce­
ment said, "the ability of Egypt to devote adequ.ate resources to 
assure the project's success has become more uncertain than at the 
lIbid., pp. 112-13. 
2Ibid., p. 114; Hugh Thomas, The Suez Affair (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966), p. 24-.--­
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1 .
time the offer was made." The other reason given was that Egypt 
had not secured the necessary agreements with the other riparian 
states (Le., Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda).2 "The American Se,-,retary 
of State," says Harry Hopkins, "had invited the Egyptian President 
to stand on his carpet--and now he had snatched it from under his 
feet.,,3 
American policy makers, especially Secretary Dulles, had 
apparently arrived at the conclusion that there was no hope of 
restraining Nasser by trying to appease him. They watched Nasser 
draw closer to the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc; they heard 
him and his colleagues adopt a sharper anti-Western tone; they 
witnessed the flow of Russian arms into Egypt and saw how Egyptian 
resources were being earmarked for those and future shipments; and 
they sadly received the news of Egypt's recognition of the People's 
Republic of China. At home the Congress refused to grant the 
Administration authority to negotiate long-term commitments with 
foreign countries; the Aswan Dam project came under attack from pro­
Israeli and cotton-interest groups; this at a time when Presidential 
elections were at hand and when American politicans paid more attention 
to the demands of special interest groups. The problem with Nasser 
is summed up in what Nikita S. Khruschev is reported to have said 
when co~menting on the Suez crisis and the events leading to it a 
lNew York Times, July 20, 1956; Current Documents, 1956, p. 604. 

2I bid., pp. 603-4. 

3Hopkins, EgVpt, the Crucible, p. 179. 
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short time before his death. Egypt refused "to follow the path set 
for it by the United States, England, and France,1I said Khrushchev; 
tha~ is why the Dam loan was withdrawn. l But the main reason for the 
withdrawal may have been what Robert Murphy wrote in his book, 
Diplomat AmoI!& ·warriors. Murphy says that though he and his colleagues. 
uwho worked with Dulles were never told explicitly why he acted so 
abruptly," they 
surmised that perhaps the main reason was because Nasser 

was scheduled to make a trip to Moscow early in August. 

If the United States would agree to the Aswan Dam financing, 

the Egyptian President could then concentrate in Moscow on 

concluding his second big arms deal with the Russian, thus 

getting the best of both worlds. Dulles guessed accurately 

that Nasser would not journey to Moscow at all if the Aswan 

Dam offer w~re rescinded, because that would compel the 

Egyptian to go hat-in-hand not only with regard to the High 

Dam project but on the arms deal as well. 2 

All these factors must have played a role in inducing Dulles 
to withdraw the Dam offer. But they were not the only ones. Dulles, 
no doubt, wished to, in the words of John Beal, "expose the shallow 
character of Russia's foreign economic pretentions.,,3 He also had 
a reason for his publicized refusal. Speaking for Dulles, John 
Beal says, 
It was necessary to demonstrate to friendly nations, by 

act rather than by oral explanation, that the U.S. toler­

ance of nations which felt it necessary to stay out of 

Western defense alliances could not brook the kind of in­

sult Nasser presented in his repeated and accumulated un­

friendly gestures. • •• The choice was between letting 

lL'I'lrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, p. 434. 
ZRobert Daniel Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday, 1964), p. 377. 
'Beal, John Foster Dulles, p. 260. 
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him do~m easily, through protracted negotiation that came 
to nothing, or letting him have it straight. Since the 
issue involved more than simply denying Nasser money for 
a dam, a polite and concealed rebuff would fail to make 
the really important point. It had to be forthright, 
carrying its own built-in moral for neutrals in a way 
that the omo1u of applied propaganda would not cheapen. 1 
Moreover Dulles felt that Nasser must not be allowed to "b1aclanai1" 
the United States. He, therefore, in Senator Hubert Humphrey's 
opinion, "withdrew the offer with the clear intention of punishing 
Nasser in the eyes of the world for making a deal with the Soviet 
Union to obtain the arms which we Li.e., the U.S~/ had refused to 
sell him. ,,2 
But what did the objective of "punishing Nasser" mean? Did 
it mean punishing Egypt and the Egyptians? Did it mean punishing 
the Egyptian army that brought Nasser to power? Did it mean 
punishing the Egyptian regime that was in power then? Did it mean 
punishing Nasser as an lndividual? Did it mean punishing him a~ 
the leader of a popular movement that was the moving force through­
out the Arab world? Whatever the objective was, it ought to have 
looked impossible to achieve to any serious observer of the 
situation. It is difficult to ascertain what the State Department 
hoped to accomplish by withdrawing the offer, and in reflection, 
the more obvious is the unwisdom of that decision. 
Nasser's position was strong enough not to be easily toppled 
or shaken to the point where he would have abandoned his Soviet 
1Ibid., pp. 258-60. 

2Humphrey, "A Chronology of Failure," 13. 
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friends. British troops were no longer on Egyptian soil, and their 
departure in June of that year awarded Nasser the applause and 
congratulation of the Arab world. Nasse~'s popularity was at its 
height following the arms deal with Russia and his being at the head 
of a new constitutional regime that had replaced the Revolutionary 
Command Council. General Neguib had already been placed under house 
arrest and Nasser faced no serious challenges from the Wafdists, 
the Muslim Brothers, or from his army. Demonstrations and demons­
trators were in full support of his government. His fellow officers 
respected and honored him because they acknowledged his superiority 
over them in his intellectual abnities, his political courage, his 
boldness, and uprightness. They were committed to him not only 
because they admired and trusted his strong leadership, but also 
because they realized that to him they owed most of their political 
fortunes. Indeed his position in Egypt, if not in a11 the Arab 
world, was practically impregnable and unassailable, and his policies 
until then had received overwhelming public approva1. l 
The voices heard from Cairo were not raised against Nasser. 
Washington might have expected or, at least, desired that the 
Egyptian people would rise against Nasser. Instead the E~fptian 
and Arab public lashed back at the United States in tones of extreme 
bittenless and hostility. The reasons for the withdrawal of the 
offer, the Egyptian press claimed, were Israel, American cotton 
growers, and the Republican Party's concern over Jewish money and 
lFiner, Dulles ~ Suez, pp. 54-55; Dougherty, "The Aswan 
Decision in Perspective," pp. 38-39. 
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votes in the fall elections of that year. What hurt the Egyptians 
most was the claim in the State Department statement that Egypt's 
economy was unsound. l 
III. NASSER'S NATIONALIZATION OF THE CANAL 
The withdrawal of the Western offer, Mr. Dulles thought, left 
Nasser with the choice between two alternatives. Dulles assumed 
that Nasser would either ask the Russian for a loan (and thus put 
them on the spot), or abandon the project completely. Nasser did 
eventually ask the Soviet Union for the money and received it in 1958. 
But he had a third alternative that Dulles apparently was not aware 
of at the time. Before getting a loan, Nasser wanted to avenge 
injured Egypt. That was to be his first and primary task--to take 
an action that would inflict an injury on the West that would more 
than equal the injury to Egypt's pride. 
His dramatic action came in a week's time and fell like lightning 
upon a confounded West2 and a bewildered world, whose one third 
exploded in thundering cheer and overwhelming joy. Nasser's 
nationalization of the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956,3 caused his 
popularity to rise to new heights in. the Arab world. His action 
lFiner, Dulles ~ Suez, pp. 55-56. 
2See Thomas, The Suez Affair, p. 26; Murphy, Diplomat ,\mong 
Warriors, p. 378. 
3See Nasser's Nationalization Order in Current Documents, 
~. 1956, pp. 604-06. 
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provoked his enemies, especially Britain and France, and converted 
what looked like a major rebuff, if not a defeat to his policy, 
into a resounding victory. It represented a major triumph of :iasser's 
nationalist policy that even his rivals commended him for it. 
Muhammad H. Haykal notes that Nasser, before making his historic 
announcement, wrote his own appraisal of the situation. He then 
asked two or three of his closest associates to make an assessment 
of the British and French positions. Israel was counted out as 
unlikely to participate in hostilities against Egypt at that time. 
Enough information was gathered to show that the British and French 
could not mount a successful military attack in a periccl less than 
two months. That was all Nasser wanted to know before he made his 
nationalization speech in Alexandria. l 
The surprise shown by the West was not justified. The 
provocative nature of the decision to withdraw the of~er was bound 
to evoke a strong Egyptian reaction that was meant to hurt the 
West. Secretary Dulles had apparently failed to make serious calcu­
lations or to anticipate such a move. 2 Anthony Eden commented later, 
England was not able to do anything about the publicized wit~drawal 
lal-Ahram (Cairo), September 24, 1971. 
2See Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 377. Murphy 
recalls that Dulles had not consulted his staff on the matter; 
he did not consult with him (Murphy), as ~ Middle East hand then; 
he did not tell President Eisenhower until "the morning of Hussein's 
visit"; he did not inform the British Ambassador until one hour 
before the announcement was made; and Eugene Black, the President 
of the World Bank, "was particularly distressed by the sudden 
cancellation. II 
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announcement since she was "informed but not consulted and so • • • 
had no prior opportunity for criticism or cOt:mlent."l Nevertheless, 
England followed suit two days later. Eden admits that his govern­
ment had by mid-July come "to the conclusion that they could not 
go on with a project likely to become increasingly onerous in 
finance and unsatisfactory in practice." But the British govern­
mentes decision was not made public because Eden "would have 
preferred to play it long and not to have forced the issue.,,2 
"The public refusal," says M. Fitzsimons, "does suggest that a 
firm hand and clear mind were not controlling American decisions 
at that time.,,3 
On August 12, during a press conference, Nasser stated that 
his decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company was not made 
until the United States withdrew the offer to help build the High 
Aswan Dam. He also assured the Western powers that his decision 
was done by Egypt alone and that the Soviet Union had nothing to do 
with it.4 
The act of nationalization was extremely satisfying because 
it was not only an answer to an intended rebuff, but also because 
it was against a symbol of colonial exploitation. Egypt had provided 
lEden, Full Circle, p. 470. 

2Ibid. 

3Fitzsimons, "Suez Crisis and the Containment Policy," 440. 

4Egyptian Gazette (Cairo), quoted in Dougherty, "The Aswan 

Decision in Perspective," 42. 
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up to three quarters of the Canal's cost in land, money, and labor. 
But, until the mid-1930's, Egypt was not paid anything back except 
an annual rental charge of IE 300,000, which was not brought up to 
1 percent of the annual revenue from the Canal until 1949, and only 
under heavy nationalist pressure. By 1955, the 44 percent share 
sold to Britain by the Khedive Ismail reached a market value of 
IE 1,000,000, and an annual yield of about IE 3,000,000. To add 
insult to injury, the Canal Company practiced job discrimination 
against Egyptians. Harry Hopkins observes, 
Few Egyptians were employed except in very subordinate 
posts; the first Egyptian pilot did not appear until 1941, 
and then only under heavy Government pressures. A well­
educated Egyptian who had applied for a post there as a 
young man said: "As soon as they knew you were Egyptian, 
you were out. They would take the lowest sort of Maltese 
or Greek rather than an Egyptian, no matter how well 
qualified. ,,1 
That is why nationalization met with "an explosion of joy 
which united all classes in Egypt. And not only in Egypt--for • 
the thunder of occasional l~ghtning of applause swept the entire 
Arab world from the Gulf to the Atlantic.,,2 Hopkins adds, 
"The Suez Canal • • • is an integral part of Egypt"-­
art. XVII Anglo-Egyptian Evacuation Agreement, 1954. . 
What the Company held was an operating concession granted 
in 1888, expiring in 1968, not the ditch itself •••• 
In 1956, fair compensation was offered--and paid. 3 
In his memoirs, President Eisenhower is in agreement with the view 
1Hopkins, Egypt, the Crucible, p. 180. 

2Ibid • 

3Ibid., n. 
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expressed in the above quote. He says, 
The weight of world op~n~on seemed to be that Nasser was 
within his rights in nationalizing the Canal Company • • • • 
The inherent right of any sovereign nation to exercise the 
power of eminent domain within its own territory could 
scarcely be doubted, provided that just compensation were 
paid to the owners of the property so expropriated. The 
main issue at stake, therefore, was whether or not Nasser 
would and could keep the watenqay open for traffic of all 
nations, in accordance w:i.th the Constantinople Convention 
of 1888.1 
That is why, Eisenhower says, "In my telephonic and other communi­
cations ~rlth Prime Minister Eden I frequently expressed the opinion 
that the case as it stood did not warrant resort to military force. ,.2 
IV. THE l-t"EST' S REACTION 
To Nasser's nationalization of the Canal, there was no concrete 
allied reply as Anglo-American cooperation showed signs of breaking 
down. The statements m'3.de and the measures taken were day-to-day 
improvisations along with a steady and desperate Anglo-French 
resolve to use force. 
A statement released by the State Department on July 27 declared 
that Nasser's action of July 26 carried "far-reaching implications.,,3 
On July 28, the State Department protested to Ambassador Hussein 
"the tone and content of statements made with respect to the United 
States by the President of Egypt.,,4 On July 29, Secretary Dulles 
lEisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961, p. 39. 

2Ibid • 

3U•S., Department of State, Bulletin, XXX\T (August 6, 1956), 221. 

4Ibid .) 222. 

-----
168 
declared that Nasser's action struck "a grievous blow at international 
confidence. ,,1 The United States, Britain and France issued a joint 
statement on August 2, following an agreement among them in London 
to call a 24-power conference to deal with the Suez Canal problem. 2 
In a Radio and TV Address on August 6, Mr. Dulles declared, "To 
permit this to go on unchallenged would be to encourage a breakdown 
of the international fabric upon which the security and the well­
being of all peoples depend.,,3 During the London Conference, Secre­
tary Dulles said on August 16, "Egypt seizes hold of a sword with 
which it could cut into economic vitals of many nations • • • what 
is required is a permanent operation of the Canal under an inter­
national system.,,4 
But despite all this talk, Washington was determined not to 
use force. Secretary Dulles declared on August 3, "We do not ••• 
want to meet violence "..ith violence."S According to Hugh Thomas, 
even while Dulles was still in Peru, "the State Department quickly 
decided that they would not regard this event as an occasion for the 
immediate use of force--indeed the idea never occurred as a remote 
possibility--and told the British and French ambassadors so.,,6 
lIbid., 221. 
2For text of Tripartite Statement on the London Conference, 
see U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XXXV (August 13, 1956), 
262-63. 
3Ibid ., 260. 
4Ibid., 337. 
SIbid., 262. 
6Thomas, The Suez Affa.ir, p. 49. 
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The British and French initial reaction, on the other hand, 
was to use force immediately. The day Nasser nationalized the Canal, 
Nu-i a1-Said and Crown Prince Abde1 I1ah of Iraq were in London. 
Eden says in his memoirs that they "understood at once how much 
would depend upon the resolution with which the act of defiance 
was met."l They warned, Eden adds, "several times of the conse­
quences of Nasser succeeding in his grab. They would be swept 
away."2 Nuri is reported to have demanded, "Hit him, hit him hard 
and hit him now.,,3 Crown Prince Abde1 Ilah, according to Harry 
Hopkins, "had told Colonel Gerald de Gaury that unless the British 
army intervened and toppled Nasser 'within a few weeks' it would be 
,4'too late.'" 
Robert Murphy, who in the absence of Secretary Dulles in Peru, 
was sent by President Eisenhower to London "'to see what it was all 
about'" and to "'hold the fort,,"5 reported back on July 30 that 
France and England had decided "to employ force without delay or 
attempting any intermediate or less drastic steps."6 In his memoirs, 
President Eisenhower says that he, by July 31, had received news 
"that the British government had taken a firm decision to 'break 
1Eden, Full Circle, p. 472. 

2I bid., p. 520. 

3rhomas, The Suez Affair) p. 31. 

4Hopkins, Egypt, the Crucible, p. 185. 

5Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 379. 

6Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961, p. 664 (letter to Eden, 

July 31, 1956, Appendix B). 
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Nasser' and to initiate hostilities at an early date for this 
purpose."l With Secretary Dulles, who left for London July 31, 
Ei~enhower ~ent a letter to Eden in which, after he suggested a 
conference on Suez, said, "For my part, I cannot over-emphasize the 
strength of my conviction that some such method must be attempted 
before action such as you contemplate should be undertaken.,,2 
On the same day, Nasser made an announcement in Cairo to the 
effect that, unless there was outside interference, normal trade 
between Egypt and the United Kingdom did not have to be disturbed, 
and that navigational freedom in the Canal would be guarded. He 
warned, however, that Egypt would fight if the West intervened 
militarily. On this, Nasser obtained the support of the Soviet 
Union, which was confirmed in a public statement by Khrushchev. 3 
Britain and France accepted Dulles's suggestion to call a 
conference of 24 maritime powers to begin August 16 because the 
British Chiefs of Staff reported that "if there were no U.S. help, 
an Anglo-French military force capable of restoring international 
control of the Canal Zone could not be mounted for at least six 
weeks. ,,4 Dulles also comforted Eden by saying that "a way had to 
be found to make Nasser disgorge what he was attempting to swallow."S 
lIbid., p. 40. 

2Ibid., p. 664, Appendix B. 

3
.!ill., p. 41. 

4Thomas, The Suez Affair, p. 55; see also, Eisenhower, Waging 

Peace, 1956-1961, p. 40. 
SEden, Full Circle, p. 487. 
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The United States and her allies were sure Egypt could not run 
the Canal. Jacques Georges-Picot, the President of the Suez Canal 
Company, haJ repeatedly stated that Egypt could not run the Canal 
without his Company's pilots. To keep the Canal running while 
attempts at a peaceful settlement were being tried, Britain and 
France decided on August 2 to delay the withdrawal of the Suez 
Canal Company employees planned by the Company.l The idea was that, 
in case a negotiated settlement were not reached, French and British 
pilots would be withdrawn; traffic through the Canal would be dis­
rupted, and a cause for the use of force against Egypt would be 
provided. 
The London Conference dispatched the Menzies 2 Mission to Egypt. 
Nasser received the Mission and listened to the proposals of the 
London Conference but no agreement was reached. President Eisenhower's 
remark during a press conference while the Menzies Mission was 
still in Egypt, to the effect that it was a peaceful settlement the 
United States sought, may have strengthened Nasser's resolve not to 
agree to any concessions. By September 11, Secretary Dulles had 
worked out and revealed the idea of the Suez Canal Users's Association. 
SCUA accomplished for Dulles what he sought--a postponement of Anglo­
French plans to attack Egypt in mid-September. 3 
On September 14, British and French pilots walked off their 
lThomas, The Suez Affair, pp. 58, 73. 

2prime Minister of Australia. 

3Thomas, The Suez Affair, pp. 73-77.
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jobs et Suez. Colonel Mahmud Yunis and his aides, left with twenty-
six pilots and thirty trainees out of two hundred and fifty pilots 
normally required, ran the Canal without a hitch. 1 Fifteen Soviet 
pilots arrived the night British and French pilots left. Other 
volunteers joined from the United States, India, Iran, Greece, and 
elsewhere. 
The fact that Egypt was able to run the Canal smoothly and 
efficiently after the Company's installations were taken over in 
Cairo, Port Said, Port Tawfik, and Ismai1iya, and after French and 
British pilots left, astounded the West. This discovery strengthened 
Western suspicions that Nasser had prepared to nationalize the Canal 
long before July 26, and there seems to be sufficient evidence to 
suggest that Egypt had, for sometime, been preparing to take over 
the Canal. However, the retraction of the Dam offer seems to have 
hastened it. The Canal concession was due to expire in 1968, and 
the mood in Egypt was against its renewal. So it is very likely 
that the Egyptian authorities were planning its nationalization in 
1968, at the latest. The fear in Egypt was that Britain and France 
might try to renew the concession or attempt to place the Canal 
under inLernationa1 control. Since early 1955, the Company began 
to seek the aid of An~rican oil companies in an effort to extend 
the concession. 2 
1Wi1ton Wynn, Nasser o~ Egypt (Cambridge, Mass.: Arlington 
Books, 1959), p. 177; Richard H. Nolte and William Roe Polk, "Toward 
a Policy for the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, XXVI (July, 1958), 
655. 
2Dougherty, "The Aswan Decision in Perspective," 42-43; Thomas, 
The Su~z Affair, p. 24. 
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James Dougherty says that there were rumors in Egypt, several 
months before the nationalization of the Canal, of a board of direc­
tors that had been formed to work secretly on nationalization plans. 
Dougherty cites the Egyptian journal, Sabah al-Khair, as saying that 
"the problem of nationalization had been studied under Nasser's 
personal direction since February 1956."1 A Russian source confirms, 
"The Egyptian government had long been preparing to nationalize 
its own property, which had been seized by the imperialists. Dulles's 
decision to withhold financial assistance only precipitated matters."2 
On the first day of the London Conference (August 16), Secretary 
Dulles said, "Speaking on August 12, 1956, he lNasse:!.7 said that he 
had been thinking about it for two a.nd a half years. ,,3 
Once Egypt proved that she could run the Canal efficiently, 
the major reason for a military attack against her was removed. 
In his memoirs, President Eisenhower says,. 
not only were the Egyptian officials and workmen competent 

to operate the Canal, but they soon proved that they could 

do so under conditions of increased traffic and with in­

creased efficiency ••• any thought of using force, under 

these circumstances, was almost ridiculous.4 

From then on America's preoccupatj.on became a concerted effor.t to 
keep Britain and France from attacking Egypt. But Britain and France 
ISaban al-Khair (Cairo), August 2, 1956, cited in Dougherty, 
"The Aswan Decision in Perspective," 44. 
2Georgi Ushakov ~ "Dulles' 'Aswan Gambit I: the Story of a Cold­
War Fiasco." New Times (Moscow, May 19, 1964), p. 28. 
3U•S., Department of State, Bulletin, XXXV (August 27, 1956), 336. 
4Eisenhower, Waging Pt::ace, 1956-1961, p. 51. 
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were convinced that Nasser could not be retrained through diplomatic 
means, that he was bent on inflicting injuries on the West and that 
he was likely to be more damagitlg unless ne was checked. In fact, 
Eden's mind had apparently been made up since the dismissal of 
General Glubb in March as Commander of Jordan's Arab Legion. He 
blamed Nasser for his dis~issal. Shortly afterwards, he is reported 
to have told Anthony Nutting, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, 
III want him LNasseE7 destroyed, can't you understand? I want him 
removed, and if you and the Foreign Office don't agree, then you'd 
better come to the Cabinet and explain why." When Nutting tried 
to explain that "At the moment there did not appear to be an 
alternative, hostile or friendly. And the only result of removing 
Nasser would be anarchy in Egypt,1I Eden replied, "But I don't want 
an alternative. • • • And I don't give a damn if there's anarchy 
and chaos in Egypt."l 
The Americans, detecting clear signs of a continued strong 
inclination on the part of their allies to use force, cautioned 
that the use of force, besides violating the United Nations Charter, 
could very possibly lead to a general war. On October 2, 1956, 
Secretary Dulles, in a nelvS conference, explained the independent 
policy of the United States on the Suez problem as follows: 
As far as the formula for the users association is concerned, 
there • • • was drawn up a draft of the charter • • • • There 
is talk about the "teeth" being pulled out of it. There were 
never "teeth" in it, if that means the use of force •••• 
lAnthony Nutting, No End of !! Lesson: the Storr. of Suez 
(New York: C.N. Potter, 1967), pp. 34-35. 
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Now there has been some difference in our approach to 

this problem of the Suez Canal. This is not an area 

where we are bound together by treaty. • • • There are 

also other problems where our approach is not always 

identical. For example, there is in Asia and Africa 

the so-called problem of colonialism. Now there the 

United States plays a somewhat independent role • • • 

and that makes it impractical for us, as I say in every 

respect to identify our policies with those of other 

countries on whichever side of that problem they find 

their interest. 

V. OPERATIONS "MUSKETEER" AND "KADESH" 
On the Suez question the United States took the lead in oppos­
ing the use of force. On his three trips to London during the crisis, 
Dulles's efforts through the London Conference and the Users's 
Association were aimed at not only reaching a solution of the problem 
through negotiation, but also at gaining time with the hope that 
Anglo-French resolve to use force might weaken. In his public state­
ments, Dulles made it clear that the United States would oppose the 
use of force. Eden, however, did gain the impression that Washington 
would not oppose an attack on Egypt if all attempts through negotia­
tion failed. After all, it was Dulles who told Eden, "a way had to 
be found to make Nasser disgorge what he wa.s attempting to swallow. ,,2 
But Dulles's public statements, meant to disassociate the United 
States from British colonialism, infuriated Eden. 3 
lU.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XXXV (October 15, 1956), 
577. 
2See footnote 52 above. 
3Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Cob1E:mtz, Duel at the Brink: John 
Foster Dulles' Co~.£ of American ?owe~ (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 
1960), p. 172. 
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M. H. Haykal argues that Dulles preferred the use of methods 
other than military to force Nasser to "disgorge what" he "was attempt­
inb to swallow." The difference in views between Dulles and his 
allies, therefore, according to Haykal, was not a difference in the aim 
but in the method. Dulles, says Haykal, urged an assault against 
Nasser from within; he sought the liquidation of the Egyptian Revolution 
but without much fuss; he sought Nasser's defeat but not through the 
use of bullets. l What Haykal is implying here is, no doubt, the use 
of the same tactics used to bring down Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran 
in 1953. 
Another means "hidden, in the recesses of the State Depart­
mentIs files" was ''Mr. Dulles's incomplete but implementable plan to 
'bring Nasser down through economic pressure. ,,,2 In New Times, 
Georgi Ushakov contends that Dulles showed an inclination to use force 
if it could help topple Nasser, but later changed his views because he 
saw it could not succeed. 3 
As the Menzies Mission, the Users's Association, and the United 
Nations failed to accomplish what the British and French sought, and 
as Washington became more resolute and open in its opposi.tion to the 
use of force, "Eden decided that from then on, the less said to Dulles, 
the better. fl4 As Anglo-French war preparations began in earnest, "s 
lBaykal, Nahnu ••• wa-Amrika, p. 117. 

2"The Eisenhower Doctrine: Beginnings of a Middle East Policy," 

Round 	Table, XLVII (March, 1957), 141. 
3Ushakov, "Dulles' t Aswan Gambit' , II 185. 
4Drummond, Duel ~ the Brink, p. 174. 
• • • 
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blackout in communications had been imposed," says President Eisenhower 
in his memoirs, "we had the uncanny feeling that we were cut off from 
our allies."l Nasser, accordine, to M. H. Haykal, became aware of Anglo-
French military preparations through his contacts with EOKA elements 
in Cyprus and with members of the British Labor Party.2 
On October 15, American reconnaissance planes revealed that 
Israel was mobilizing and that she had sixty French Mystere warplanes 
instead of twelve sold earlier to her by France with American approval. 3 
President Eisenhower sent a personal message to the Israeli Premier 
David Ben-Gurion with the Israeli Ambassador to the United States 
Abba Eban. On October 25, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria announced the 
conclusion of a pact to increase their military cooperation and to 
place their armed forces under Egyptian command in case of war with 
Israel. Israel continued her military buildup. On October 27, the 
State Department forwarced a cable from President Eisenhower to Premier 
Ben-Gurion expressing "concern at reports of heavy mobilization on 
your side. I renew the plea • • • that there be no forceable 
initiative on the part of your government which would endanger the 
peace."4 
lEisenho~~r, Waging Peace, 1956-1961, p. 56. 

2al-Ahram (Cairo), September 24, 1971. 

3France had actually "del.i..vered no fewer than seventy-five of 

the latest French Mystere fighter aircraft" by October 13. See 
Nutting, No End of ~ Lesson, p. 88. 
~isenhower, Waging Peace, 195,6-1961, p. 69. 
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On October 28, while Israel gave an order for general mobilization 
of her reserves, her Ambassador in Washington told American officials 
that those were purely defensive measures. But the United Staces 
had some indication that Israel and France were cooperating. That 
same day another cable was sent to Ben-Gurion urging him "to do nothing 
which would endanger the peace."l 
Washington, all the while, had assumed that Israel was preparing 
to attack Jordan. Instead, her army struck in Sinai on October 29. 
Late that day, while it still was unclear what the Israeli objective 
was, the White House issued a statement to the effect that the United 
States was determined to carry out her pledge of supporting the victim 
of aggression in the Middle East under the terms of the 1950 Tripartite 
Agreement. 2 Until the next day; October 30, the United States 
government continued to have a "lack of clear understanding as to 
what exactly was happening in the Suez area," says Pr~~sident Eisenhower, 
"due to the break in our communications with the French and British. 
We were in the dark about what they planned to do."3 
It soon became clear, however, that Israel's action was part 
of a general plan in collusion with France and Britain to aCQieve 
separate aims through joint action.4 British and French military 
1Ibid., p. 70. 
2Ibid~, p. 73; Current Documents, 1~56, p. 646. 
3Eisenhower, Wa~ Peace, 1956-1961, p. 75; Nutting, No End 
of ~ Lesson, pp. 110-13. 
~fichael Reisman, The Art of the Possible: Diplomatic Alternatives 
in the Middle East (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), 
pp. 8-9. 
---
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planners went to work on plans for a military operation against Egypt 
in the first wee.k of August. Plans for Operation "Musketeer" were 
submitted on August 8 and accepl~d first by Prime Minister Eden on 
August 10, and then by the French Prime ~1inister Mollet. The 
Operation was to begin in mid-September, roughly six weeks from the 
time planning began. 1 
The London Conference, which commenced on August 16, did not 
keep the British and French from going ahead with their preparations 
for war. American UZ reconnaissance aircraft and U.S. forces in 
France became aware of those preparations. British and French 
subjects were told by their respective governments to begin leaving 
Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. To Loy Henderson, the American 
member of the Menzies Mission, Eden said before he left for Cairo, 
''We are determined to secure our just rights in Suez, and if necessary 
we will use force, because I would rather have the British Empire fall 
in one crash than have it nibbled away as it seems is happening 
now. liZ 
Therefore, when the Menzies Mission left for Egypt on September 1, 
it was clear to both Egypt and her friends that the Anglo-French threat 
to use force was imminent. President Eisenhower was prompted to 
write Prime Minister Eden on September 2, 
I am afraid, Anthony, that from this point onward our 

views on this situation diverge. As to the use of force 

or the threat of force at this juncture • • • military 

preparations and civilian evacuation exposed to public 

1Thomas, The Suez Affair, p. 68. 

2Finer, Dulles over Suez, p. 192. 
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view seem to be solidifying support for Nasser. • •• I 
regard it as indispensable that if we are to proceed solidly 
together to the solution of this problem, public opinion in 
our several countries must be overwhelmingly in its support. 
I must tell you frankly that American public opinion flatly 
rejects the thought of using force, particularly when it does 
not seem that every possible peaceful means of protecting our 
vital interests has been exhausted without resu1t. l 
Eden says in his memoirs that he found this letter disquieting 
and disturbing. He wrote back on September 6, 
I can assure you that we are conscious of the burdens 
and the perils attending military intervention • • • • 
We have many times led Europe in the fight for freedom. It 
would be all ignoble end to our long history if lve accepted 
to perish by degrees. 2 
On September 11 Eden received a more disquieting letter, this 
time from Marshal Bu1ganin of the Soviet Union. He wrote, 
Britain is demonstratively concentrating her troops in 
Cyprus, in the neighborhood of the Suez Canal area. French 
military formations, too, have been landed on Cyprus. Other 
military measures have also been taken, aggravating the ten­
sion. All this is accomplished by pubHc official declara­
tions of the readiness of Britain and France • • • to begin 
hostilities against Egypt if she refused to place the Canal 
under foreign administration. 3 
Bulganin then warned, 
small wars can turn into big wars • • • I must tell you, 
Mr. Prime Minister, that the Soviet Union, as a great 
power interested in the maintenance of peace, cannot hold 
aloof from this question. 4 
Marshal Bu1ganin wrote Eden again on September 28. Once more he 
warned, 
1Eisenhower, W~ging Peace, 1956-1961, p. 667, Appendix C. 
2Eden, Full Circle, p. 521. 
3Thomas, The Suez Affair, pp. 184-185, Appendix II. 
4Ibid., pp. 186-87. 
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My colleagues and I want to stress once again that the 
policy of war threats and of attempts to interfere in the 
domestic affairs of Egypt is creating a threat to peace 
in the Near and Middle East and is fraught with dangerous 
consequences. Any attempt to carry Olt,t one plan or 
another through the use of force against Egypt means to 
set oneself in opposition to the majority of countries, 
including states the security of which is directly affected 
by the events in this area and which cannot remain indifferent 
when it is a matter of a breach of the peace, a matter of 
aggression. l 
Six days before Israel struck on October 29, Bulganin wrote Eden a 
relatively friendly letter reflecting his satisfaction ~~th what 
had been accomplished at the United Nations. The letter stated 
that, 
recourse to negotiations through the Security Council has 
already yielded initial fruit • • • attempts to settle 
the Suez problem in any other fashion cannot facilitate 
the attainment of the necessary area of agreement and are 
pregnant with dangerous consequences. 2 
The D-Day of September 15 and 16 was changed to September 26 
and then to October 8, b~fore it finally became October 29. Contacts 
with Israel regarding joint military action against Egypt began in 
early September. Prime Minister MOllet of France, however, is 
believed to have sugge,sted collaboration with Israel as early as 
July 27, but Prime Minister Eden rejected his suggestion at that 
time. Toward the end of September, rumors ,vent out that Israeli 
and French officials were having secret meetings. In fact, France 
began to supply Israel with almost any military equipment she 
wanted as early as the first week of August. General Moshe Dayan, 
1Ibid., p. 192. 

2Ibid., p. 195 .. 
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the Israeli Chief of Staff then, knew of Operation "Musketeer" on 
September 1, and also knew that Nasser withdrew his forces from 
Sinai because of the Anglo-French threat.! 
In coordinating plans ~~th Israel for the military operations 
against Egypt, the French suggested a date for the Israeli attack 
close to the election date in the United States, so President 
Eisenhower would not risk opposing Israel for fear of losing the 
Jewish vote. Starting September 10, Israel began her diversionary 
attacks against Jordan. By September 17, General Dayan and his 
staff had already begun studying plans for the capture of Sinai. 
On September 21, those plans were approved by the French. At that 
stage, Eden seems to have come a long way in accepting the idea of 
Israeli participation in the campaign. 
Eden gave his final approval of the French plan on October 16 
during a meeting in Paris between the British and French Prime 
Ministers and Foreign Secretaries. This meeting was preceded by 
another in London on October 14, during which Eden gave tentative 
approval of the plan. In fact, Pinau and Lloyd met Ben-Gurion 
outside Paris at Sevres on October 22 to assure him of their .govern­
ments's commitment to the plan. "For Israel to move at all," says 
Hugh Thomas, "Ben-Gurion wanted a written agreement, signed by all 
three countries, together with the presence at the final discussion 
of a responsible British Minister."2 By October 25, Ben-Gurion 
1Ibid., pp. 84-86; Nutting, No End of ~ Lesson, pp. 56-57. 
2Thomas, The Suez A::fair, p. 112. 
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got what he asked for and gave the green light to General Moshe Dayan 
on the same day.l The following is Anthony Nutting's comment on 
this agreement: 
Our traditional friendshi?s with the Arab world were to 
be discarded; the policy of keeping a balance in arms deliveries 
as between Israel and the Arab States was to be abandoned; 
indeed, our whole peace-keeping role in the Middle East was 
to be changed and we were to take part in a cynical act of 
aggression, dressing ourselves for the part as firemen or 
policemen, while making sure that our fire-hoses spouted 
petrol and not water and that we belaboured with out truncheons 
the assaulted and not the assaulter. And all to gain for 
ourselves guarantees for the future operation of the Suez 
Canal which had only a day or so before beensubstanti~lly 
gained in Lloyd's negotiations with Fawzi in New York. 
Israel depended on Britain and France for equipment, supplies, 
and air cover for her initial attack. The final decision was that 
Israel would attack on the 29th of October. England and France 
would issue an ultimatum to both Israel and Egypt to cease hostilities 
and withdraw to within ten miles of the Canal, or else they would 
intervene to separate them and protect the Canal.3 The Israeli 
military operation was named "Kadesh." France was to provide an 
"umbrella" of French fighters to protect Israeli cities and to 
parachute food, supplies, and ammunition to the advancing Israeli 
forces. Thirty-six hours after the beginning of the Israeli attack, 
British bombers were to begin bombing Egyptian airfields and military 
lMoshe Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1966), p. 60. 
2Nutting, No End of i! I,esson, p. 94.; see also, Michael Adams, 
Suez and After: Year of Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958), 
p. 	81. 
~utting, No End of a Lesson, pp. 90-109; Thomas, The Suez 
Affair, pp. 86-111. 
184 
insta11ations.1 On October 25, General MOshe Dayan noted in his 
diary, 
Our forces will go into action at dusk on 29 October 1956, 
and we must complete the capture of the Sinai Peninsula with­
in seven to ten days. The decision on the campaign and its 
planning are based on the assumption that British and French 
forces are about to take action against Egypt. According to 
information in our possession, the Anglo-French forces pro­
pose to launcll their operations on 31 October 1956. Their 
aim is to secure control of the Suez Canal Zone, and for this 
they will need to effect a sea landing or an air drop with, 
no doubt, suitable air cover.2 
President Eisenhower claims that he had no knowledge of the 
Anglo-French-Israeli plans. The CIA and Allen Dulles, who had 
gathered sufficient information about the military preparations 
of these powers, apparently withheld it from him. As Israel attacked 
on October 29, thirty-six French war planes fle'tv to Israel. Other 
French planes dropped food and arms to Israeli paratroops at Mitla 
in Sinai. Not yet aware what exactly was happening, President 
Eisenhower cabled Prime Minister Eden on October 30 expressing 
concern and astonishment at the British Ambassador's unsympathetic 
attitude toward Washington's intentions of taking the case of Israel's 
military action against Egypt to the United Nations and his unwi1ling­
ness to allow any action to be taken against Israel. Referring 
to the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, the cable stated that the 
United States was bound by that agreement and expected Great Britain 
to abide by it too. "All this development, with its possible 
consequences,1I concluded President Eisenhower, 
1Thomas, The Suez Affair, pp. 112-15. 

2Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign, pp. 60-61. 
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including the possible involvement of you and the French 
in a general Arab war, seems to me to leave your govern­
ment and ours in a very sad state of confusion, so far 
as any possibility of unified understanding and action 
are concerned. It is true rhat Egypt has not yet formally 
asked this government for aid. But the fact is that if the 
United Nations finds Israel to be an aggressor, Egypt could 
very well ask the Soviets for help--and then the Mid East 
fat would really be in the fire. l 
VI. DIVIDED ALLIES, UNITED ENEMIES 
As planned, an Anglo-French l2-hour ultimatum was issued 
October 30 to both Egypt and Israel to stop fighting, to withdraw 
to within ten miles of the Canal, and to accept the temporary 
occupation by Anglo-French forces of the Canal Zone. If at the 
expiration of the 12 hours Egypt and Israel had not complied "we 
would intervene in such strength as necessary to secure compliance.u2 
Israel accepted the ultimatum; Egypt rejected it. When the attack 
began, it did not appear like it was for the purpose of just sepa­
rating the combatants or occupying key positions at the Canal. 
Hundreds of bombers from Malta and CYP1~S converged on Egypt and 
began a 48-hour bombardment of ports, airfields, railways, radio 
towers, and communication centers. To the American government, 
Prime Minister :Hollet said, "If your government was not informed 
of the final developments, the reason ••• was our fear that if 
we had consulted it, it would have prevented us from acting."3 
lEisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961, p. 16. 

2Nutting, No End of ~ Lesson, p. 194, Appendix VIII. 

3Eisenhower, ~ging Peac~, 1956-1961, p. 11; see also, Nutting, 

No End of ~ Lesson, p. 163. 
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On the same day, the United States had requested a meeting of 
the Security Council "to consider steps to be taken to bring about 
th': immediate cessation of military actiof! by Israel against Egypt. ,,1 
The British and French used their veto power to defeat two resolutions 
(one by the United States and the other by the Soviet Union) aimed 
at condemning the use of force and calling on Israel to withdraw 
from Egyptian territory. Soon after the ultimatum was issued, the 
United States warned England and France against the occupation of 
positions at Suez. 
Up to October 31, the Israeli forces were held up quite well 
by the Egyptians at Mitla and Abu Aweiglia. But when the Ang1o­
French attack began on October 31, Nasser ordered a general with­
drawal from Sinai to concentrate defenses around Cairo. Syria's 
requests to open a northern front against Israel were discouraged 
by Nasser. Instead, the Syrians blew up the Iraq Petroleum pipe­
lines. 2 
On November 2, Secretary Dulles spoke before the United Nations 
General Assembly. "I doubt that any delegate ever spoke from this 
forum with as heavy a hcaI:t as I have brought here tonight," said 
Dulles, 
IU.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XXXV (November 12, 
1936), 748. 
2Thomas, The Suez Affair, p. 130; Seale, St;:y.ggle for §llia, 
p. 262; Rabih Lutfi Jumah, S8~ al-'Udwan a1-Thulathi (Cairo: a1-Dar 
al-Qawmiyah lil-Tiba'ah wa-al-Nashri, 1962), pp. 111-16; Samir Sadiq, 
Qissa.t: a1- I Udwan a1-Thu1athi 'ala Misr (Cairo: a1-Dar a1-Qawmiyah 
1i1-Tiba'ah wa-a1-Na.shr, 1961), pp. 13~-35. 
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We speak on a matter of vital importance, where the 
United States finds itself unable to agree with three 
nations with whom it has ties, deep friendship, admir­
ation, and respect, and two of whom constitute our oldest, 
most trusted and reliable allies. l 
On November 5, the tVhite House issued a statement rejecting a Soviet 
proposal to jointly use force in Egypt to restore peace. 2 Former 
Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev says that this note was meant 
to expose "the hypocrisy" of President Eisenhower's "public statement 
condemning the attack against Egypt." }Ir. Khrushchev quotes President 
Eisenhower as saying, "This is incredible! Can the Russians be 
serious? To think that we would join them against Britain, France 
and Israel! It's incredible!" Khrushchev concludes, 
So our note had done exactly what it was supposed to 

do; it had put the lie to the Americans' claim of being 

fighters for peace and justice and nonaggression. They 

may have been fighters in words, but not in deeds, and 

we had unmasked them. 3 

He then goes on to argue that England and France did ~ot fear America's 
condemnation of their action, but had to pay serious attention to 
. Russia's "stern warning.,,4 
It is true that violent notes were received by France, Britain, 

and Israel from the Soviet Union on November 5. The note to Israel 

questioned Itthe very existence of Israel as a state" as a result of 

1U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XXXV (November 12, 1956), 
751. 
2Ibid., (November 19, 1956), 795-96; see text of November 5 

Sovie~ ~~()te in Ibid., 796. 

-'Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 434-35. 

4Ibid., p. 436. 

188 
her attack against Egypt. l The notes received by Britain and France 
threatened the use of "every kind of modern destructive weapon,,2 
against them. Mr. Khrushchev, however, neglects to point out .hat 
America's strong opposition to the assault on Egypt was declared on 
the first day of fighting and that Russia's missile threat3 did 
not come until it became clear on whose side America stood. 
Until he went to the hospital on November 3, Secretary Dulles 
led the United States in opposition to the three-power attack on 
Egypt. During Dulles's illness, President Eisenhower took direct 
charge of the matter and spoke to Prime Minister Eden on the phone 
demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities. Washington kept 
up its pressure on London by not coming to its rescue when the run 
on the pound sterling in international money markets was having 
devastating effects on Britain's resolve to continue the war. It 
is believed that the American pressure on sterling was more effective 
than Russia's threat to attack Britain and France with Rockets. 4 
United States opposition to the use of force in Egypt, however, 
Secretary Dulles is reported to have told French Foreign Minister 
Pineau, was 
lQuoted in Avigdor Dagan, Moscow and Jerusalem: Twenty Years 
£f Relations Between Israel and the Soviet Union (New York: Abelard­
Schuman, 1970), p. 108. 
2Quoteu in Thomas, The Suez Affair, p. 142. 
3It is presumed that this threat was made upon the recommendation 
of President Shukri al-Quwatly of Syria, who was then in Moscow on a 
state visit. See Thomas~ ~ Affair, p. 142; Seale, Struggle for 
Syria, pp. 261-62. 
4Drununond, Duel.!! the Brink, pp. 174-75. 
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not based on a desire to keep Nasser in power • • • the 

United States did not accord preference to Nasser or the 

Arabs over Britain and France, its traditional and great 

allies. He noted that neither cultural nor racial ties 

bound the United States to the Arabs. But, he said, the 

use of force against EfYpt could only result in rallying 

support behind Nasser. 

The basis for United States opposition was mainly moral and 
practical. Practical, because the United State believed that force 
could not defeat the West's enemies or settle the problems at hand. 
"In all recent troubles in the Middle East," said President Eisenhower, 
"there have, indeed, been injustices suffered by all nations involved. 
But I do not believe that another instrument--war--is the remedy 
for these wrongs." The moral basis of the American stand was also 
explained by President Eisenhower. He says, 
we sense a special concern for the fate and fortune of 
those 700 million people in 19 nations who have won full 
independence since World War II. We know and respect 
both thei~ national pride and their economic neec. Here 
we speak from the heart of our heritage. I¥e, too .• were born 
at a time when the tide of tyranny running high threatened 
to sweep the earth. We prevailed and they shall prevail•••• 
We cannot and 1;re will not condone armed aggression, no matter 
who the attacker and no matter who the victim. We cannot, 
in the world any more than in our own nation, subscribe to 
one law for those opposing us, another for those allied with 
2us. There can be only one law, or there will be no peace. 
VI. DEFEAT INTO VICTORY 
Nasser won a conclusive victory in 19.56. A cease-fire resolution, 
introduced by Secretary Dulles on November 1 to the United Nations 
lIbid., pp. 174-77. 
2Time , November 12, 1956. 
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General Assembly, 1 lias approved by a vote of 64 to 5 on November 2.2 
"This vote," corranented Vice President Richard Nixon on the same day, 
constituted a world-wide vot·- of confidence, the like of 
which has never been known befo:::-e. • •• For the first 
time in history we have shown independence of Ang1o­
French policies toward Asia and Africa which seemed to 
us to reflect the colonial tradition. That declaration 
of independence has had an electrifying effect throughout 
the wor1d. 3 
The November 2 resolution was followed by two others, adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly on November 4. The first was 
a proposal, advanced by Mr. Lester Pearson of Canada, to organize 
and dispatch a U.N. Peace Force to separate between Egypt and Israel 
and restore free traffic through the Suez Canal. This was adopted 
by a vote of 57 to O. The second, adopted by a vote of 59 to 5, 
was another cease-fire resolution sponsored by 19 nations. The 
hostilities finally ended on November 6. The United States fully 
supported the United Nations in its efforts to restore peace to the 
area. The invading forces eventually vii thdrew from Egypt; NasRer f s 
government was paid compensations for the damage caused to its 
country; and the Canal remained under sole Egyptian contro1.4 
The pressure on England, financial, economic, and political, 
had its effect, no doubt. 5 But world opinicn seems to have been 
1Current Documents, 1956, p. 656. 

2Ibid .) pp. 057-58. 

3Quoted in Finer, Dulles ~ Suez, p. 397. 

4I bid., pp. 403-10; Thomas, The Suez Affair, pp. 134-49; Nutting, 

~ End of ~ Lesson, pp. 168-71. 
5Ibid., pp. 137-40, 144-47. 
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the most effective force. During October, in conversation with Tom 
Little, then Middle East Correspondent of the London Observer, 
Nasser said, "I don't intend to fight them Li-e., Britain and Franc!;./~ 
I intend to stand back and wait for world opinion to save me."l 
It was moral force, no doubt, that brought the military operations 
to a halt. "At Westminster the British House of Commons was suspended 
in an uproar," says Harry Hopkins, 
of a sort hardly heard for a generation. The basically moral 
issue of "Suez" split the British with a violence and bitter­
ness rare in England's history. And the revulsion and anger 
of many in Britain was swollen by the sense of outrage in the 
COImllonwealth. "In the Middle of the twentieth century," wrote 
the leading Pakistan newspaper, Dawn, "enlightened countries 
like Britain and France have suddenly turned the clock back 
hundreds of years • • • and decided to act as self-chartered 
libertines of the gun and bomb. 2 
It was Nasser who detected, understood and used this moral 
force--the new weapon of the "Third World." The anxiety and fear 
felt by Prime Minister Eden were testified to by Anthony Nutting, 
Minister of State at the Foreign Office, who resigned on October 31, 
over the Suez issue, following the issuance of the ultimatum to 
Egypt and Israel. Nutting says that the censure of the United 
States and the Commonwealth and the United Nations pressures threatened 
to isolate Britain. 3 Nutting says, "I know that he LEdegf felt 
I 
i 
very deeply the censure which he had brought upon hins elf froml 
I the United States and the Commonwealth.,,4 
I 
, 
lQuoted in Hopkins, Egypt, the Crucible, p. 184. 
2Ibid., pp. 184-85; see also, Adams, Suez and After, pp. 4-5. 
I 
I 3Nutting, No End of ~ Lesson, pp. 124-39. 
4Ibid., pp. "133-34. 
i 
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According to Harry Hopkins, 
Suez has a claim to be considered the first war in modern 
history to be stopped in its tracks by the force of world 
opinion. It may be argued that Nasser was merely benefit~ing 
from an accident or lucky gamble. But it seems more likely 
that this man, so very much of his time and place, instinctively 
understood what wag neglected by more sophistocated politicians, 
the power and character of the ideas at work in the world of 
the 1950's, and this, and his nerve in mobilizing them in the 
construction of a sort of global morality drama of unprecedented 
dimensions should ensure him, if nothing else does, a place 
in history.l 
VII. THE AFTERMATH 
While Nasser acknowledged the value of America's support during 
the crisis, he could not forget her other actions before, during, 
and after the crisis. Those included America's refusal to supply 
Egypt with lubricating oils and parts for her U.S.-made machinery, 
her withdrawal of the offer to help build the Aswan High Dam, her 
refusal to sell the needed wheat to feed the Egyptian people, her 
cancellation of distribution of CARE lunches to Egypt's school 
children, and her denial of Egypt's requests for medicines to treat 
the victims of the Suez war. These were actions which left deep 
scars. "The Soviets responded almost immediately," to Egyptian 
requests for wheat and pharmaceuticals, says Miles Copeland, "when 
made to them. ,,2 
In doing so, the United States drove Nasser further into the 
.. 
arms of the Soviet Union and n~de the new Soviet-Egyptian friendship 
lHopkins, Egypt, the Crucible, p. 185. 

2Copel and , The Game of Nations (New York), p. 214. 
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more acceptable to the Egyptian people.. For years Egypt sought 
American assistance. The offer to help build the Dam came only 
after Nasser made the arms deal with Russia. Nasser pointed out his 
main difficulty with the United States in an answer given to American 
newSmen who asked if he would be willing to meet with President 
Eisenhower to try and resolve his area's problems. "Of course • • • 
I am ready to do anything," he answered, "to serve the cause of peace. 
But I cannot answer directly because of my experience with your State 
Department. They may make statements to humiliate Egypt by rejecting 
this as before."l When asked what his reaction was to discontinued 
CARE food distribution in Egypt, Nasser replied, "I had no reaction. 
After our e~~erience with the High Dam~ I learned that we must depend 
on ourselves."2 
The Suez crisis brought to an end the collective responsibility 
of the United States, GI:eat Britain, and France under the Tripartite 
Declaration of 1950 to protect their common interests in the area. 
Britain and France came out of the crisis seriously humiliated and 
stripped of what influence or power they had in the region. The 
United States was left face-to-face with a growing Soviet presence and 
a challenge that seriously threatened Western interests. 3 
Nasser continued to call for a just solution of the Palestine 
problem and to encourage activities aimed at discrediting France and 
1Egyptian Gazette, September 28, 1957, quoted in Castleberry, 
"The Arabs' View of Postwar American Foreign PoliCY," 2ln. 
2Ibid • 
~{urewitz, "Soviet-knerican Rivalry in the Middle East," 10. 
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Britain, their allies in the Middle East, and the Baghdad Pact. Ties 
between him and Syria and the Soviet Union were growing closer by 
the day. His anti-West policies became mere acceptable in the Arab 
w-orld after Suez; therefore more successful. "The blood which flowed 
in Egypt," says p. V. Milogradov, "and the barbarous destruction of 
Port Said have finally opened the eyes even of those who in one way 
or another still believed in the 'civilizing mission' of the imperialist 
powers in the East."l 
American continued to think that Nasser "was an obstacle to the 
United States alliance system and too friendly to the Soviet Union. ·,2 
As the year 1957 began and the United States assumed full responsibility 
for the protection of Western interests in the Middle East, Nasser was 
I1more and morel! viewed as an "enemy of the West,"3 and the signs 
pointed to an inevitable head-on collision between him and the United 
States. 
lp. V. Milogradov, in E. M. Zhuko'l, "The Eisenhower Doctrine 
and U.S. Foreign Policy," International Affairs (Moscow, February, 
1957), p. 74. 
2Richard H. Nolte, flU. S. Policy in the Middle East," in 
Georgiana G. Stevens, ed., The U. ~ and the Middle East (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 164. 
3Campbell, The Middle East in the Muted Cold War, p. 7. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE 
After Suez, America, Britain's heir in the Middle East, found 
herself face-to-face with Russia. The United States became the only 
Western power with some influence in the area not yet eroded. The 
Soviet Union, on the other hand, by the end of 1956, had made great 
gains by supporting Arab nationalism against the West. Russian arms, 
trade, financial and technical aid, helped cement a growing and 
promising Sovi~t-Arab relationship. The United States sought the 
same ends but followed different tactics. Russia's support of Arab 
nationalism meant a strategy of enlisting Arab public support and 
seeking those things the Arabs themselves sought. Among the things 
Russia sought, respected, encouraged, and supported were the Arab's 
wish to be neutral, their national independence, their need for 
various forms of aid, their economic development, their need for 
strong backing, and a call for an agreement renouncing the use of 
force in the ~1idd1e East. In the words of V. Mayevsky, "the Sovie.t 
Union supported and continues to support the principles of the 
Bandung Conference and • • • it is trying to build its relations 
with the countries of Asia and Africa on the basis of these prin~iples."l 
In the face of this Soviet challenge, the Baghdad Pact proved 
lMayevsky, in Zhukov, "The Eisenhower Doctrine and U.S. Foreign 
Policy," p. 70. 
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inadequate. More effective means were called for to check Russian 
advance. But the Eisenhower Administration did not as yet seem to 
have come to grips with the true nature o~ the political and social 
mood in the Arab world. There was ample evidence as to what the 
Arab mood was. The reaction to the Baghdad Pact was a clear indication 
of what the Arab world did not want. With all the efforts to make 
Jordan join the Baghdad Pact, public national pressure prevented 
King Hussein from joining it. The Pact had been successfully resisted 
and Iraq, its only Arab member, had been isolated. 
When in December 1955 and January 1956 new efforts were made to 
draw Jordan to the Baghdad Pact, riots broke out in Amman and other 
Jordanian cities denouncing the Jordanian government and the Baghdad 
Pact. Two cabinets fell during those two months and King Hussein 
had to announce that he had no intention of joining the Pact and 
promise free elections. On March 1, 1956, he dismissed General John 
Glubb, the British Commander of Jordan's Arab Legion, and replaced 
him with General Ali Abu Nuwwar, a pro-Nasser officer. Hussein 
dissolved the Parliament in June and free elections were held on October 21. 
The elections brought in a parliament with a clear pro-Nasser major­
ity. Premier Sulayman al-Nabulsi headed a government that was composed 
mainly of Ba'thists and National Socialists. By January 1957, 
Jordan's annual British subsidy had been replaced by an annual sum 
of $35 million to be paid by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria. l 
lLenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, pp. 459-69; 
Emil Lengyel, The Changing Middle East (New York: John Day Co., 
1960), pp. 210-13; Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York), pp. 
217-19. 
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During the Suez crisis, pro-West Arab regimes joined Syria in a 
great show of solid support for Egypt. But the crisis and its conse­
quences serL:msly undermined the pro-West policies of those regimes. 
Thus the power "vacuum" recognized by the West, but the existence of 
which Nasser strongly denied, was felt by governments friendly to 
the West. Lacking popular support, those regimes looked and found 
no significant crutch powerful enough to lean on. Weak and shakey, 
they hoped the United States would quickly step in and provide 
sufficient backing and support against the progressive national forces 
threatening to sweep them away. "Nasser could only hope," says Miles 
Copeland, "that we come up with something as embarrassing to the 
blacklegs as the Baghdad Pact had been. • We did."l 
Since Nasser did not cooperate with the West in the formation 
of a Western-sponsored defense system, the United States concluded 
that he should be isolated from the rest of the Arab world and, 
perhaps, eventually brought down. According to Round Table, 
The Egyptians are not far off course in suspecting that 
the United States is preparing--by means of the Eisenhower 
Doctrine and by such diplomacy as the invitations Washing­
ton extended to both King Saud of Saudi Arabia and Prince 
Abdul Ilah of Iraq--to isolate Egypt if it remains intransi­
gent. 2 
Nasser, on the other hand, sought to achieve further victories 
for his policies. His main objectives were uniting the Arab world 
under one l~~dership, following one Arab foreign policy, achieving 
true and complete independence for all Arabs, and forming a purely 
lIbtd., p. 215. 
2nThe Eisenhower Doctrine: Beginnings of a Middle East 
Policy," 146. 
198 
Arab defense system. Until 1956, Nasser had the upper hand and had 
generally won every round against Britain, Nuri aI-Said of Iraq, and 
the United States. The fact that he was able to keep Syria OIl his 
side was, no doubt, the key to his success. His triumph at Suez 
gained him all the popular Arab sentiment and support he ever hoped 
for. 
Russia being his principal supporter after 1955, he could not 
allow his fellow Arab states to join an alliance aimed at her. 
Besides, he could not see how Arab countries, including his own, 
could permit an independence just won to be jeopardized by American 
overlordship. Most importantly, he could not tolerate any pressure 
on Syria, which might weaken his hold on her and increase the ranks 
of his Iraqi rival, resulting in a shift in the area's balance of 
power in favor of his enemies. 
I. THE DOCTRINE INTRODUCED 
On January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower proposed to the American 
Congress the adoption of a resolution authorizing him to use the 
United States armed forces in the Middle East "against covert armed 
aggression from any nation controlled by International Connnunism."l 
The proposal reflected a fear in Washington of a Soviet bid to fill 
the supposed power "vacuum" in the Middle East through an anned 
attack or by internal subversion. According to L. Brent Bozell, 
lU.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XXXVI (January 21, 
1957), 86. 
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the President gave the impression "that the country has greater reason 
to fear Communism than to fear war." What he was asking for was 
"authority Lo resist Soviet agg!.~ssion, or .!.'!:2l to resist it, as he 
sees fit."l 
Secretary Dulles seems to have been convinced that the Soviets 
lacked moral restraint, that they had the capacity for armed attacks, 
and that the Middle East presented too great a temptation for them. 
On January 14, 1957, he told a joint session of the Foreign Relations 
and Armed Services Commission of the Senate, "I can assure you that 
the leaders of International Communism will take every risk that they 
dare in order to win the Middle East.,,2 This was the danger that 
Secretary Dulles could see. He felt that the Russians were not 
likely to let this opportunity slip by. "Soviet ground, naval and 
air forces," said Dulles, 
are stationed in thE' areas adjacent to the Middle East-­
Bulgaria, the Black Sea, the Ukraine, the Caucasus and 
Central Asia. These Soviet forces are of a size, and 
are so located, that they could be employed at any time 
with a minimum of warning. 3 
It is this feeling of real danger that made the Eisenhower 
Administration take the urgent and hasty measures embodied in the 
Eisenhower Doctrine proposals. By March 9, the proposals were already 
approved by tbe Congress and sign.:!d by the President.4 .A fund of 
IL. Brent Bozell, "The Mideastern Policy," National Review, III 
(January 19, 1957), 56-57. 
2U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XXXVI (February 4, 1957), 
174. 
3Ibid., 170. 

4Ibid. (March 25,1957),481. 
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$200,000,000 was provided and the United States promised economic 
and military assistance to any Middle Eastern state desiring protection 
un~~r the teCIDS of the Eisenhower Doctrine. To line up adherents, 
President Eisenhower appointed Mr. James P. Richards, who left for the 
Middle East on March 12.1 On March 22, the United States announced 
her intention to join the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact. 2 
The Eisenho'Vrer Doctrine was devised to meet the threat of 
internal subversion and external outright aggression by Soviet 
communism. Its aims and objectives were those of the 1951 defense 
proposals with slight modifications. The preservation of the status quo 
continued to be a fundamental objective of American policy in the 
Middle East. The Eisenhower Doctrine differed from the Truman 
Doctrine mainly in aspects meant to suit the temper of the Middle 
East at the time. The weakness of the Truman Doctrine was in the 
fact that it could not possibly be enforced to its fullest. In 
retaliating, the United States had to pick and choose from among 
aggressions and subversions committed by the communists. Some were 
met militarily, some verbally and diplomatically. These facts were 
known to both the United States and the Soviet Union. The Eisenhower 
1Ibid., 482; Ibid. (April 1, 1957), 526. 
2Statement made by President Eisenhower's Press Secretary in 
a news conference during the meeting betw'een President Eisen.ltower 
and Prime Miuister Harold Macmillan at Tucker's TOWll, Bermuda, 
March 22, 1958. See Current Documents, 1957 (Washington, D.C., 
Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 771; see also, M. Perlman, 
"Withdrawal in East--Retreat in tvest," Middle Eastern Affairs, 
VIII (May, 1957), 178. --­
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Doctrine was considered necessary so the Soviet Union could be specifi­
cally informed that the Middle East was an area the United States 
would, if necessary, use military force to defend. Such action, 
however, would be dependent upon the invitation of the ,country 
co~cerned. The latter condition was not part of the Truman Doctrine. 1 
II; THE DOCTRINE I S DRA\o.."'BACKS AND DIFFICULTIES 
It is not known who originated the idea of the Eisenhower 
Doctrine. Miles Copeland suggests that it might have been Secretary 
Dulles or Assistant Secretary Bill Rountree. He recalls, 
clearly • • • that neither the "Middle East Policy Planning 
Committee" (State, Defense, and CIA) nor the regular staff 
of the Bureau of Near Eastern and African Affairs had any­
thing to do with it • • • in the light of extant intelligence 
on the Arab world it made no sense at all. As I remember, 
the Middle East hands were fairly unanimous about this. W11en 
the CIA representative on the MEPPC was asked, "Would you 
fellows like to send someone along on the mission that's going 
to explain it to Arab chiefs of state?" he replied, "We 
can't afford to associate ourselves with every lunatic scheme 
that comes a10ng.,,2 
The Doctrine was criticized for being silent with regard to 
the only kind of aggression the Arabs really feared--aggression by a 
non-communist country. Memories of the 1956 invasion of Egypt by 
Britain, France, and Israel, were still fresh in Arab minds. It 
said nothing about a million idle, miserable and bitter Palestinian 
refugees, whose problem constituted the single most explosive issue 
lRamazani, "Changing United States Policy in the Middle East," 
373-74; Graber, "The Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines," 331-32. 
2Cope1and, The Game of Nations (New York), p. 216. 
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in Middle Eastern affairs, and who sadly waited for the institution 
of justice. What the Doctrine did say, however, offended the Arabs 
and stirred resentment in them. References to the existence vf a 
power "vacuum" in the Middle East exposed Arab military weakness and 
intensified their feeling of inferiority. The call to "stand up and 
be counted," among America's friends or enemies insulted them and 
violated their popular ideal of "positive neutrality." 
Ever since the policy of "positive neutrality" was announced 
by Arab nationalists and adopted by most Arab states, Secretary 
Dulles was determined to make it ineffective. Nasser and the Arabs 
knew that neutrality could not be maintained unless the:y abstained 
from pacts, alliances, conditional agreements, and political strings. 
"The sharply anti-communist character of "Che Eisenhower Doctrine:" 
says V. Mayevsky, 
will, its authors calculate, confront each Middle Eastern 
country, and also every other neutral country, with a 
dilemma: either support the doctrine and adhere to the 
anti-communist bloc, or not support it and be counted among 
America's enemies, with all the consequences flowing there­
from. In essence, the doctrine aims at putting an end 
to the neutral policy pursued by many Eastern countries, des­
troying the Bandung concept and the principle of peaceful 
co-existence and drawing the Asian and African countries into 
the "cold '\flar."l . 
Therefore, the Doctrine, which seemed simple and straightfor­
ward to its authors, created all kinds of complications to the 
chiefs of A-t-ab states. "By endorsing the Doctrine," observes 
Patrick Seale, "an Arab state would be forced to make a public 
lMayevsky, in Zhukov, "The Eisenhower Doctrine and U.S. 
Foreign policy,n p. 70 .. 
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stand not only against Russia but also against an Arab neighbour."l 
And that was what the Arab states, even pro-West ones, wanted to 
avoid for fear of public censure and incrlmination. By most Arabs, 
the Eisenhower Doctrine was seen "as an American effort," says Max 
Thornburg, 
to place the next war's battlefield in the Middle East 
instead of nearer home, to replace British with American 
"imperialism," to seduce Middle East governments into 
bartering sovereignty for American aid, and to turn the 
Middle East countries against Communists because Americans 
feared Communism as a threat to their own way of life. 2 
As far as Nasser was concerned, his hope, that the United 
States would come up with a plan as embarrassing to his pro-West 
opponents as the Baghdad Pact, was more than fulfilled. But "the 
only aspect of the Eisenhower Doctrine that gave him pause," says 
Miles Copeland, 
was the assignment of Congressman James P. Richards to 

take the happy news to President Chamoun, King Hussein 

and the others. The choice of an emissa.ry who could be 

presumed to have about as much comprehension of Arab 

affairs as Nasser had of pop art greatly puzzled Nasser, 

and made him suspect that the project had some 

Machiavillian twist that was going over his head. "The 

genius of you Americans," he once told me, "is that you 

never make clear-cut stupid moves, Qnly complicated 

stupid moves which make us wonder at the possibility 

that there may be something to them "(<Ie are missing ."3 

Through the Eisenhower Doctrine the United States was placed 
in the position of bearing full responsibility for Western interests 
lSeale, Struggle for Syria, p. 286. 

2Thornburg, People and Policy in the Middle East, p. 200. 

3Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York), p. 216. 
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in the area. The enemy to be fought was, of course, communism. The 
enemy became unidentifiable, however, as it disappeared into the 
t8Lb1ed web of Arab politics. The United States found it increasingly 
difficult to differenciate between communists, Arab nationalists, 
Ba'thists, and Nasserists. By branding all these groups as enemies, 
the United States drove Arab nationalists further into Soviet arms. 
There was no question about the popularity of the Soviet Union 
with the Arab masses. Her support and her policies, since 1954, 
made a great impact on the Arab mind. Pro-Soviet sentiment was evident 
everywhere--in Arab press, in Arab official statements, in demons­
trations and public meetings, and over radio. But this popularity 
was due to the fact that Russia supported Arab interests, not to 
ideological convictions. The Arabs praised the Soviet Union not 
because they were communists, but because they were nationalists, 
delighted over a new protector and ally. The United States over­
looked this important fact. The anti-communist record of both Nasser 
and the Ba'th Party were disregarded. The apparent cleavage between 
the nationalists and the communists was brought about only in 
opposition to Western pressures. Failing to distinguish between the 
nationalists and the communists, the West pushed them into each other's 
1arms. 
III. THE DOCTRINE IN THE BALANCE 
Syria was the first among the states of the Middle East to 
attack the basis of the new American plan. A rejection of the "vacuum" 
1Seale, Struggle for Syri~, pp. 286-88. 
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theory was issued by the Syrian government on January 10, 1957, 
only five days after President Eisenhower delivered his Doctrine 
me~sage to the Congress. According to the Syrian statement, no power 
had the right to intervene in the area for any reason whatsoever; 
communism did not pose a threat to the Arab world; and the only 
dangers the Arabs could see were Zionism and the remnants of colonialism 
and "imperialism." "Beyond all doubt," declared Prime Minister Sabri 
al-Asa1i, "there is no sign whatever of international communist 
dangers in Syria threatening its independence, security, or freedom."l 
Both Syria and Egypt saw alignment as a danger to their 
cherished independence. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt, met 
in Cairo in early 1957 to discuss the Doctrine and come up with a 
unified policy toward it. King Saud tried to sell the American point 
of view to his colleagues. King Hussein sided with him. Syria and 
Egypt took the stand 
that any compromise at this juncture with the West 

would not only be futile since it would be an invita­

tion for Russia to start its own militant strategy 

in West ASia, but it would once and for all end the 

prospect of Arab independence of either of the power 

blocs, an objective which the Arab nations had 

accepted at Bandung. 2 

The meeting ended with a partial victory for the United States. And 
the possibility of winning Arab states, other than Iraq and Lebanon, 
to the plan was strengthened. 
Attention was then focused on Syria. If she could be won over, 
1Mirror, January 13, 1957, quoted in Torrey, Syrian Politics 
and the lli,gary, p. 338. 
2"The Ike Doctrine Powder Keg," Jana, IV (June, 1957), 4. 
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it would mean a serious blow to Nasser's policies and a significant 
setback to his campaign against the Eisenhower Doctrine. The Richards 
Mission left no doubt that a majur objective was to isolate Syria 
from Egypt. By avoiding both Damascus and Cairo, Mr. Richards was 
seen as an agent of Washington trying to reestablish the policy of 
"divide and rule," to undermine the goal of Arab unity, and to 
institute a new "imperialism." 
Since conditions in Jordan made it impossible for Mr. Richards 
to visit Amman, King Hussein sent Mr. Samir Rifai, a former Prime 
Minister, to meet him in Beirut. Upon Rifai's return to Amman, the 
King dismissed his freely-elected, left-ward leaning, and pro-Nasser 
government. It was reported that the action was taken following an 
attempt to overthrow King Hussein and establish a republic. General 
Ali Abu Nuwwar, the Commander of Jordan's army, was accused of leading 
the attempted coup, arnsted, and then released and allowed to go to 
Syria. In place of the freely-elected government, Hussein established 
his own authoritarian rule based on traditional and reactionary elements 
in his country. Soon, Hussein received King Saud's approval of his 
actions. To add insult to injury, Hussein demanded the withdrawal 
of Syrian troops stationed in his country since the Suez crisis. l 
The United States goverr.ment, uninvited and in harmony with its 
policy of "massive retaliation," accompanied Hussein's action by 
rapid fleet movements into the eastern Mediterranean, generous 
lLengyel. Changing Middle East, pp. 212-13; Lenczowski, The 
Middle East in World Affairs, pp. 462-69; Copeland, The ~ of 
Nations (New York), pp. 218-19. 
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promises of financial and economic assistance, and assurances of 
American help in defending the independence and sovereignty of 
Jordan. On June 29, the United States extended to Jordan a gr~nt 
of $10,000,000 in addition to another $10,000,000 granted in April. l 
Washington's behavior infuriated both Syria and Egypt, and 
made it possible for commentators to suggest that the King's action 
was inspired or encouraged by the United States. The presence 
of the Sixth Fleet in the Beirut harbor and off the Syrian coast, 
and the attitude of Syria's neighbors intensified the fear over what 
might happen to her progressive nationalist government. Writing 
during those tense days and weeks, Jana's correspondent said, 
If the Syrian government in Damascus, by any chance, 

accepts the Eisenhower Doctrine which is but one step 

towards the Baghdad Pact, the Nasser regime in Cairo 

will be in danger. The Americans would have achieved 

what the British and the French wanted to do in Cairo 

by resort to arms but failed--change Nasser and bring 

into existence in Egypt a government which wouldoe 

"amenable" to the West. 2 

But Nasser was determined not to let this happen. His strong ally was 
Russia, whose interest was in keeping Syria out of Western defense 
plans. 
After visiting fifteen Middle Eastern countries, including 
Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, and Morocco, Mr. Richards reported 
on May 27 and June 13 that all the states visited, with the exception 
of the Sudan and Yemen, "have endorsed the objectives" of the Eisenhower 
lWilliam Appleman Williams, America and the Middle East (New 
York: Rinehart, 1958), p. 54. 
2"The Ike Doctrine Powder Keg," 4. 
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Doctrine.! 
But when the Syrian crisis prompted talk in Washington of 
in.-oking the Doctrine against Syria, things began to fall apart. 
The call for Arab unity, in an effort to back Syria, caused existing 
support for the Doctrine to collapse. The Lebanese government came 
under pressure from opposition groups for its continued endorsement 
of the Doctrine; the Iraqi government wisely avoided any mention of 
its sympathy for it; and King Hussein, under intensive pressure from 
nationalist forces in his own country, kept out of it. 2 Although 
Lebanon remained the only Arab country to retain approval of the 
Doctrine, she joined Saudi Arabia to lead the whole membership of 
the Arab League in giving assurances of support to Syria against 
any aggressor, no matter who it was. 3 
Damascus and Cairo radios strongly attacked the Eisenhower 
Doctrine and the American effort to encircle and isolate Syria. The 
messages from Moscow were not less persuasive. In the light of what 
was taking place, they were very convincing indeed; "we must not 
allow the enemies of peace," V. Mayevsky's exhortation went, 
to drag us into the "cold ~...,ar," as they are trying so hard 
to do. The basis of the Leninist foreign policy of the 
Soviet Union was and remains peaceful co-existence, relax­
ation of tension and strengthening of peace throughout the 
wor1d.4 
lU.S., Department of State, Bulletin, XXXVI (June 17, 1957), 
969-72; Ibid., XXXVII (July 1, 1957), 17-19. 
2New York Times, October 15, 1957. 
3I bid., November 1, 1957; Ibid., November 13, 1957. 
~yevsky, in Zhukov, "The Eisenhower Doctrine and U.S. Foreign 
Policy," p. 71. 
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Soviet support for Syria against the forces ranged against her 
continued to come loud and clear. 
IV. THE DOCTRINE AND SYRIA 
In November 1956, the Iraqi conspiracy to effect a change 
of government in Syria was discovered and most of the West's allies 
in that country were destroyed. Syria's People's Resistance Forces 
were rapidly growing in numbers and in strength. During the Suez 
crisis, the news was heard of Soviet volunteers ready to come to 
Egypt's aid. In 1957, those same volunteers were reported ready 
and willing to come to Syria's aid too. Syria's contacts and agree­
ments with Russia and the eastern bloc increased. 
Official and unofficial sources in Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, 
Britain, France, the United States, and Israel, listened to and 
circulated reports of ma9sive deliveries of Soviet military equipment 
and technicians, of Soviet military officers and of secret desert 
bases. There was very scant concrete evidence to confirm those 
reports, however. The Syrian government repeatedly denied such 
reports and assured the world that Syria was not going communist. 
But Syria's denials and assurances were not listened to. 
Meanvmile, Syria continued to strengthen her ties with the 
communist bloc. In March, the Czechoslovak Techno-Export Company 
was ewarded the contract to build the first Syrian oil refinery at 
Horns. Ba'th-communist cooperation grew stronger and the Syrian 
Parliament listened to a number of anti-West speeches delivered 
by its only communist member, Khalid Bakdash, the foremost communist 
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leader in the Arab world. 
On August 6, Syria signed with the Soviet Union a widely­
ranging economic and technical agreement in Moscow. On August 13, 
three American diplomats, accused of plotting to overthrow the 
Syrian regime, were expelled. l When the United States government 
retaliated by expelling the Syrian Ambassador with one of his aides 
and issuing a warning to Syria, Nasser declared his full and "complete 
support for Syria, whose 'only sin' was that 'she did not dance to 
the American tune. 1112 On August 17, Afif al-Bizri, allegedly a 
communist sympathizer, became Chief of Staff of the Syrian army and 
a number of officers were purged. News of these events heightened 
tensions in Washington. The State Department concluded that a 
serious Soviet attempt was underway to take over Syria. "The great 
question Mr. Dulles and other leaders of Western diplomacy will face 
this week," commented the New York Times, "will be wht~ther the United 
States and Syria's pro-Western neighbors can tolerate a Soviet satel­
lite ••• in the heart of the Middle East.,,3 
But Syria's friendship with the Soviet Union was only the 
natural outcome of normal aud mutually beneficial relations with 
a powerful friend that extended help without conditions--the type 
of help sought by the neutralist-nationalist forces in the Arab 
lNew York Times, August 14, 1957. 

2Hopkins, Egypt, the Crucible, p. 206. 

3New York Times, August 18, 1957. 
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world. 1 The dismissal of the P~erican diplomats was preceded by 
charges which cannot be dismissed as fabrications. The trials which 
fOLlowed revealed the facts. What actua1!y fOiled the plot was the 
fact that the Syrian army officers, with whom American offic:i.a1s 
had clandestine contacts, were loyal to the regime. They immediately 
reported the subject, content and intent of those contacts. It 
was revealed later that the former Syrian dictator Adib a1-Shishak1i 
and retired Colonel Ibrahim a1-Husayni made clandestine trips to 
Beirut where they met the conspirators, including some leaders of 
the Syrian National Social Party.2 
Evidently the United States government and its Middle Eastern 
friends were quite anxious to replace the leftist regime in Syria 
at any cost and by any method that gave any hope of succeeding. 
It is important to note that the forces which the United States 
was trying to overthrow were not communist but progressive national 
forces, which she suspected as either being communist or communist 
collaborators. Even the appointment of Afif a1-Bizri as Chief of 
Staff of the Syrian army should not have caused panic in Washington. 
Colonel Hamid a1-Sarraj, Syria's strongman at the time, told Patrick 
Seale in Cairo on January 27, 1961, 
Bizri's appointment had nothing to do with his supposed 

communist leanings (which in any case only emerged later) 

not with Kha1id a1-Azm's visit3 to Moscow. It was simply 

1Torrey, Syrian Politics and the Military, pp. 338-42. 

2Ibid ., pp. 360-61. 

3The visit during which an economic and technical agreeme'nt 

was concluded with the Soviet Union. 
I
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that we had demanded from Nizam al-Din1 the dismissal 
of a number of senior officers implicated in Ibrahim 
al-Husayni's attempted coup. Nizam aI-Din refused. We 
then engineered his dismissal and his replacement by 
Bizri w~o seemed a non-contr~versial figure; he had no 
personal following in the army and was connected with 
none of the major factions then feuding inside the 
general staff. His appointment was therefore acceptable
2to everyone.
Though unwarranted, Washington's alarm caused Secretary 
~~lles to conduct crisis talks with President Eisenhower, with his 
advisers, and with the British Ambassador in Washington. At the 
close of these talks, Dulles concluded that there was nothing, short 
of force, that the United States could do to alter the situation in 
Syria. Syria's neighbcrs were asked to help determiue policy in 
dealing with her. America's efforts were aimed at isolating Syria 
and en,couraging "all anti-communist countries in the Middle East 
to use what pressure they can to restrain" her. 3 
Syria's Minister {·f Defense Khalid al-Azm, though bitter 
about the attitude of the United States and her Middle Eastern 
friends, declared that Syria's foreign policy would continue to 
be that of "positive neutrality"; but, he warned, "we are at the 
outer edge of that policy; do not force us to go beyond it.,,4 
V. LOY HENDERSON'S MISSION 
The United States, however, was determined. so it seems, 
lThen Chief of Staff of the Syrian army. 

2Sarraj to Seale, in Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 295. 

3New York Times, August 22, 1957. 
---~-.;..;;;,. 
4Quoted in Seale, Struggle for Syria, pp. 295··96. 
.... 
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to do away with Syria's leftist regime despite Syria's claims of 
neutrality. On August 22, Deputy Under Secretary of State Loy 
Henderson, a leading expert on the Middle East, was sent on a mission 
to the area. His stops in Ankara and Beirut resurrected memories 
of the events which led to the fall of Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh in 
Iran in 1953. On his first stop at Ankara, Henderson conferred 
with Adnan Menderes, the Turkish Prime Minister, with King Faysal 
of Iraq, and with King Hussein of Jordan. In Beirut, he met 
President Chamoun. Back in Ankara, he conducted fu'rther discussions 
with Menderes, Crown Prine Abdul Ilah of Iraq and his army's Chief 
of Staff. 
Henderson's trip made Syria and Egypt suspicious and drew 
bitter attacks from them and the Soviet Union. He was accused by 
the three capitals of preparing to directly intervene in Syria 
through his expertise in staging coups d'etat. While Henderson 
was still in the area, a New York ~~~ correspondent sent the 
following dispatch from Damascus: 
There is no sign either in Egypt or in Syria that the 
Soviet bloc, with its technical, economic, military and 
cultural missions, is trying to Sovietize these two coun­
tries or to stir up a classic Marxist revolution. What 
the Soviet Union has found are two friendly Arab countries 
who are willing to help block Western efforts •••• 
So far as it is known, there are no card-carrying communists 
among the officers of the Syrian armed forces. l 
In his first report to the State Department on September 5, 
Henderson described the situation as very serious. He reflected 
lQuoted in Ibid., pp. 296-97. 
,I 
". ! 
,I'. 
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"deep concern lest Syria should become a victim of interns.tional 
communism and, as such, become a base for further threatening the 
independenc~ and integrity of th~ region. lfl On September 7, Secre­
tary Dulles issued a statement, after meeting with Mr. Henderson 
and President Eisenhower, in which he said, "There was particular 
concern over border incidents and intensive propaganda and subversive 
activities directed toward the overthrow of the duly constituted 
governments of Syria's Arab neighbors. ,,2 Secretary Dulles added 
that President Eisenhower 
affirmed his intention to carry out the national policy, 
expressed in the congressional Middle East resolution which 
had been adopted, and exercise as needed the authority 
thereby conferred on the President. In this connection, 
the President authorized the accelerated delivery to the 
countries of the area of economic alld other defensive items 
which have been programmed for their use.3 
It should be remembered that Henderson's report was influenced 
by pro-Western states in the Middle East, which had no loye for 
either Nasser or Syria or for their progressive national and neutralist 
policies. The report, therefore, was bound to be one-sided. But 
apparently Secretary Dulles heard what he wanted to hear. A program 
to strengthen the defenses of Syria's neighbors began as early as 
September 5. An airlift of arms to Jordan was announced; reinforce­
menta were sent to Iraq and Lebanon; and Turkey concentrated her 
troops along the Syrian frontiers with American officers present.4 
lCurrent Documents, p. 1037. 
2U•S., Department of State, Bulletin, XXXVII (September 23, 
1957), 487. 
3Ibid • 
~olte and Polk, "'roward a Policy for the Middle East," 646-47. 
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All these measures were being taken while Syria was known 
to possess neither the capability to attack any of her neighbors, 
nor the desire to do so. Her policy was a purely defensive one. 
In fact, she 'vas in a state of fear as to what might happen to her 
and worried about the possibility of not being able to defend herself 
in case she was attacked. Trenches were being dug everywhere in 
Syria--an activity that President Quwatli took part in. 
During a news conference in Moscow on September 10, Soviet 
Foreign Minister Andre Gromyko said to Soviet and foreign corres­
pondents, 
It goes without saying that the fabrications about 

some sort qf complicity on the part of the Soviet Union 

in the Syrian events were needed to divert public atten­

tion from the aggressive actions of the United Stateslin 

the Near and Middle East, particularly against Syria. 

Mr. Gromyko went on to say that, if the United States truly believes 
that Syria intends to attack her neighbors, the United States should 
take the matter to the United Nations. But because the accusations 
were not true, the U.S. government had not appealed to the United 
Nations. In fact, the accusations were so incredible that one is 
likely to suspect that neither Dulles nor Eisenhower believed them. 
Turkey had an army of half a million men, superbly trained and 
equipped and proven in Korea; while Syria had a tiny army, ill-
equipped, poorly trained, and lacking in experience. That is why 
the Soviet Union, in a note sent to Turkey on September 11, stated 
that 
lCurrent Documents, 1957, p. 1039. 
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no one can take seriously the biased assertions now 
being circulated that Syria is a threat to the security 
of this or that state in the Middle East. We think 
even those who resort to such assertions scarcely believe 
them the~se1ves.l 
The same note contained a warning to the Prime Minister of Turkey. 
It said, 
We shall not conceal the fact that we have met with 
great concern the report about Turkish troop concen­
trations on Syria's borders, as well as about the ship­
ments of Americanal~s to TULkey to effect an attack 
against Syria. • • • We are confident, Mr. Prime 
Minister, you will agree that the Soviet Union cannot 
remain indifferent to these events. 2 
America's fear of communism made her overlook .local Arab 
tensions. According to H.A.R. Philby, "the United States Govern­
ment ignored the many warnings that must have reached it, not least 
from its own trusted officials in the area.,,3 The United States's 
anti-Syria attitude and actions got her involved in a long-standing 
Baghdad-Cairo rivalry for the control of Syria. Washington's policy, 
whether intentionally or not, was clearly in favor of Iraq's long-
cherished dream of winning control over Syria--the key to any degree 
of success in Arab leadership. The rulers of Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, 
and Saudi Arabia knew that the communist danger in Syria was not 
serious. But they also happened to agree then, mainly through an 
effort on their part to rally Arab support for the Eisenhower 
Doctrine and for their general opposition to Nasser, that a favorable 
lIbid., pp. 1042-43. 

2Ibid., p. 1042. 

3H.A.R. Philby, "Nasser and the West,U Middl~ East Forum, XXXIV 

(April, 1.959), 40. 
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change of regime in Syria was essential to the success of their 
pro-West policies. 
It is in this context that some of them, at least, were willing 
to see Hellderson's plan for military action a.gainst Syria come 
through. The trials following the Qasim revolution in Iraq revealed 
most of what lleeds to be known. The documents produced during those 
trials gave evidence of the unconventional methods contemplated by 
Henderson and those he met in Ankara. l In his confession staten~nt, 
Rafiq Arif, the former Chief of Staff of the Iraqi army, said that 
Loy Henderson told the Turkish and Arab officials he met in Turkey, 
If armed action is taken, reasons should be devised before­
hand to make it possible to defend such action in the United 
Nations. • •• The case should also be put in such a way as 
to reassure the other Arab states that this is not a war 
against Syria but action against a (treacherous?) state of 
affairs, and that communism is opposed to Islam as well as 
to Christianity.2 
Professor George Kirk argues that with the Syrian situation 
as it was, the American government's fears were justified, and that 
Mr. Henderson and the "statesmen conferring with him in Turkey had 
discussed what action they might take against Syria in certain 
eventualities.,,3 But that is all that is being claimed. It is 
sufficient to know that the United States government considered the 
situation in Syria serious enough to plan for military action 
against her and to carry it out when the circumstances demanded it. 
1I bid. 

2Quoted in Seale, Struggle for Syria, p. 299. 

3George Kirk, "The Syrian Crisis of 19S7--Fact and Fiction," 

]nternational Affairs (London), XXXVI (January, 1960), 60. 
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VI. THE SMELL OF DEFEAT 
It did not take long for Syria's Arab neighbors to decide to 
reconsider their stand, however, as public censure began to expose 
their complicity, and as their fear of losing power paralyzed them. 
But as Turkey's forces remained poised at the Syrian frontiers, it 
became evident that she was the only Middle Eastern power that was 
still willing to play the Washington war game. Arab nationalists 
everywhere bitterly attacked the United States and Turkey. On 
September 13, the Soviet Union sent Turkey another warning. Premier 
Bulganin accused her of being an instrument in Washington's hands, 
ready and willing to fulfill the American intention of overthrowing 
Syria's government. A conflict with Syria would "not be limited 
to that area alone,,,l Bulganin warned. 
At the United Nations, Secretary Dulles restated his fears, 
on September 19, "that Turkey now faces growing military dangers 
from the major buildup of Soviet arms in Syria on its southern 
border.,,2 He was followed on September 20 by Soviet Foreign Minister 
Andre Gromyko, who declared that the Soviet Union "cannot remain 
indifferent and observe from afar the attempts that are being made 
to turn the Near and Middle East into a permanent hotbed of armed 
conflict."3 To give force to Grornyko1s words, two Soviet warships 
INew York Times, September 14, 1957. 

2U•S., Department of State, Bulletin, XXXVII (October 7, 1957), 558. 

3New York Times, September 21, 1957. 
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arrived at the Syrian port of Latakiya the following day. 
Like Du11es~ Henderson~ evidently, did not show an interest in 
seeking facts but a confirmatior of a conviction that Syria was going 
communist. Neither the U.S. government nor its emissary made any 
direct approach to the Syrian government in an effort to find out 
the reasons for the position taken by Syria, and as to how well-
founded were the accusations leveled against her. This lack of 
openmindedness on the part of the U.S. government gave Russia the 
opportunity to come to Syria's defense and to gain greater support 
and respect among Arab progressive elements. Russia's notes to 
Western powers, calling for a joint declaration renouncing the use 
of force in the Middle East,l gave public proof of her declared 
policy of peaceful co-existence and the prevention of war. 
Moreover, the position of Syria's government was strengthened 
rather than weakened. ?ressure on Syria served neither the interests 
of pro-West Arab states nor the interests of the United States. 
Lebanon, Jordan~ Iraq~ and Saudi Arabia were finding it increasingly 
difficult, even embarrassing, to identify with U.S. policy. Their 
vulnerability to nationalist opposition forces was becoming danger­
ously alarming. The discovery of the plot against Syria in August 
multiplied their troubles as they were discovered to be in the 
conspiratorial camp of Syria's enemies. Public censure and rattona1 
judgment forced them to moderate their views and to urge the United 
States to do so. Those states "mindful of Nasser's prestige and of 
lCurrent Documents~ 1957~ pp. 761-70. Russia's proposals were 
repeatedly rejected by the West. 
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the unpopularity of American policy with many of their own subjects," 
says Malcolm Kerr, "got cold feet and disavowed any intention to 
join in pressure on Syria."l ()p a visit to Syria, King Saud issued 
a statement on September 27 in Damascus before his return to his 
kingdom, saying, 
On this occasion, I would like to declare without obscurity 
and ambiguity and with the sincerity for which I am known 
by my Syrian brethren in particular and the Arabs in general 
that I denounce any aggression against Syria and against any 
other Arab country from wherever it comes. I shall resist 
with my Syrian brethren and the Arabs any aggression committed 
against them and against their independence whatever its 
source may be. I do not think any Arab will sink so low 
as to harm any other Arab. 2 
Speaking for Saudi Arabia at the United Nations General Assembly 
on October 2, Ahmad al-Shukairy declared, 
The affairs of Syria are for Syria. • • • Who is in 
power, who is not in power, is the concern of Syria, 
and Syria alone. We are not here to deal with the change 
of governments. This domestic realm of internal affairs 
must remain immune, for it has been declared immune in 
the lUnited Nation2,7 Charter. 
Shukairy affirmed that IISaudi Arabia shall stand by Syria. in the 
defense of her sovereignty and independence • • • l~nd shall resis!! 
any attempt to interfere in the affairs of Syria.,,3 
Sounding as criticism of U.S. policy, President Eisenhower 
replied to al-Shukairy's statement the following day during a press 
conference. "I do not know," he said, 
lKerr, "Coming to Terms with Nasser," 73. 

2Curren~ Documents, 1957, p. 1044. 

3Ibid • 
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what particular thing inspired the speech of yesterday•••• 
I do know this: Only within, almost hours, I received from 
the King of Saudi Arabia a message of warm friendship, expres­
sing satisfaction in the things we have been able to accomplish 
through cooperation • • • and the hope this friendship would 
lcontinue to grow. 
The President, however, conceded that the situation in Syria appeared 
to be solidifying somewhat, and 
The original alarm of countries like Lebanon, Jordan, and 
Iraq~ and to some extent Saudi Arabia, seems to have been 
quieted by what they have learned. • • • Just what grounds 
they have for that, I don't know, but I just can say this: 
We have tried our best to b~friends with every nation in 
the area. 2 
But had the United States government really tried to do so? 
If it had, she surely had not succeeded. Instead, Washington had 
to back down and gained only discredit as its Arab friends declared 
their support for Syria. The United States and Turkey were left 
alone to bear the brunt of the blame, and to appear as the only 
nations determined to take action against Syria. 
Egypt's and Syria's victory was Russia's victory too. The 
launching of the first Sputnik of October 4 made Russia's victory 
all the more glamorous, and lent weight to her determination to 
defend Syria. To the Arabs, Russia had demonstrated her ability 
and determination to defend her friends. 
King Saud's instant success and surge in popularity should 
have given a clue to the United States as to what would be a popular 
policy to follow in the Arab world. By edging away from Washington. 
lIbid., pp. 1044-45. 

2Ibid. 
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achievement, as far as modern Arab history is concerned~ and a 
tremendous push forward for their aims of fulfilled nationalism 
anJ Arab unity. 
Soon after, the only subscriber to the Eisenhower Doctrine, 
Lebanon, found herself in the throes of a crisis aggravated by 
President Chamoun's acceptance of the Doctrine. President Chamoun's 
espousal of the Eisenhower Doctrine, as well as his refusal to sever 
relations with Britain and France following the Suez crisis, had 
angered strong Arab nationalists in Lebanon. l The opposition accused 
Chamoun of having compromised their country's neutrality by leaning 
too far toward the West. 
Lebanon's half-Muslim, half-Christian population lived in 
relative peace and stability under the "National Pact" of 1943. 
The Pact brought the two groups together when the Muslims agreed 
to give up their goal of union with the overwhelmingly Muslim Syria 
and the Christians agreed to sever their political ties with the 
West. This balance was disturbed when President Chamoun decided 
to endorse the Eisenhower Doctrine. 2 Under the existing political 
setup, "no government is at all possible in Lebanon," says Michael 
Adams, 
lRobert McClintock, "The American Landing in Lebanon: Summer 
of 1958,11 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXXVIII (October, 1962), 
pp. 199-200; Michael Adams, "The Frustrated Civil War," The Reporter, 
XIX (August 7, 1958), 17. For a detailed analysis of the causes of 
the crisis, see Fahim Issa Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: 
Midd1£ East Institute, 1961), pp. 30-47. 
2Kamal Suleiman SaHbi, The Modern History of L~ba'C!Q!! (New York: 
Praeger, 1965), pp. 187-200. 
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unless it enjoys at least the tolerance of What are in effect 
powerful feudal chieftains. President Camille Chamoun's 
mistake was first to embark on a foreign policy (pro-American 
atld anti-Arab nationalist) bound to antagonize the Mos1im 
section of the population, and then to provoke the enmity, 
not of one or two of these local leaders but of all of them, 
by so managing the general elections of June, 1957, as to 
exclude from the chamber of deputies almost every important 
opposition figure. 1 
The tense situation in Lebanon found occasion to explode when 
on May 8 Nasib al-Matni, editor of a1-Te1egraph newspaper, was assass­
inated in Beirut. By May 10, Tripoli was on general strike. Dis­
order and street clashes spread to Beirut and other cities. The 
declared reason for the civil disturbances was the supposed intention 
of President Chamoun to run for a second term. 2 
On May 17, the Department of State issued a statement outlining 
the conditions under which the United States armed forces might be 
sent to Lebanon. The statement said that the government of Lebanon 
had not as yet asked for American military assistance, and that 
American property and lives were not in danger yet. 3 In reply to 
questions during a press conference on May 20, Secretary of State 
Dulles said the.t there were several provisions under the Eisenhower 
Doctrine for the use of force in Lebanon. There was the provision 
to help preserve the independence of nations, especially when their 
lAdam:s, "The Frustrated Civil War," 17. 
2Sa1ibi, Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 200-201; Qubain, Crisis 
.!n Lebanon, pp. 49-51, 65-87. An amendment of the Lebanese constitution 
was required because continuing in office for a second term would be 
contrary to its provisions. 
3Current Documents, 1958 {Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1962f:" pp. 937-38.-­
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independence is considered vital to world peace and American national 
interests. There was also the provision to use force in support of 
DAtions uncier attack from communist-controlled countries. And there 
is the basic right for the United States to protect American lives 
and property.l 
VIII. THE CASE BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS 
When Chamoun's government discovered that the opposition leaders 
were dra,nng on sources in Syria and Egypt for support, it lodged a. 
complaint on May 22 before the United Nations Security Council 
charging the United Arab Republic with interference in Lebanon's 
internal affairs. 2 Lebanon's complaint was not considered by the 
Security Council, however, until June 6, to allow the Arab League 
time to consider another Lebanese complaint to it. The failure 
of the Arab League to solve the problem left it for the Security 
Council to settle. During its first meeting, the United States 
representative said that the evidence of outside interference supplied 
by Lebanon was "very impressive" and urged "all concerned • • • to 
maintain respect for the independence and the integrity of Lebanon 
and to prevent any actions and developments inconsistent with this 
objective.,,3 
On June 10, the U.S. represent3tive at the United Nations, 
lIbid., pp. 938-39. 

2Ibid., p. 940. 

3Ibid., p. 941. 
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Henry Cabot Lodge, reaffirmed his government's conviction that the 
evidence of interference by the United Arab Republic was conclusive 
and declared, "Thel"e should be no doubt of the firm detennination 
of the United States to continue to support the integrity and 
independence of that country."l In answer to Soviet criticism of 
u.s. policy through the Soviet representative at the United Nations, 
Lodge added, 
The Soviet strictures against the United States are so 
standardized that it would be a waste of time to demonstrate 
their absurdity. And this is one night, Mr. President, in 
our history, when we must not waste time. Yet instead of 
joining forces with us to do something quick and helpful the 
Soviet representative seems to be looking for reasons not to I i. 
!do something. 2 
After five days of debate, the United Nations Security Council 
adopted a resolution of June 11 to dispatch a U.N. observation group 
to Lebanon. 3 On July 1, Secretary Dulles outlined the prerequisites 
for direct American military assistance to Lebanon. "We do believe," 
he said, 
tDa~ the presence in Leb~non oi foreign troops • • • 

Li~1 justifiable • • • lbut i~1 is not as good a 

solution as for the Lebanese to find a solution them­

selves. It would be ••• a sort of measure of last 

resort. 4 

In its report of July 3, the U.N. observation group reported 

lIbid., p. 943. 

2Ibid., p. 944. 

3Text of resolution, in U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, 

XXXIX (July 14, 1958), 90. 
4Current Documents, 1958, p. 952. 
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difficulty in the observation of the Lebanese-Syrian borders due to 
the fact that most of the border areas were not under the control of 
the Lebanese government, that the rebels had not "formally anu 
implicitly recognized" the group's right to observe, and that the 
nature of the terrain made the task more difficult. In cities, 
observation was not possible except by previous arrangement. It 
was, therefore, not possible to determine, the group reported, 
whether arms and men "had infiltrated from outside; there is little 
doubt, however, that the vast majority was in any case composed of 
Lebanese. ,,1 Besides, the American A:nbassador in Beirut, Robert 
McClintock, had to tell President Chamoun that "evidence of U.A.R. 
interference was far from conclusive."2 
IX. THE LANDING OF U. S. MARINES 
But President Chamoun was counting on Americall help, when 
it was deemed necessary, under the terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine. 
'According to Miles Copeland, there was sufficient reason to believe 
that a compromise settlement would have been worked out had it not 
been for President Chamoun's refusal to cooperate and for the, 
July 14 coup in Iraq. In fact President Eisenhower confirmed this 
view by saying, "In early July it appeared that the Lebanon crisis 
would pass without Western military assistance.,,3 The main reason 
lIbid., pp. 952-58. 

2Cope1and, The Game of Nations (New York), pp. 238-39. 

3Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961, p. 269. 
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for Chamoun's refusal, says Copeland, was his belief that American 
help would be forthcoming on demand. l Chamoun is reported to 
have told Alllbassador McClintock chat the United States "must either 
promise to support him or else watch his and every other pro-Western 
regime in the Middle East, including Iraq and Jordan, fall like 
ninepins to the Egyptian."2 The Ambassador, in turn, cabled Washington 
urging measures to enhance involved American prestige in Lebanon and 
to "be prepared either to support the current regime in resisting 
subversion or to cut its losses and learn to live with a great Arab 
nation presided over by Nasser."3 
Charles Thayer contends that Secretary Dulles's June statement 
that "if the United Nations ~yas unable to protect the legitimate 
government of the Lebanon, the United States would undertake to do 
so ••• by force if necessary," was taken to mean that Chamoun was 
issued a "blank check" hy Washington which he could "cash" anytime 
it became necessary. "Just who was to define 'necessary'," says 
Charles Thayer, "was not clear but President Chamoun at least assumed 
that this was his prerogative." In fact, Chamoun, more than once, 
tried to get the United States to intervene on his behalf before she 
finally did immediately following the July 14 Revolution in Iraq.,,4 
lIbid., p. 236; see also, Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961, 
p. 268. 
2Charles Wheeler Thayer, Diplomat (New York: Harper, 1959), 
p. 8. 
3Ibid • 
4Ibid., p. 24. 
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The surprise coup in Iraq, while the Lebanese civil war was 
still smoldering, put the Eisenhower administration on the spot and 
faced it with what appeared to be an inevitable necessity to ~ct to 
salvage some of the crumbling fabric of the Western position in the 
Middle East. President Chamoun immediately requested American 
troops. Ambassador McClintock assured him that they "would arrive 
within forty-eight hours--not realizing,H says Miles Copeland, 
that the fleet was only a day away. The fleet arrived in 
less than twenty-four hours, to unload wave after wave of 
grim-faced Marines, rifles poised for action, to be greeted 
by startled bathers sunning themselves on Beirut's beautiful 
beaches and hordes of little boys selling chewing gum. l 
Miles Copeland asserts that the CIA had information of U.A.R.­
planned and backed coups against Nuri a1-Said, King Hussein and 
Chamoun. Ambassador McClintock affirms that "Washington had very 
reliable information that ••• a coup d'etat had been scheduled 
against King Hussein of Jordan for 17 July. ,,2 McC1in"l:ock concludes, 
therefore, that the American landing in Lebanon and the British 
airlift to Jordan 
were undoubtedly decisive in preventing the ~p1ng out 

of the Lebanese and Jordanian governments by force in 

a manner similar to that of the Iraqi government in 

Baghdad. In consequence, it can be fairly said that 

this limited use of force was successful in achieving 

the political objective, which was to niaintain peace in 

the Middle East and to show the world generally that 

the United States and Great Britain, with the support 

lCope1and, The G~ of Nations (New York), p. 239. 
2Z.lcClintock, "American Landing in Lebanon," 69. 
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of their allies, were ready to go to great effort and 

risk to assist small, free, friendly nations to maintain 

their integrity and independence. l 

Rober~ Murphy, President Eisenhower's emissary to the Middle 
East following the Qasim coup in Iraq, says that the President wanted 
to show that the United States was not afraid of the Soviet Union 
and that she was capable of more than just wores. The "military 
action,1I says Murphy, "undertaken Rt the expressed desire of the 
constitutional head of the Republic of Lebanon, was based on the 
traditional American policy of protecting our citizens ana defending 
our national interests." Murphy adds that President Eisenhower 
expressed the belief 
that if the United States did nothing now, there would 

be heavy and irreparable losses in Lebanon and in the 

area generally. He wanted to demonstrate in a timely 

and practical way that the United States was capable of 

supporting its friends. 2 

According to Ambassador McClintock, the landing of U.S. Marines 
in Lebanon achieved four things: (1) Lebanon's integrity and 
independence were maintained; (2) the United States, by intervening, 
proved to the whole world that she was ready to defend her friends 
be they big or small; (3) the presence of the Marines helped cut 
short the process of reconstruction and prevented the crisis from 
continuing; (4) "American int(;'!rvention in Lebanon destroyed the myth 
in Arab eyes of Soviet invinsibility. ,,3 
lIbid., 74. 

2Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 389. 

3McClintock, "American Landing in Lebanon," 77. 
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x. FACT AND FICTION 
The decision to land the Marines in Lebanon and to back a 
British troop airlift to Jordan won solid popular approval in the 
United States. But this general support lasted only for the duration 
of the crisis. The shortcomings and failures of U.S. policy in the 
Middle East were becoming obvious, and the Democrats were determined 
to press for a review of it once the crisis was over. Some Pentagon 
officials complained that the repeated failures were a result of 
America's unwillingness to allow Britain, France, and Israel to 
bring an end to the Nasser menace in 1956. Senator William 
Fulbright, displaying more thoughtfulness, reasoned, "We have never 
made the fundamental policy decision as to whether Arab nationalism-­
epitomized ill Nasser--was a force with which we should try to work, 
or a force we should oppose."l 
Mr. Dulles seems to ha'le had the conviction that the military 
intervention in Lebanon was necessary to safeguard the integrity 
and independence of small nations in Asia and Africa. Those nations, 
it was thought, were reassured by the swift American action in the 
Middle East--a public and practical demonstration of U.S. readiness 
to support her allies everywhere. It, however, soon became evident, 
even to Secretary Dulles, that the landing of the Marines in Lebanon 
was not about to solve America's problems in the Middle East, or in 
other parts of the world. The immediate and pressing task of the 
IQuoted in liThe Eisenhower Doctrine: Beginnings of a Middle 
East Policy," 358-59. 
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Eisenhower administration became the withdrawal of those Marines 
without too much embarrassment and loss of face. 
The aggressions that Nasser and Moscow were blamed for \,are 
found to be not so easy to identify and separate. Blaming Nasser 
and Moscow for America's problems in the Middle East is "an over­
simplification," Round Tabl~ commented, "Senator Fulbright reasons 
that what is happening is not the loss of the area to communism but 
its gradual hand-over to Arab nationalism. ,,1 
Moreover, what was thought to be a Nasser-inspired coup in 
Iraq, turned out to be a surprise even to him. On an exploratory 
trip to Iraq, Robert Murphy met Abd aI-Karim Qasim. Murphy reported 
that Qasim's justification of the coup was "that only by such un­
conventional means was it possible for the impoverished people of 
Iraq to get rid of their corrupt royal regime. "Kassim," Murphy 
added, "stressed the purely domestic character of the revolution, 
which he said had been organized for national rather than ideological 
. reasons." To !Iurphy I s question about Russian influence in Iraq, 
Qasim assured him "that he had not risked revolution for the purpose 
of handing Iraq to the Soviet Union • • • LOEI in order to make 
Iraq subservient to Egypt.,,2 
In this connection, it is significant to note that Russia was 
not less surprised at what took place in Iraq than Nasser. Muhammad H. 
Haykal reports that Nasser first heard of the Qasim coup over BBC 
1Ibid., p. 359. 

2Murphy , Diplomat Among Warriors, pp. 413-14. 
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radio while at Brioni with Marshal Tito. Upon hearing the news of 
the coup and of the landing of the Marines in Lebanon, Nasser made 
up ~is mind to go to Moscow instead of following his earlier plan of 
returning to Cairo. He arrived in Moscow on July 17 with the intention 
of finding out what the Soviets were prepared to do in the Middle 
East in the light of those developments. Khrushchev first gave 
Nasser the impression that he was finding it difficult to formulate 
a policy because events were occurring in qUick succession. l 
But Khrushchev soon was able to tell Nasser that the Soviet 
Union was not ready to face the United States because she was not 
prepared for a third world war. When Nasser said that he was going 
to fight if Syria were attacked, Khrushchev advised that he should 
bend with the storm. "Dulles thinks himself a minister of the gospel,1I 
said Khrushchev, "but though I am an athiest, I am nearer to God 
than he is because he has no heart." Nasser pleaded with him to 
issue a warning like the one Russia issued during the Suez crisis, 
so possible Western action against Iraq or Syria could be prevented. 
Khrushchev refused on the grounds that he did not want to do anything 
that might lead to war. All he was ready to do was to conduct 
military maneuvers along the Bulgarian-Turkish borders. IIThis is 
only a maneuver;" Khrushchev reminded his guest, "I beg you Mr. Presi­
dent to remember that it is nothing more than a maneuver.,,2 Nasser 
lal-Ahram (Cairo), October 15, 1971. 
2Ibid.; this agrees with Dulles's assessment of the Soviet 
position immediately preceding the landing in Lebanon; see Eis~nhower, 
'HfWaging Peace, 1956-1961, p. 271. 
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should have remembered that, during the Suez crisis, both Russia 
and the United States were united in their opposition to the use of 
force in Egypt. 
About Qasim, Khrushchev says that he could see he "represented 
the progressive forces of Iraq. We already had some information on 
Kassem. He had had sporadic contacts with communists and called 
himself a communist." He adds, 
We could tell from Nasser's reaction ••• that the news 
came as a complete surprise to him. • •• Shortly before 
the coup in Iraq, Egypt and Syria had formed the United Arab 
Republic, and Nasser nourished the hope that the new Iraqi 
government would fall into line with the policies of Egypt. 
This was a completely understandable desire, but as it 
turned out, neither Nasser's hopes nor our information about 
Kassem were borne out. Kassem turned out to be highly un­
stable politically.l 
Arab reaction to the landing of the Marines in Lebanon was 
generally hostile. Arab nationalists attacked the action and 
denounced it as armed aggression. The British landing in Jordan 
met with stronger resentment because British planes flew over Israeli 
territory to get to Jordan.2 In Lebanon, several of Chamoun's 
supporters turned against him when he called the Marines. 3 The 
Wall Street Journal reported that the Speaker of the Lebanese House 
of Parliament, Adil Osayran, who until the landing "was a supporter 
of President Chamoun and his harassed government, calls the U.S. 
landing 'an act of aggression.' His sentiment is echoed by other 
IKhrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, p. 438. 

2a l-Ahram (Cairo), October 15, 1971. 

3New York Times, July 18, 1958.
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politicians who had been counted in the pro-Western camp."l 
The Lebanese crisis and the Iraqi Revolution of 1958 demons­
tr_.ted that an alliance of two Arab natiolls with the West "in 
defiance of the others cannot be regarded as a working defense 
arrangement against the Soviet bloc."2 As it was expected, Chamoun's 
government was replaced by one dominated by the opposition. General 
Shihab, the Chief of Staff, who refused to use the Lebanese army 
against the opposition, became President, and Rashid Karami, the 
opposition leader in Tripoli, became Prime Minister.3 
XI. NEW REALITIES 
The 1958 chain of events, which followed a series of failures 
suffered by the West in the Middle East, forced upon the United 
States the realization that her approach to Middle Eastern problems 
was not working. Foremost among her objectives in the Middle East 
was the preservation of the status guo for the protection and 
promotion of American and Western interests. This objective was 
sought first through an unsuccessful bid to bind the area's states 
in a regional defense system. When this objective met with Egypt's 
lWall Street Journal, July 22, 1958; see also, Eisenhower, 
Waging ~, 1956-1961, pp. 280-81. 
2Majid Khadduri, "American !'oreign Policy in the Middle East," 
S.A.I.S. Review, V (Spring, 1966), 22. 
3Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon, pp. 154-56; it is significant to 
note that these were the two individuals Nasser suggested, and for 
the same positions, when in June he was approached about a compromise 
solution in Lebanon; see Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York), 
p. 237; see also, Eisenhower, WaginB Peace, 1956-1961, p. 268. 
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and Syri.a I s strong resistance, the United States and the West sought 
an alliance that would draw to it those states which wished to join 
in the hope that Egypt could be isolated and her bid for Arab leader­
ship checked. But this alliance, known until 1958 as the Baghdad 
Pact, drew only one Arab state to its ranks. 
The final attempt, differing mainly in the fact that it was a 
purely American initiative, could eventually boast only one Arab 
subscriber, Lebanon. But the very fact that those two states joined 
the respective Western alliances constituted a danger both to their 
regimes and to American and Western interests. "The trouble," says 
Sidney Lens, "as Iraq proves so eloquently, is that military bases 
are no more formidable than the stability of the country in which 
they are built. If a I friendly' regime topples, our bases topple 
with it."l 
The important American discovery in 1958 was th'1.t the long-
held concept of preserving the status guo was a wrong concept and that, 
if the United States were to guard her interests and position in the 
area, she had to undo most of what she had done in the preceding 
decade. Before 1958 came to a close, the Baghdad Pact had to be 
renamed since Baghdad had defected2 and Lebanon's new regime hastened 
to withdraw that country's support of the Eisenhower Doctrine because 
Lebanon's troubles were mainly blamed on the Chamoun government's 
lSidney Lens, "The Dulles Dilemma in the Middle East," The 
ProgreSSive, XXII (September, 1958), 7. 
2It came to be known from then on as the Central Treaty 
Organization. 
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endorsement of it. 
The United States finally realized that her past preoccupations 
wi~h Middle East defense made her overlook the importance of economic 
and technical aid programs, and to see neutrals as enemies, who 
deserved neither aid nor sympathy. Though the United States continued. 
to see the Soviet Union as presenting a serious threat to the Middle 
East, "its ability to use Arab states for its own purposes was down­
graded."l American statesmen were finally convinced that they could 
not go on fighting "both communism and Arab nationalism, and still 
save the Middle East."2 
The Eisenhower Doctrine proved to be a costly experiment. It 
showed the wide gap that separated Arab views from those of America 
on the seriousness of the communist threat. Its net effect was - < 
f:I, l 
disunity, new tensions, new division, and new prob1ems. 3 "This 
whole episode," says Edward Buehrig, "so lamentably lacking in any 
.r~ 
of the arts of diplomacy, has had dubious results for American 
!po1icy.,,4 
Having seen his plans for the Middle East go down in defeat 
and, having watched the prestige of the United States sink to its :'II ..,;; ~ 
all-time low in that area, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles died. 
f 
1Magnus, "Politica1--Strategic Interests," p. 22. 	 I 
r 
I 
2Campbell, "America and the Middle East," 149. 

3Thornburg, People ~nd Policy in the Middle East, p. 31. 

4Edward Buehrig, "The Arab tvor1d and the United States: A I 

Critical Survey of American Policy in the Middle East," Middle 	 -I 
" East Forum, X~~III (July, 1958), 31. ! '
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American diplomats in the Arab countries, "bitter about the Eisenhower 
! . 
Doctrine (which they had almost unanimously opposed), began advocating 
'facing the fact of Nasser' and ~ealizing that the 'Arab world of 1959 
is not that of Lawrence of Arabia. ,"1 Christian Herter took over as 
Secretary of State and the American government began to grope toward 
the reestablishment of friendly ties with the Arab countries. 
It became sufficiently clear that the United States was not 
able to enforce her wishes in the Middle East. A trend, therefore, 
was begun during the last two years of the Eisenhower period to 
emphasize the economic aspects of her aid program and to develop 
a gradual rapprochement with the radical or prograssive Arab countries, 
notably the United Arab Republic. This meant improved relations with 
Nasser, readiness to respect the interests of his new U.A.R. and 
the forces which supported it, and offering constructive help for 
her development. This was an implicit admission of past U.S. failure 
and an acknowledgement of the successes of Nasser and Arab nationalism. 
Under those circumstances, all the United States could hope to 
accomplish was, to a certain extent, channel the tide of Arab national­
ism or deflect it a bit from its course. It became necessary fur the 
United States to realize that the Arabs were to be treated as equals 
and that any attempt to go against the nationalist tide would not be 
accomplished through the deployment of armed force. It was hoped 
that such a policy would dissuade Nasser from capitalizing on Western 
disasters and failures and would help restore a measure of confidence 
lCopelal1d, The Game of Nations (London), p. 220. 
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between the United States and the Arabs. In the words of Malcolm 
Kerr~ 
For the United States it b~came necessary to review her 
cold war requirements and settle on minimally acceptable, 
rather than ideally desirable, goals. Instead of organizing 
Arabs for defense against a Soviet invasion that none feared, 
America had to leave the Arabs' international and domestic politics 
to their own good or bad judgment, and hope that Arab govern­
ments would become sufficiently absorbed in domestic affairs 
to abstain from adventures that might precipitate a renewed 
American Soviet involvement. l 
-
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lKerr, !!'Coming to Terms with Nasser'," 73. 
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CONCLUSION 
The post-War involvement of the United States in the Middle 
East came suddenly and without much preparation. The need to replace 
Bri.tain and France in the Middle East required a reorientation of 
America's post-War plans and policies. As she was thrust upon the 
Middle Eastern stage, the United States faced four major problems. 
The first and most disturbing was a potential Soviet threat to take 
control of the Middle East. The second was the Arab-Israeli conflict 
over Palestine. The third was a contest between her own interests 
and the interests of Britain and France. The fourth was inter-Arab 
rivalry, which threatened to make it difficult for the United States 
to deal with them. In the words of Robert Strausz-Rupe, 
The Middle East has confronted the United States with a 
series of painful dilemmas, essentially moral ones: hO\J 
to reconcile diverse "rights" to national self-determination 
with one another; how to reconcile diverse "rights" of 
national self-determination with the claims of America's 
allies; how to square the United States' obligations to the 
United Nations with the United States' diverse stated posi­
tions vis-a-vis allies, neutrals, and enemies; and finally, 
how to compromise ideals of democracy by condoning, here 
and now, the usually undemocratic practices of weak rulers. l 
The United States wanted and needed Arab oil and friendship, but 
outraged and estranged them by her open-handed support of Zionism. 
~len the United States was given the chan~e to par.ticipate in an Anglo-
American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine, Pres:ident Truman blew 
lStrausz-Rupe, "The United States and the Middle East," 
p. 6. 
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up its carefully prepared "recommendations by puhlically endorsing 
its pro-Zionist sections.,,2 The Arab refugee problem, which was 
ca~3ed by th~ creation of the State of Israel, added to the bitter­
ness toward America and continues to serve as a reminder of what took 
place in Palestine. In Arab eyes, the Palestine policy of the United 
States constituted a betrayal of their interests and rights and a 
negation of American moral principles. This is an issue that Arabs 
fully agree on be they pro or anti-West. 
In Iran and Turkey, American policy was successful because those 
two countries were willing to accept the kind of help the United 
States was ready to give. The policy of containment went through 
its first tests in Iran and Greece. It was successful in the sense 
that what appeared to be a Soviet attempt t~ directly or indirectly, 
take control of those two states was thwarted by a firm American 
stand behind the traditional rulers of Greece and Iran. The status 
quo in both countries was preserved. 
When the United States sought Arab participation and support 
in an effurt to erect a collective anti-communist defense system 
in the Middle East, the Arabs refused to cooperate because they felt 
it not in their best interests to do so. They, like the United 
States in her developmental era, preferred to remain neutral. Besides 
,presenTing their independence and national sovereignty, they, as 
neutrals, could draw on both sources for aid. As a stop-gap arrangement, 
1Fitzsimons, "The Suez Crisis and the Containment Policy," 430. 
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therefore, meant to preserve the status guo and through it the safety 
and security of the State of Israel, the United States joined Britain 
and France in issuing the Tripartite Declaration of 1951 guaranteeing 
Arab-Israeli frontiers and refusing to supply arms to belligerent 
states. This policy worked as long as the Western powers continued 
to be the major suppliers of arms to Middle Eastern states. When the 
Soviets began supplying Syria and Egypt with arms in 1955, however, 
the Western monopoly on the sale of arms in the Middle East was broken 
and the efficacy of the 1951 Tripartite Declaration came to an abrupt 
end. According to M.A. Fitzsimons, "it may be argued that for the 
period 1946-1955, when the Soviet Union was neither conspicuously 
active nor influential in the Middle East, United States policy contrib­
uted little to the solution or easing of the area's all but intractable 
problems."l In fact, her choice to preserve the status guo placed 
her in opposition to rev,Jlutionary change in the Middle East and 
opened the way for the Soviets to pose a serious challenge to America's 
position in the area. 
The newly independent nations of the Middle East badly needed 
economic development and industrialization to help transform their 
backward agrarian societies into modern urban communities, to create 
national power and unity, to help acquire military strength and 
international recognition. A better life for the exploited, bitter 
and resentful masses was earnestly sought along with the attainment 
of a national self-determined existence, free from foreign interference. 
lIbid., 419. 
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In the Arab world, Arab nationalism has been the decisive social 
and political force since the late 1940's. An understanding of its 
goals, desires and fears was essential for the success of rel~cion-
ships between any state and the Arab world. In an effort to reassert 
national pride and dignity, the leaders of this movement sought to 
foster unity, independence, neutrality, social and economic reform, 
liberty and justice. They blamed the ills of their society on the 
West, especially Britain and France. Street demonstrations and anti-
West propaganda were violent expressions of an over-suppressed desire 
and too-long thwarted aspiration for independence and unity. Military 
strength was sought to safeguard their independence and their reform 
programs. 
In the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union 
for the control of the Middle East, the crucial issue was winning the 
allegiance, friendship and good will of the people of the Middle 
East by dealing with them on the basis of a mutually advantageous 
relationship. The United States, maintaining a superiority over 
Russia in economic and military strength, had an excellent fighting 
change. Until 1953, the Soviet Uniun was unattractive under Stalin 
and direct control was preferred before Russian aid was extended. 
Moreover, the post-War Stalin era was a hard one for the Soviets. They 
were busy consolidating their position in eastern Europe and dealing 
with enormous internal problems, not the least were post-War reconstruc­
tion and rehabilitation. Had the nations of the Uiddle East been 
helped by the United States toward economic development, they would have 
I 
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States, however, had to be willing to allow the needed revolutionary 
transformation and the unseating of the feudal ruling classes to 
ef:cct a drastic social and political chmlge in preparation for economic 
development. 
Instead, the cooperation of the United States with the exisUng 
regiMes guaranteed support and backing for the privileged and 
reactionary ruling classes, whose aim was to hold to their privileged 
positions of power and keep the rest of the population in their 
undesirable backwardness and landlessness. When the United States 
eventually established close cooperation with the former colonial 
powers, the worst fears of the people of the Middle East were con­
firmed. Her alliance with reactionary dictators and with colonialism 
made the United States suspect in the eyes of the Area's people. 
America's anti-revolutionary policy was the result of her 
inability to understand the nature and deeper social struggles of 
the people of the Middle East. Americans have not had to go through 
the problems plaguing the nations of the Middle East. They, therefore, 
could not understand them. National socialism was popularly identified 
in the United States with revolutionary communism. American industry 
I' 
and capital have a powerful influence in government and stand to lose 
their investments and cheap raw materials under revolutionary regimes. 
Chester Bowles has observed that many young Arab students come to the 
United States for study. "In our universities," he said, 
they learn about Jefferson and Lincoln and other great men who 
have helped create our democracy. They go horne fired with the 
hope that they can do something for their own people, only to 
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find a deadly entrenched feudalism, often supported political­

ly and economically by American money, diplomacy, and tanks. l 

In an effort to secure the Middle East against Soviet intrusions, 
the containment policy took on the form of a military campaign designed 
to meet what was thought to be a military threat by the Soviet Union. 
Soviet communism was seen as a threat to the American way of life. 
The stiff and unpragmatic Soviet policy under Stalin was met with 
military pacts, alliances and involvements on the part of the United 
States and her allies. American foreign policy supported any anti­
communist regime. Though reactionary and rejected by its own people, 
the fact that it was pro-American and anti-communist gratified such a 
regime in American eyes as "democratic." National movements to over­
throw those regimes were opposed and suppressed. 
i 
To Secretary Dulles, the communist question was a moral one. I, ~,' ~The struggle between "democracy" and communism was a struggle betTN'een I";,:
good and evil. But that is not hO'ti Middle Eastern nationalists 
I
viewed the problem. Despite a significant change in Soviet foreign 
policy following Stalin's death in 1953, the Eisenhower administration 
still sought to achieve the same ends in the Middle East through 
essentially the same means employed by Truman and Acheson, and in 
spite of an impressive record of failure. Washington continued to 
assume that recipients of American aid should automatically become 
friends and allies against Soviet communism. Though vitally important 
in terms of American security, economic aid was often viewed as charity 
lCh€:ster Bowles, IILong-term Issues in the Middle East," 
Academy of Political Science Proceedings, XXVI (May, 1957), 107. 
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or an indication of American generosity. No far-sighted planning 
was worked out to take into consideration long-range American security 
considerations. It is not surprising, therefore, that, by 19~5, 
American influence came close to being nonexistent in the Arab world. 
The new Soviet approach attempted to identify Soviet aims and 
objectives with the goals and aspirations of the Arab nationalists. 
The Soviets were ready to cooperate with any force that opposed the 
West. Their post-1953 foreign policy approach succeeded because, while 
the United States was saying, in Senator Hubert Humphrey's words, "'those 
who are not with us are against us,' ••• the Soviet spokesmen were 
saying, 'those who are not against us are with US.'" Senator Humphrey 
adds that in a conference in Cairo, the Soviet delegate, in presenting 
his country's foreign policy, said, 
We do not ask you to participate in any blocks, reshuffle 

your governments or change your domestic or foreign policy. 

We are ready to help you as brother helps brother~ • • • 

Tell us what you need and we will help you and send, accor­

ding to our economic capabilities. l 

This shift in Soviet foreign policy was not fully understood by 
Washington or, at least, was not successfully combatted. The United 
States did not believe the Soviets could deliver on their promises. 
She continued to insist on concrete and immediate returns and guarantees 
for her aid. Those returns and guarantees included demands that no 
national leader could afford to satisfy without considerable loss in 
power and prestige in the eyes of his own people. Moreover, such 
demands were self-defeating because they tended to und~rmine the 
lHumphrey,"A Chronology of Failure," 11-12. 
.., 
247 

position of the same leaders Washington was trying to work with. 
The Soviets, on the other hand, were content to see nationalist 
leaders achieve their objectives and secure their non-alignmellt with 
the West. Any American attempt to oppose them could only be in Soviet 
favor. To the Arabs, this was a golden "opportunity to better their 
own position and gain a freedom to maneuver they never enjoyed before."l 
According to Walter LaFeber, 
The Secretary of State knew that, as he phrased it, 

"to oppose nationalism is counter-productive," but as late 

as June 1956, his views of communism and an apparent con­

fusion over the meaning of nationalism enabled Dunes to 

say that neutrality had "increasingly become an obsolete 

conception and, except under exceptional circumstances, it 

is an immoral and short-sighted conception."Z 

Sidney Lens observed that, as a statesman, Dulles worked hard 
to draw allies and supporters for American policy. He failed, 
however, because he had a blind spot that prevented "him from f 
I" 
seeing and understanding the nature of the revolution sweeping t 
the underdeveloped areas of the world." Lens contends that a wise 
Dulles would have recognized that neutralists were the greatest 
bulwark against communism and that, through them, the whole developing 
world could have been sealed off against communist intrusion~.3 
Washingtonts insistence that neutralism aided the Soviets and was, 
therefore, anti-American greatly contributed to the deterioration 
of America's position in the Middle East. 
ICampbell, The Middle East in the Muted Cold War, p. 9. 
2Walter LaFeber, ~~erica, Russia and the Cold War, 1956-1966 
(New York: Wiley, 1967), p. 173-.--- - ---­
3Lens, "The Dulles Dilemma in the Middle East," 7. 
t 
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A revolutionary regime has no choice but to maneuver between 
the great powers to free its economy, to industrialize, and to maintain 
he~ independence. The fact that neutralists were considered anti 4 
American made it almost impossible for the United States to differentiate 
between nationalists and communists. When she chose to oppose them, 
the nationalists could not avoid seeing her as an enemy. 
Soviet policy was flexible enough and pragmatic enough to ignore 
the fact that communist parties were suppressed and their members 
persecuted by local regimes and that nationalism and communism did not 
agree on ideology. In contrast, American policy did not even conform 
to the declared "new outlook" of the Eisenhower administration in 
foreign policy, which promised to give special attention to the interests, 
desires, and hopes of the newly independent nations of the world. 
As an extension of this approach, Secretary Dulles declared in the 
spring of 1953, "The United States should seek to allay the deep 
resentment against it that has resulted from the creation of the State 
of Israe1."l The United States made it known that her intention was 
to follow a policy of impartiality as between the Arab states and 
Israel. Unfortunately, however, the United States did not succeed 
in being consistently impartial. Washington's difficulty in following 
a strictly impartial policy in the Arab-Israeli zone waS complicated 
by heavy minority pressures in the United States. By 1958, "a half­
billion dollars of official United States assistance was given to 
1Dulles, "Report on the Near East," 835. 
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Israel, amounting to two or three times the sum contributed to all the 
Arab countries combined, and even private American gifts have been 
gi·'en a quasi-official nature by being mac!e tax excmpt. 1I1 Harold B. 
Minor was prompted to comment, "There has been • • • such a wide gulf 
between policy enunciation and application that we need to examine 
critically the meaning of this word impartiality.,,2 
The American stand on Suez against aggression stands out in 
bold relief as the most positive American act in support of international 
freedom and justice. But the real reasons for this stand were clashing 
Western interests, the American belief that an attack against Egypt 
could not achieve the desired objectives of the United States and 
her allies, and the fear that such an attack could provoke a general 
war. Nevertheless, it was an act that was greatly appreciated by the 
Arabs and gave the smaller nations of the world a new hope that 
justice and liberty can be preserved. The Suez crisis, however, 
unleashed powerful emotional and social forces determined to reshape 
life in the Middle East. This dynamic movement was seen by Washington 
and its allies as a wave of conspiracy and intrigue to be blamed on 
Nasser of Egypt and his supporters in the Arab world. 
The very fact that this was the view from Washington strained 
relations between Arab nationalists and the United States. No one 
can deny that there was intrigue, conspiracy, and subversion, but 
INolte and Polk, "Toward a Policy for the Middle East,U 654. 
2Harcld B. Minor, "Commentary Ion E1ie Salem's Problems of 
Arab Political Behav~oi7," in Philip-Warren Thayer, cd., Tensions in 
the 1'!iddle Ea3t (Ba,ltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), p. 89. 
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Nasser cannot be blamed for all that took place--Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia were not idle. "But the real question was," says Harry 
lJ.c,~kins, IInot whether there was Egyptian 'subversion,' but why that 
'subversion' was so uniquely successful." The answer that·Hopkins 
provides is that Nasser's message expressed what his "listeners had 
long been waiting to hear; it went over the heads of Rulers, sheikhs, 
pashas, muftis, mudirs, omdas, and all their manifold Excellencies, 
and directly addressed the man in the bazaar and the fellah in the 
village."l 
Washington's policy reaction to this post-Suez fever was a 
determination to isolate Egypt and Syria or to bring about a change 
of government, at least in Syria. As the main centers of Arab national­
ist activity, those two countries were not expected to endorse the 
Eisenhower Doctrine--an anti-communist alliance not really meant to 
include them. Instead of isolating Syria and Egypt, Washington's 
policy brought them closer together and to the Soviet Union. The 
Eisenhower Doctrine was endorsed only by Lebanon and, in early 1958, 
Syria and Egypt became one United Arab Republic. 
Before 1958 came to a close, Iraq, the only Arab member of the 
Baghdad Pact, and Lebanon, the only adherent to the Eisenhower 
Doctrine, defected. Arab nationalists had made great gains and the 
Soviet Union was well on her way to achieving her objectives in the 
lUopkins, EgyPt, the Crucible, p. 187. 
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Middle East. The Soviet deliveries of arms to Syria and Egypt, 
which began in 1955, were followed by Soviet economic and technical 
ai~ to both countries and in 1958, the Soviets finally advanced an 
offer to help build the High Aswan Dam for Nasser. In 1959, Egypt 
began to get American aid too, which signified a tacit acceptance of 
Nasser's terms by Washington. This was an acceptance, though reluctant, 
of the facts of Arab nationalism and neutralism as expressed by Nasser. 
Washington was fb~d to recognize that the forces of nationalism were 
capable of undercutting her influence because their desires and hopes 
were the genuine hopes and desires of the people of the Middle East, 
which were neither manufactured by Nasser nor imported from Moscow. 
The Soviets, despite Washington's resolve to contain them, 
had, by 1958, entered the Middle East in full force. The Truman 
Doctrine, the Baghdad Pact, and the Eisenhower Doctrine have failed 
to keep them out. Doris Graber contends that the Truman and Eisen­
hower Doctrines were unnecessary and hard to apply. The former was 
too broad and the latter too narrow. The broadness of the Truman 
Doctrine made it impossible to be fully implemented; the Eisenhower 
Doctrine was limited by the fact that its implementation depended 
on the consent of the Middle Eastern nation in question. Graber 
suggests that 
it would be best to reaffirm the traditional rule--which 

is being applied in practice--that intervention will remain 

a last resort to be used when the United States considers 

itself seriously endangered. 1 

1Graber, liThe Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines," 333. 
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In general, U.S. policy in the Middle East between 1946 and 
1958, was negative in approach; it emphasized military considerations; 
it misinterpreted the nature of the Soviet communist threat; and it 
heavily committed the United States in support of reactionary and 
unworthy regimes. When George Kennan first enunciated the policy of 
containment, he warned that, for it to succeed, the United States 
must cope with her responsibilities as a world power, which "has a 
spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major ideological 
currents of the time. To the extent that such an impression can be 
created and maintained, the aims of Russian Communism must appear 
sterile and quixotic."l Kennan goes on to say that "the United States 
need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself 
worthy of preservation as a great power."2 
By 1958, it became doubtful whether the United States could 
measure up to this standard. A pro-American Iraqi politician, 
Dr. Fadhil al-Jamali, concluded,before 1958, that the United States 
was losing the struggle "for the minds of men.,,3 George Kennan may 
have been right when he said, "it was not 'containment' that failed; 
it was the intended follow up that never occurred.,,4 
lKennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," 581. 

2Ibid., 582. 

3Quot.ed in Castleberry, "The Arabs' View of Post-war American 

Foreign Policy," 25. 
Li-Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," 365. 
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